The influence of language on spatial memory and visual attention by Gudde, Harmen
 The Influence of Language on Spatial Memory and Visual Attention 
 
By 
 
Harmen B. Gudde 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University 
of East Anglia for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any 
information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. 
In addition, any quotation or extract must include full attribution. 
 
 
Research undertaken in the School of Psychology, University of East Anglia. 
May 2017
i 
 
The Influence of Language on Spatial Memory and Visual Attention 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between language and non-linguistic processes. 
The experimental work presented, focusses on the influence of language on two non-
linguistic processes: spatial memory and visual attention.  
In the first series of experiments, the influence of spatial demonstratives 
(this/that) and possessives (my/your) on memory for object location was examined in 
four experiments, using an adapted version of the memory game procedure 
(Coventry et al., 2008, 2014). The experiments were designed to test between 
different models regarding how language affects memory: the Expectation model, 
the Congruence model, and the Attention-allocation model. Over a series of 
experiments, our data supports the Expectation model, which suggests, consistent 
with models of predictive coding (cf., Lupyan & Clark, 2015), that memory for 
object location is a concatenation of the actual location and the expected location. 
The expectation of a location can be elicited by language use (e.g., demonstrative or 
possessive pronouns).  
The second series of experiments examined demonstratives and memory in 
English and Japanese. We chose Japanese, because it purportedly employs a three-
demonstrative system, compared to a binary system as in English (this, that). Three-
way systems can be used to explicitly encode parameters that are not encoded in 
English, for example the position of a conspecific. In four experiments, we wanted to 
test whether a system as different as the Japanese demonstrative system is from 
English, has a similar influence on non-linguistic cognition. To this aim, we had to 
first experimentally establish which parameters are encoded in the Japanese 
demonstrative system. Second, we tested how this three-term demonstrative system 
acted in light of the Expectation model. The idea that Japanese demonstratives 
encode the position of a conspecific, which we confirmed in this study, poses an 
interesting problem for the Expectation model. The Expectation model works via the 
idea of an expected location; but the expected location calculated from a speaker 
gives a contradicting expectation value to the expected location from a hearer. Our 
memory data did not completely support any of the current models. However, 
interestingly, the position effect found in Japanese was also apparent in English. This 
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might suggest that demonstrative pronoun systems, despite the fact that they seem 
different, could be based on universal mechanisms. However, the effects we found 
were stronger in Japanese, suggesting the weight of a parameter (such as position) 
might be influenced by whether or not a language explicitly codes the parameter. 
In the last experiment, we considered the influence of language on visual 
attention. Specifically, we examined if language expressing different spatial frames 
of reference affect how people look at visual scenes. The results showed different 
eye-movement patterns for different frames of reference (i.e., intrinsic vs. relative). 
These eye-movement signatures were consistent with participants’ verbal 
descriptions and persisted throughout the trials. We show for the first time that 
different reference frames, expressed in language, elicit distinguishable eye-
movement patterns. 
The work presented in this thesis shows effects of language on memory for 
object location and visual attention. Effects of language on memory for object 
location were consistent with models of predictive coding. Furthermore, despite the 
fact that English and Japanese employ different demonstrative systems, results for 
both languages were remarkably similar. These results could indicate universal 
parameters underlying demonstrative systems, but perhaps parameters differentially 
weighted, as a function of whether or not they are explicitly encoded in a language. 
Finally, we showed that spatial language (prepositions) guide visual attention. To our 
knowledge this is the first time frames of reference are associated with identifyable 
eye-movement patterns. The results are discussed and situated in current literature, 
with theoretical implications and directions for future research highlighted.  
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Chapter 1 – On the Relation between Language and Non-Linguistic Cognition 
The relationship between language and non-linguistic processes is a 
fundamental topic in cognitive science. The fact that we spend the vast majority of 
our waking time using language marks the importance of this potential relationship: 
if language has an effect on non-linguistic processes, this influence could be very 
persistent. Hitherto, there has been limited consideration regarding the mechanism 
via which language can affect cognition and perception. In this thesis, we use the 
domain of space to explore the relationship between different types of language and 
cognition – specifically spatial memory and visual attention – and tease apart 
mechanisms driving potential influences.  
Space is fundamental in cognition and it can be used as a structuring tool for 
domains such as time, sound, number cognition, emotion, and metaphors in language 
(cf. Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2008). Therefore, space is widely regarded a fundamental building block of 
language and cognition (Bowerman, 1996). At the same time, there is a radical 
diversity in how space is encoded in languages around the world (Evans & Levinson, 
2009). In testing the relationship between language and cognition, it makes sense to 
test language that is both high frequency and distinctive between languages. In this 
thesis, we use two types of languages that fit these criteria: demonstrative pronouns 
and spatial prepositions, arguably the most important types of spatial language.  
Demonstrative pronouns occur in every language, they are suggested to have 
developed early on in any given language, are among the earliest words infants 
acquire. Demonstratives are among the most frequently used words within a 
language and are commonly used to create a joint focus of attention (Burenhult, 
2003; Clark, 1978; Clark & Sengul, 1978; Deutscher, 2005; Diessel, 2006; 
Tomasello, 1999). Like demonstratives, spatial prepositions are among the first 
words children learn (Bowerman, 1996). Spatial communication requires selecting a 
spatial term from a range of available options, often with the additional choice of an 
underlying conceptual reference frame that guides the interpretation of spatial 
directions.  
This leads us to our central question: is there any evidence that language 
affects (non-linguistic) cognition and perception? In this chapter we first review 
literature regarding the relationship between language and non-linguistic cognition 
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and perception in the context of different theoretical perspectives on language 
(learning) which assume to varying degrees that language can affect non-linguistic 
processes. After this we will cover research in different domains such as memory, 
number cognition, and colour, both within and between languages. We will then 
review the types of language that we use in the experimental chapters in this thesis, 
demonstrative pronouns and spatial prepositions, in more detail. The chapter will 
conclude with a brief précis of the rest of the thesis.  
1.1 Networks for Perception 
Perception has often been considered a bottom-up system, in which different 
areas in the brain are activated by domain specific information (cf. Kveraga, 
Ghuman, & Bar, 2007). However, for language to be able to affect cognition and 
perception, there needs to be an integration of information processing, in which top 
down processes can influence cognition and perception. For example, Fodor (1989) 
suggested modularity of the brain, in which different modalities (e.g., visual and 
auditory perception) are innately based in different brain areas, defined by their 
functional role, and operate independently of each other. These individual brain 
areas would provide input for central computational processes that combine the 
modal areas. A cognitive system like this would not allow for top-down influences. 
However, this modularity-perspective is problematic, since the noise and clutter in 
natural perception (e.g., vision: differences in lighting, shadows, occlusions, 
reflections, etc.), for instance, would make it near impossible to identify objects in 
any but the simplest circumstances (Bullier, 2001a, 2001b; Kveraga et al., 2007). For 
successful perception (and cognition), humans need to be able to bind knowledge of 
concepts with perceived information. Indeed, research has suggested that input in the 
visual system is rapidly distributed to a large number of visual areas and feedback 
networks in the brain (Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; Lupyan, Thompson-Schill, & 
Swingley, 2010). These networks span across the brain and integrate different areas 
associated with the processing of different modalities (cf., Barsalou, 2008; Meteyard, 
Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012; Meyer & Damasio, 2009).  
It has been proposed that in these types of feedback systems, memory 
consists of multiple modal ‘data points’ stored in their respective brain areas (e.g., 
Bird & Burgess, 2008; Byrne, Becker, & Burgess, 2009). Remembering is suggested 
to happen via the activation of at least one of those data points, after which the brain 
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activates a full representation, via a process of pattern completion in a feedback 
system. For example, if one brews a cup of coffee, there is a co-occurrence of 
sensory-information, say smell and taste. Each brain area processes its respective 
input and sends the information in both forward and backward direction between 
convergence-divergence zones (CDZs), such that the combination of sensory input 
constructs a full representation of the experience of coffee, including smell and taste 
(Meyer & Damasio, 2009). The next time one smells coffee, the olfactory area 
processes the smell and forwards this information to higher-level processing areas, 
which in turn send signals to lower-level areas of other modalities, so that the entire 
representation of coffee is activated, triggered by only the smell of coffee.  
These feedback systems have two components specifically interesting for this 
thesis. First, these networks integrating different types of information are 
instrumental for the potential of language influencing cognition and perception.  
Second, networks like this can explain that cognition works via predictive coding; 
the pattern completion involved requires anticipation of prediction of data points that 
are not (yet) available (Bar, 2009; Bird & Burgess, 2008; Friston, 2009). We will 
take a closer look at the idea of predictive coding in discussing the results of our 
experimental chapters.  
In this chapter, we will explore how language might affect cognition – spatial 
memory and visual attention. We next review literature that tested the relationship 
between language and cognition via cross-linguistic studies. If language influences 
cognition, it might be that different languages do so in a different way. After this 
review, we will look at studies that tested differences within a language.  
1.2 Cross-linguistic differences in language and cognition/ perception  
There is much debate regarding if and how language affects non-linguistic 
cognition. One long-standing debate regards the influences of one’s native language 
on cognition and perception.  Do speakers of different languages have different (non-
linguistic) cognition and perception as a function of the language they speak, as 
proposed by the linguistic-relativity hypothesis (also known as the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis) (Sapir, 1929; Whorf, 1956)? It is important to note that there are many 
different variants of the linguistic relativity theory, ranging from a weak version 
(suggesting that linguistic structure influences the way we think about things under 
specific circumstances when language may be used as a tool in a task) to a strong 
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version (the language one speaks directly influences perception and cognition) (cf., 
Wolff & Holmes, 2011). The strong version of the hypothesis is controversial since 
it denies the possibility of a universality in (human) cognition. In contrast to 
linguistic relativity, the theory of universal language assumes that even though 
languages are superficially different (e.g., different words and grammar), their 
underlying structure is universal (e.g., Chomsky & Foucault, 2006). In the 
universalist account, perceptual information is encoded by the perceptual system and 
affected by later reconstructions, when higher-order cognitive processes (e.g., 
contextual information, categories) play a role (Fodor, 1989). Any differences in 
memory caused by contextual information should occur at retrieval in this view. 
Linguistic relativity, on the other hand, proposes that language affects perception 
directly, at the level of encoding.  
It was originally proposed that speaking a different language means one 
experiences (e.g., perceives, analyses, and acts in) the world differently (Whorf, 
1956), based on the fact that languages differ strongly in terms of how they encode 
the world (e.g., space, time, substances, and objects) (cf. Kemmerer & Tranel, 2000; 
Levinson, 2004). For example, if a language contrasts the colours light blue and dark 
blue, as is the case in languages such as Russian, Korean, and Greek, linguistic 
relativity suggests that one perceives blue differently compared to when one’s 
language does not encode this contrast (Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006; Winawer 
et al., 2007). To give another example, data from the domain of sound perception 
suggested that differences in how tone pitches are verbalised (Dutch: high/low; 
Farsi: thick/ thin) formed different non-linguistic pitch representations consistent 
with these linguistic metaphors for pitch (Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid, & Casasanto, 
2013). After training in the Farsi thin/thick representation, Dutch speakers performed 
similar to Farsi speakers. We will discuss linguistic differences across domains in 
depth in sections 1.3 (between languages) and 1.4 (within languages). 
Whereas (strong) linguistic relativity suggests that language affects our 
perception of the world (cf. Gumperz & Levinson, 1991, 1996; Slobin, 1996; Wolff 
& Holmes, 2011), there is a mediating account suggesting ‘pragmatic 
inference’occurs through language (Frank & Goodman, 2014). In this account, 
cognition is not (re)shaped; language merely alters a speaker’s interpretation of a 
task. On the borderline of these two accounts one can find the thinking for speaking 
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hypothesis (Slobin, 1996). Slobin suggested that while we are constructing 
utterances in discourse, thoughts are processed in a linguistic form. However, this 
linguistic form cannot fit perfectly onto the original representation, since each 
language has a limited number of words and grammatical forms to characterise a 
situation model (e.g., the representation of an object or event). Thinking for speaking 
therefore suggests that while engaging in discourse, one needs to pick the specific 
characteristics of a situation model that helps the conceptualisation of that model 
while being available in the language that is used  (Slobin, 2003). In other words, 
when investigating how language shapes our thoughts, we need to evaluate how we 
think while we use language for communication. For example, if one wants to say 
that their Uncle John took Aunt Mary for dinner at a nice restaurant on 10th street, 
then the language of expression affects how the event is communicated. In English, 
the verb specifies whether it is in the past or the future, but in Mian (a language from 
Papua New Guinea) the verb specifies whether it happened just now, yesterday, or 
longer ago than that. In Indonesian the verb would not specify whether it had already 
happened or has yet to happen and in Turkish the description would specify whether 
one witnessed the event themselves. In Russian, the verb would encode the speaker’s 
gender, in Mandarin one would specify whether the uncle is paternal or maternal and 
whether he is the first, second, etc., or youngest brother. In some indiginous 
languages it would be difficult to specify precisely where it was, as they reportedly 
lack linguistic methods for expressing exact quantity (e.g., Pirahă employs a ‘one-
two-many’ system, Mundurukú has number words up to 5, whereas Warlpiri and 
Anindilyakwa completely lack counting words) (example based on Boroditsky, 
2011; Butterworth & Reeve, 2008; Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008; 
Gordon, 2004; Pica, Lemer, Izard, & Dehaene, 2004; Slobin, 1996).  
When describing Uncle John’s event in different languages, a speaker has to 
think about differences between languages to be able to encode them appropriately. 
That does not necessarily mean however, that language actually changes their 
cognition. Despite the fact that, in this example, English speakers do not specify 
from which side of the family Uncle John is, they usually have this information – 
they just do not explicitly encode it in language. However, there is evidence that 
language does shape spatial cognition. For example, it has been argued that children 
are influenced by spatial language in the development of their spatial cognition (Choi 
SECTION 1 – The Influence of Language on Non-Linguistic Cognition 
 
7 
 
& Bowerman, 1991; Choi, McDonough, Bowerman, & Mandler, 1999). Choi and 
colleagues tested how children in English and Korean talked about motion events. In 
English, motion and path are usually expressed separately, whereas Korean makes 
this distinction based on whether the motion was caused or spontaneous. They found 
that English speaking children, from as early as 17-20 months generalised spatial 
terms, whereas Korean children kept words for spontaneous and caused motion 
separate. They argue this challenges the idea that children map spatial words onto 
non-linguistic spatial concepts, and that they are instead influenced by the 
organisation of their spatial language as they learn it.  
In this thesis, we aim to contribute to this discussion. We use spatial language 
as a way to explore the relationship between language and non-linguistic cognition, 
specifically spatial memory and visual attention. In the next section, we will discuss 
how cross-linguistic differences might influence cognition and perception. This 
review is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather will illustrate the range of 
domains in which the influence of language on cognition and perception has been 
considered, often with decidedly mixed results.  
1.3 Cross-linguistic differences and non-linguistic cognition and 
perception 
1.3.1 The influence of motion expression on memory for events 
One way to test the influence of language is by exploring differences in non-
linguistic cognition comparing speakers of different languages that make different 
distinctions (Gennari, Sloman, Malt, & Fitch, 2002). Gennari and colleagues 
presented videos of events (e.g., a man carrying a board into a room), while Spanish 
and English participants were equally divided over three conditions: an encoding 
condition, in which they were encouraged to verbally encode the events, a free 
encoding condition in which participants just watched the videos, and a ‘shadow’ 
condition, in which participants repeated nonsense syllables as a verbal interference 
task. Results showed that participants did verbally encode the videos differently: 
Spanish speakers used the same verb for actions that shared path, and used more 
path-verbs, while English speakers used the same verb for actions that shared 
manner and used more manner verbs. There was no evidence that there was a 
recognition difference between languages. This is important, as this would be 
predicted by linguistic relativity. Similarity judgments in the linguistic encoding 
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condition did differ between languages, consistent with the pattern of descriptions in 
each language, but only after linguistic coding.  
Another example of differences between languages in describing events is 
that there are languages in which the verb encodes the manner of motion (e.g., 
English: strolling, running, etc.) and languages where the verb instead encodes the 
direction of motion (e.g., Greek: descend, cross). Papafragou, Massey, and Gleitman 
(2002) explored the influence of this linguistic difference in two separate tasks, run 
over two separate days. On the first day, participants engaged in a linguistic task, in 
which they described events depicted in different pictures (e.g., a boy jumping over a 
log, See Figure 1.1). On the second day, participants engaged in a non-linguistic 
task, in which they were presented with pictures that were similar or different from 
the first task (e.g., a boy jumping over a log or a boy stumbling over a log), and had 
to judge whether they had seen that picture before. Results showed that linguistic 
preferences differed significantly between languages; Greek participants verbally 
coded the direction and English participants the manner of movement. But even 
though participants showed clear linguistic preferences on the linguistic task, their 
(non-linguistic) memory performance was identical (Papafragou et al., 2002). 
Similarly, when Greek and English participants listened to verbal descriptions of 
events, their eye-movements followed the linguistic pattern of their native language, 
but in a free-inspection task (not cued by language), attention allocation was similar 
across languages (Papafragou, Hulbert, & Trueswell, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Example of the manner variation stimuli used by Papafragou et al. (2002): 
“the boy jumping over a log” vs. “the boy stumbling over a log”. 
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These findings are consistent with ‘thinking for speaking’ (Slobin, 1996, 
2003) and other accounts suggesting language does influence non-linguistic 
processing, but only in linguistic tasks (Frank et al., 2008; Gilbert et al., 2006; 
Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999). However, it has been suggested that  
language can have an effect despite verbal interference. For example, 
Athanasopoulos and colleagues (Athanasopoulos et al., 2015), suggested differences 
between language use in bilinguals, after they found that German-English bilingual 
participants matched motion-events using constraints of the specific language they 
were using at that time. Participants speaking in German matched motion-events 
based on motion completion moreoften than when speaking in English. Moreover, 
the authors claim to have found a double dissociation: when participants engaged in 
an English verbal interference task (repeat a string of three two-digit numbers in 
English), their matching behaviour was congruent with German, but if they did a 
German verbal interference task (repeat a string of three two-digit numbers in 
German), their matching behaviour fitted the English language categorization. This 
would indicate the influence of language on human cognition is strongly context-
bound and transient.   
1.3.2 Numbers 
Not all languages have cardinal number terms. However, in the domain of 
number processing, evidence shows that a lack of language does not necessarily 
inhibit number processing in an online task, but does influence memory for numbers. 
For example, Gordon (2004) conducted a matching task with Pirahă speakers, a 
language known for its lack of quantity expressions (cf., Everett, 2005). Whereas 
Gordon (2004) claimed that Pirahă language employed a one-two-many structure, 
Frank et al. (2005) suggest it lacks any quantity expression, even ‘one’. In the  
matching task by Gordon, participants were asked to match two arrays of objects 
(ranging from simple linear arrays to more advanced clusters of objects, see Figure 
1.2). It was found that the lack of a linguistic counting system limited the ability of 
Pirahă speakers to establish arrays exceeding two or three items, although they 
showed evidence of chunking when presented with larger set sizes. Gordon (2004) 
concluded that humans who are not exposed to a number system through language 
cannot represent exact quantities for medium-sized arrays.  
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In a follow-up study, Frank et al. (2008) retested Pirahă speakers on the 
matching tasks but found participants were accurate in tasks where participants could 
see the original array while recreating it – despite not having a word for the concept 
‘one’, they had an understanding of it and appeared to understand calculations 
including the addition or subtraction of the number ‘one’. The authors report that the 
difference in performance between their study and Gordon (2004) could be due to an 
improved control of their testing environment. For example, Gordon’s participants 
were tested with AA batteries on an uneven surface. This could have added  
distraction and difficulty to the calculation tasks (Frank et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
Frank et al. tested participants on memory matching tasks, in which the experimenter 
covered the array after presenting a number of objects in a line and the participant 
had to reconstruct the array from memory. Results showed decreased performance, 
suggesting that language might facilitate memory to compare information across 
time, space, and modality. Whereas visual and auditory short-term memory have a 
limited capacity, the ability to verbally encode events allows for categorization and 
therefore increased memory performance. 
An alternative explanation, for the differences between the effects of 
languages in number cognition, consistent with these previous findings, suggests that 
approximate number representation might be universal, whereas exact number 
representation (specifically large numbers), might depend on a linguistic counting 
system (Pica et al., 2004). This might suggest that there might be a two-tier memory 
system for number processing, one in which language is important and one in which 
language does not play a part.  
Another line of research suggesting a relationship between language and 
number is the mental number line theory (Restle, 1970), consistent with the more 
elaborate Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) theory 
 
Figure 1.2. Three examples of the matching task by Gordon (2004). He presented 
participants with an array of batteries (lower half) and participants were asked to match 
their own array (top half).  
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(Dehaene, 1992; Dehaene et al., 1993). These theories suggest that numbers of lower 
magnitude are coupled with preferentially leftwards responses, whereas numbers 
with higher magnitude are related to rightwards responses (see also Casarotti, 
Michielin, Zorzi, & Umiltà, 2007; Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003). This mental 
number line is associated with linguistic culture, for example writing direction (cf. 
Göbel, Shaki, & Fischer, 2011). Moreover, the effects diminish or even reverse for 
participants from writing cultures where writing is not from left to right, like Hebrew 
and Arabic (Dehaene et al., 1993; Shaki, Fischer, & Petrusic, 2009). The cultural 
effect has not only been found between participants, but also within participants. 
Shaki and Fischer (2008) tested bilingual speakers of Cyrillic (left-to-right script) 
and Hebrew (right-to-left script), and showed that the left-to-right SNARC effect is 
stronger after bilingual speakers read Cyrillic and is reduced after reading Hebrew. 
Neurological studies have further supported the idea of the spatial integration 
of number processing on a mental number line. Studies with left-neglect patients 
show that participants with neglect systematically misplace the midpoint of a 
numerical interval (e.g., claiming that 5 is halfway between 2 and 6) (Umiltà, Priftis, 
& Zorzi, 2009; Zorzi, Priftis, & Umiltà, 2002), whereas healthy participants usually 
have a slight bias towards the left side of the number line (Longo & Lourenco, 
2007).  
1.3.3 Colour 
Another classic domain in which the discussion on linguistic influences has 
traditionally been a hot topic is colour. A large and growing body of research is 
looking at the influence that different languages have on colour perception. Again, in 
this domain, the discussion is between linguistic relativity (cf. Drivonikou et al., 
2007; Gilbert et al., 2006; Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000) and a universal 
account of colour perception (cf. Kay & McDaniel, 1978; Kay & Regier, 2003).  
For example, there has been a debate on whether the possession of colour 
terms affects the way colours are categorised. Heider (1972a), tested speakers of 
Dani, a Papuan language with a two-term colour system based on brightness rather 
than hue (loosely translated to mean ‘dark’ and ‘light’). In a naming task, in which a 
coloured chip was presented and participants were asked to name the colour, Heider 
found that half her participants used words in addition to these two basic terms, the 
additional words showing consistency with red, yellow, and blue, suggesting that if a 
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language does not allow direct encoding of colour differences, speakers might seek 
strategies to circumvent these limitations. In another study, Heider (1972b) explored 
whether there are focal colours, defined as the best example of a certain colour 
category, which are universally the most codable and easy to remember. Across 4 
experiments, speakers of over 25 different languages were tested in a naming and a 
memory task. In the naming task, participants were shown colours and asked to 
name them in their own language. Results showed that focal colours were given 
shorter names and were named quicker than other colours. In the memory task, 
participants had 5 seconds to memorize a specific colour. After an interval of 30 
seconds they were asked to pick the remembered colour out of an array of 160 
different colours. Focal colours were remembered more accurately, although, as 
Heider reports, the memory data might be confounded: in trials in which a 
participant doesn’t remember a specific colour, they are more likely to guess a focal 
colour. This leads to a memory bias towards focal colours, which could alternatively 
explain the memory advantage. In a third experiment, Heider taught participants 
pairs of colours (focal or non-focal) and a separate response word. Participants 
engaged in multiple training days to learn these pairs. Results showed that the focal-
colour pairs were learned faster.  
In a replication study, Roberson et al. (2000) tested speakers of Berinmo, a 
language with five basic colour terms. First they confirmed that the five colour terms 
were used consistently and with consensus to describe the colour of a variety of 
objects. Then they tried to replicate the findings by Heider (1972b), but found no 
support for the superior learning effects of focal coloured pairs. Furthermore, 
Roberson et al. found that colour terms available in language affect the 
categorization of colours, suggesting an important role of language instead of 
categorization based on innate neurophysiology. In experiments in which 
participants had to judge to which category different colours belonged, clear 
differences were found between English and Berinmo speakers. When it was tested 
whether linguistic distinctions help in categorization tasks, English and Berinmo 
speakers were asked to split two sets of stimuli, consisting of either green and blue 
(different colour names in English but not in Berinmo) stimuli, or two shades of 
green (no different colour name in either English or Berinmo). English participants 
found the green vs. blue division, colours with different colour names, easier than the 
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division of two shades of green. Berinmo speakers performed, in line with the lack of 
linguistic colour distinction, equally on both tasks (Roberson et al., 2000). This 
suggested that colour distinctions are easier when languages make a distinction 
between the two colours. 
In a study comparing English speakers with Russian speakers, Winawer et al. 
(2007) found that Russian speakers had a language advantage in the categorization of 
tones of blue. In Russian, speakers make an obligatory distinction between light-blue 
(goluboy) and dark blue (siniy), whereas in English this distinction is not obligatory. 
First, both English and Russian participants made categorical distinctions between 
light and dark blue. Results from the two language groups were very similar; they 
drew nearly the same boundary between the 20 different tones of blue (See Figure 
1.3). Then, in an online task, participants saw three squares, one on top, and two 
below. Participants had to state which of the lower two squares had the same colour 
as the top square. Results showed that Russian participants had faster response times 
if they had to discriminate between two colours encoded in different linguistic 
categories in Russian (light blue or dark blue), an effect absent in English. The 
Russian advantage disappeared when participants had to perform a language 
interference task. These effects suggest that language affects basic perceptual colour 
discrimination tasks, and that this is an online effect, since the effect disappears 
when participants engage in a verbal interference task. In an EEG study, Thierry and 
colleagues (Thierry, Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009) found that 
 
Figure 1.3. The shades of blue (above) used by Winawer et al (2007), and the three squares used 
in the colour matching task (below) 
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when Greek speakers (Greek is another language with an obligatory distinction 
between light and dark blue) were presented with succeeding trials of different 
shades of blue, there was a larger mismatch negativity if the shade of blue deviated 
compared to the presentation of different shades of green. English participants did 
not show a distinction (Thierry et al., 2009). However, this study did not include a 
verbal interference task, so it cannot be distinguished whether this effect is apparent 
only while using language, or whether the cognition of speakers of different 
languages is different, regardless of whether they are using language. 
1.3.4 Reference frames as expressed in language 
A debate similar to that of colour has been held in the literature on frames of 
reference. Reference frames are required to assign direction to space when using 
language. For example, to the left of the car could be to the left side from the 
speaker’s perspective (aligned with the left side of the speaker’s body), or the left 
side with reference to the axes of the car. It has been argued that there is a systematic 
variation between spatial reference frames in language use (Pederson et al., 1998). 
Pederson et al. ran a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic analysis of the use of spatial 
reference frames and found, consistent with Levinson (1996), that there are only 
three distinctive frames of reference, of which they only focussed particularly on the 
absolute and relative reference frame. In a series of tests, they tested speakers of 
different languages on their reference frame use, concluding systematic differences 
between languages and the behavioural responses of their speakers. For example, in 
the ‘animals in a row’ task (Brown & Levinson, 1993), a participant has to memorize 
a sequence of three animals placed on a line, all facing a specific direction (see 
Figure 1.4). Then the participant turns around 180 degrees before reconstructing the 
array on a second table. Participants can reconstruct the animal row in two ways: 
based on an absolute frame of reference (based on north/south) and a relative frame 
of reference (based on left/right). Pederson et al. found that speakers of Tzeltal, a 
language that uses the absolute frame to describe object location even in tabletop 
space, remembered the array in accordance with their language (i.e. reproducing the 
exact positions of the animals with respect to compass points) while speakers of 
Dutch and English in contrast reproduced arrays from an egocentric point of view. 
This specific test of reference frame used has been food for debate over the years, 
where some have argued that the results show evidence for clear cross-cultural 
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differences in (non-linguistic) reference frame use (Brown & Levinson, 1993; 
Levinson, Kita, Haun, & Rasch, 2002; Pederson et al., 1998). However, it has been 
argued that for humans, language may not be the decisive factor in the choice of 
spatial perspective, but strategy, based on the availability and suitability of landmark 
cues (Li & Gleitman, 2002). Not every language employs every reference frame, but 
speakers of languages can nevertheless acquire and use different reference frame 
systems with ease (Li, Abarbanell, Gleitman, & Papafragou, 2011; Majid, 
Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004). In other words, people use language as a 
tool to remember locations.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.4. The ‘animals in a row’ task. Participants memorize the location of three 
animals standing in a row, facing a specific direction. After turning 180 degrees 
participants reconstruct the memorized array. They can do this according to a relative 
reference frame (based on the animals’ position in respect to their body, or the absolute 
reference frame (based on the animals’ position to the environment) (Brown & Levinson, 
1993). 
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1.3.5 Summary: cross-linguistic differences 
To summarize, despite the large amount of research on linguistic relativity, 
results provide evidence in favour of and against the general theory. Moreover, the 
field suffers from replication failures. Recent publications, providing a promising 
avenue to reconcile some of these differences, argue that probabilistic inference 
could take away the contradiction between linguistic relativity and the universality of 
cognition (Cibelli, Xu, Austerweil, Griffiths, & Regier, 2016; Regier & Xu, 2017). 
In their work on colour, Cibelli et al. propose a probabilistic model of color memory, 
based on two assumptions: there is a universal colour space, and languages have 
specific categories to classify colours in this space. A perceived colour is inferred 
from the two sources of evidence, as a two-tier system: the actual fine-grained 
representation of a colour and the language category it is fitted into (See Figure 1.5). 
Colour memory involves the probabilistic combination of the two sources. The 
weight of each tier is a function on the amount of uncertainty (for example induced 
by a delay between presentation and reconstruction in a colour match task) about the 
actual fine-grained representation. By underscoring the role uncertainty plays in 
cognition, effects showing linguistic relativity are explained without rejecting 
universals in language or cognition. When there is a high certainty of perception, 
 
Figure 1.5. Colour memory works via the actual representation in colour space (left) and 
the language category it is fitted into. Colour memory is the probabilistic combination of 
these two sources (Cibelli et al., 2016) 
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there is a low influence of different parameters on the memory for, in Cibelli et al. 
(2016), colour. However, when the perceptual certainty decreases, the influence of 
contextual information (i.e., category membership) becomes stronger. The authors 
suggest that the non-replications in research on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis could be 
due to the use of high-certainty stimuli. We will compare our data to this theory in 
the discussion. Therefore, the fundamental question is: do differences in linguistic 
encoding change perception or memory for events, and if so, how does this work?  
1.4 The influence of language on cognition and perception within a 
language 
In the previous sections, we reviewed literature on cross-linguistic/cultural 
differences and the influence of different languages on (non-)linguistic tasks. We 
will now look at how cognition and perception might be influenced within a 
language. For example, is performance on spatial memory tasks enhanced when 
spatial language is presented at encoding vs. a no-language condition? We will 
review literature on attention, memory, verbal overshadowing, and colour 
perception.    
1.4.1 Spatial cognition 
There are many studies examining the influence of language on various 
aspects of spatial cognition. Theoretically, spatial language in communication is 
thought to help to create a joint focus of attention. For example spatial expressions, 
such as these coins or the cup is on the table, serve to direct the attention of a hearer 
to regions of space (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976; Spivey, Tyler, Eberhard, & 
Tanenhaus, 2001). Studies using eye-trackers showed that, when a verbal auditory 
description is presented with a visual array, participants tend to attend to the objects 
presented on the screen following the referring words (e.g., focus on the table when 
the table is mentioned in the description) (Eberhard, Spivey-Knowlton, Sedivy, & 
Tanenhaus, 1995). This effect is already found in 18-23-month old children (Choi et 
al., 1999). Choi et al. found that presenting target words focussed childrens’ gaze at 
different (and language-appropriate) aspects of visual scenes.  
Another domain of spatial cognition in which an essential role of spatial 
language was found is human navigation (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999), see Figure 
1.6. In their study, an object was hidden in a rectangular room (in corner C) while 
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participants were watching. In one condition, there are no spatial cues (Figure 1.6A, 
only geometrical information), in the second condition there was one blue wall 
(Figure 1.6B, geometrical and non-geometrical information). Following the object 
placement, participants had to reorient themselves in the room and find the object. 
Participants in the geometrical information condition (1.6A), infants and adults alike, 
searched the two geometrically potential corners at chance (either corner C or R). In 
the condition in which both geometrical and non-geometrical information was 
available (1.6B), adults were able to combine the two types of information to 
successfully identify corner C, but infants – like other mammals – could not.  
In a follow-up study into the development of this skill, children were found 
to develop the ability to combine the types of information around age 4. Success was 
related to the production of expressions using left and right, suggesting that flexible 
reorientation in the task was linked to emerging spatial language abilities (Hermer-
Vazquez, Moffet, & Munkholm, 2001). Moreover, when adult participants engaged 
in the task while performing a language interference task, their ability to combine 
geometrical and non-geometrical information declined. This decline was specifically 
related to linguistic interference tasks; not with other, non-linguistic, working 
memory tasks (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999).  
The pairing of language with visual events and images also affects 
recollection about the spatial world. For example, Loewenstein and Gentner (2005) 
found that preschool children performed better in a mapping task when spatial 
relations were combined with spatial language at encoding. In this series of 
experiments, an object was hidden in a ‘hiding box’, and children were asked to find 
a matching item in the corresponding place of a ‘finding box’ (see Figure 1.7). 
 
Figure 1.6. Example from Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999). The room with only geometrical 
information (1A) and the room with a coloured wall on the right (1B), as a marker to aid 
participants orientate themselves and find corner C. 
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Different sets of spatial terms were used, on, in, under and top, middle, bottom. After 
the object placement, the children were asked to find the corresponding object in the 
finding box. Over five experiments, they found that children performed better on 
spatial relational mapping tasks if they had heard an informative description of the 
hiding event and this linguistic facilitation was better for the ‘easier’ linguistic 
descriptions like top, middle, bottom. Loewenstein and Gentner argue that relational 
language fosters the development of representational structures that facilitate 
cognitive processing (see also Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999).  
Furthermore, it was shown that children that have no spatial language 
perform poorly on non-linguistic spatial tasks (Gentner, Özyürek, Gürcanli, & 
Goldin-Meadow, 2013). In a study with deaf Turkish children without any sign 
language, deaf children not exposed to a conventional (sign) language rarely 
produced gestures to indicated spatial relations between two objects. They also had a 
poor performance on a spatial mapping task compared to cognitively-matched, 
hearing children (Gentner et al., 2013).  
A series of developmental studies further investigated whether language 
facilitates spatial performance (Dessalegn & Landau, 2008, 2013; Farran & O’Leary, 
2015). For example, 4-year olds performed a task in which they had to find a target 
(e.g., a square split in half by two different colours) in an array. The aim was to see 
whether language has a role in forming or maintaining a representation of visual 
features of an object, for example a split square, coloured red on the left and green 
on the right (Dessalegn & Landau, 2008). During the trials, the children were told to 
 
Figure 1.7. Example from Loewenstein and Gentner (2005). Children observed an 
object being hidden and had to find the corresponding place in a second space. 
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look at the target object and help the experimenter find the exact same one in an 
array of three objects presented after a 1 second delay: the target’s match, its 
reflection, and a differently split square. Results showed that the layout of the objects 
was better retained when directional language was presented (e.g., the red is on the  
left/right/top/bottom), compared to a number of other conditions (e.g., when no 
description was given, when the object name was described (after the target was 
given a name, e.g., dax, wazzle), the description was a non-directional term (e.g., 
“the red is touching the green”), or when the child pointed at the object). The fact 
that none of the other conditions worked as well as directional language suggests that 
it is not a general effect of attention, but that descriptive spatial language has a 
particularly powerful facilitation on encoding. Even more surprising is the finding 
that children did not need to have a fixed understanding of directional language for 
their task performance to benefit; for example children that did know that left and 
right were opposites, but did not know which one was which. Dessalegn and Landau 
(2008) suggested that the combination of seeing the target and hearing the language 
(e.g., “the red is on the left”) could have led to a temporary understanding of the 
directional cue (Dessalegn & Landau, 2008, 2013). Follow up studies looking at 
development replicated the effect for 4 year olds, but found that 6 year olds 
performed at ceiling for both a ‘no label’ and ‘directional label’ condition, although 
by that age children may be automatically encoding the stimuli using spatial 
language which counters the different conditions (Dessalegn & Landau, 2013). 
Performance was enhanced when the target was accompanied by spatial cues (e.g., 
“yellow is on top”). There was no additional benefit for children verbalizing the 
linguistic cue themselves over just hearing the cue, as long as they had an 
understanding of the spatial terms (Farran & O’Leary, 2015).  
1.4.2 Colour perception 
In addition to the influence that object knowledge has on memory, object knowledge 
can influence colour perception. Participants had to match colours between a 
stimulus patch and a variable colour mixer (Bruner, Postman, & Rodrigues, 1951). 
Participants were presented with object images in gray-scale, objects that usually 
have a stereotypical colour (e.g., banana, tomato, orange). They then moved a 
colour-wheel to match the represented object’s colour, and judged the object-image 
to be stronger coloured (e.g., more yellow) than it actually was, in both a colour 
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matching and a memory matching task. This effect could be a function of colour 
diagnosticity. If an object has a high colour diagnosticity (e.g., yellow for a banana) 
then the object knowledge effects on colour memory and colour perception were 
stronger than when the object has a low colour diagnosticity (e.g., yellow for a 
lamp). In a conceptual replication, Delk and Fillenbaum (1965) showed that this 
overestimation towards the typical colour of an object is not just apparent in colour 
memory, but also in online tasks. Colour retrieval is suggested to be a blend between 
actual colour and typical colour (Belli, 1988). It was shown, and replicated, that 
people overestimate the similarity of colours within a category compared to the 
colours of objects between different categories even if all stimuli are presented while 
participants make their judgements (Goldstone, 1995). For example,in an array of  
letters and numbers, participants judged symbols within a respective category to be  
 more similar in colour than between categories, even if the two, between categories, 
target symbols were identically coloured (See Figure 1.8).  
Bruner et al. (1951) suggested the effect of expectation was the result of a 
‘three-step’ mechanism of perception. They hypothesised that the first step of 
perception is to make a hypothesis (an expectation) about a perception, then to 
acquire information before one can confirm or disconfirm the initial hypothesis. The 
effect of object knowledge would be elicited by this hypothesis. The misperception 
of colour as a function of object knowledge supports the perspective that colour 
perception is not just a result of incoming sensory data, but is significantly 
modulated by high-level visual memory (Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & 
Gegenfurtner, 2006). In their study, participants adjusted the colour of pictures of 
 
Figure 1.8. Participants judged symbols within a category (T, E, L vs. 8, 9, 6) as being more 
similar in colour, even though ‘L’ and ‘8’ were identical in colour (Goldstone, 1995). 
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fruit (e.g., banana) until they appeared to be gray (see Figure 1.9). However, results 
showed that participants went too far with this adjustment and moved the colour over 
the actual gray point in the direction opposite to the typical colour of the fruit. The 
authors suggest that these results show that colour perception is not determined 
purely by incoming sensory information.  
An effect of language on colour perception has also been found, both in cases 
where language is explicit during a task, and in cases where language is not explicit, 
but may affect non-linguistic performance. There is a positive correlation  
between linguistic categorization of colour (the possibility to code a specific colour 
in a specific linguistic category) and the recognition of a given colour, suggesting 
that the possession of colour words could affect colour categorization (Brown & 
Lenneberg, 1954; Roberson et al., 2000). Furthermore, when participants engage in a 
verbal interference task, the linguistic facilitation disappears (Roberson & Davidoff, 
2000), although in a replication study it was argued that whereas language facilitates 
performance, verbal interference does not necessarily prevent colour categorical 
perception (Pilling, Wiggett, Ozgen, & Davies, 2003). However, it is disputed 
whether tasks on colour-judgements can inform the debate on colour perception (cf., 
Firestone & Scholl, 2015). Firestone and Scholl argue that in interpreting these 
results, authors often confuse perception with judgment. Although it is not always 
clear whether top down cognition influences what we see or instead how we infer or 
judge based on what we see. The fact that participants judge an object to be more 
colourful than it actually is, whether in an online or a memory task, does not mean 
 
Figure 1.9. The 0-point on the Y-axis is the actual grey point. When participants adjusted 
the colour of the banana so that it appeared achromatic to them, they generally went over 
the actual gray-point, suggesting that their perception was influenced by the expected 
colour of the fruit (Hansen et al., 2006). 
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that they actually perceive colour differently – one can merely state that they judged 
colour differently.   
Another issue identified by Firestone and Scholl (2015) is that overly 
confirmatory research designs can identify effects that are not necessarily caused by 
the experimental manipulation. To control for this, a design must include both 
conditions in which an effect should occur, but also in which the effect should not 
occur - apart from finding an effect when one would expect an effect, Firestone and 
Scholl argued, one must not find the effect when it would not be expected. 
In language research, an example of this dissociation is in the effect of 
language on the different brain hemispheres. In most typically developing 
individuals, language is more strongly represented in the left hemisphere and 
linguistic tasks are processed preferentially by the left hemisphere (Carey & 
Johnstone, 2014; Mazoyer et al., 2014; Pulvermüller, 2012; Rasmussen & Milner, 
1977). Therefore, it would be expected that the influence language has on colour 
perception would be different for the left and the right visual field, as they are 
processed by respectively the right and the left side of the brain (Brown et al., 2011; 
Drivonikou et al., 2007; Gilbert et al., 2006). In colour discrimination tasks, 
language could disproportionately influence colour discrimination in the right visual 
field (RVF, processed by the typically more linguistic left side of the brain) 
compared to the left visual field (LVF). Each trial showed two graded tones on a 
spectrum from green to blue in a circle of squares. In the circle, all squares had the 
same colour except for the target (See Figure 1.10). Participants then indicated  
 
Figure 1.10. Examples of four colours (distinction between light/dark green and blue) on the 
left. On the right, an overview of the visual search task. Participants had to respond with a left 
or right button press, to indicate at which side the target was (Gilbert et al., 2007). 
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whether the target was at the left or the right side of the circle. Results showed a 
strong, exclusive influence of language in the RVF; colour discrimination of colours 
with different names is quicker in the RVF than the LVF. In a replication of Gilbert 
et al. (2006), Drivonikou et al. (2007) found similar results, with the difference that 
whereas Gilbert et al., found significant category effects in the RVF but not the LVF, 
Drivonikou et al. (2007) found significant effects in both sides of the brain, although 
effects were stronger in the RVF. Drivonikou et al. speculate the effects in the LVF 
effect could be a result of information travelling across the corpus callosum to the 
right hemisphere or that the LVF category effect reflects a universal categorical 
distinction. However, multiple studies have focussed on the idea that language 
affects colour perception differently in the two brain hemispheres since, finding 
mixed results (cf., Brown et al., 2011). And studies with pre-linguistic infants show 
categorical effects as well (Ozturk, Shayan, Liszkowski, & Majid, 2013). In their 
study, 4-6 month old infants were faster and more accurate at fixating on different 
coloured targets compared to targets from the same colour category, even when they 
controlled for chromatic separation, suggesting the existence of pre-linguistic colour 
categories. These results might suggest that categories are not dependent on 
language. 
As mentioned above, linguistic relativity and universals in language are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Cibelli et al. (2016) suggested that there are 
universals in cognition, and uncertainty can increase the influence of contextual 
information. In other words, linguistic influences could come into play when 
perceptual information allows for uncertainty.  
1.4.3 The influence of language on motion perception 
A key feature in cognition is that people are able to predict events based on 
information they perceive, for example by engaging in ‘mental animation’ in which 
they anticipate future states of the world. For example, when in traffic, one 
continuously predicts what other road users will do, and whether one has time to 
cross the road or needs to wait until a car has passed. This implies that there is a 
mapping between perception at any given time, and knowledge stored in memory 
(Bar, 2009).  
In a study presenting static scenes to participants, it was shown how language 
implying motion can affect memory for object location (Vinson, Engelen, Zwaan, 
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Matlock, & Dale, 2017). Participants saw a picture of a car either facing uphill or 
downhill on a slope, visually implying that the car moves forward or backward 
downhill. The picture presentation was accompanied by one of three conditions: 
language congruent or incongruent with the visual motion implication (congruent: 
the car moves further down; incongruent: the car moves further up) and a no 
language condition. In the no-language condition, participants misremembered the 
cars’ location to be further down on the slope. When language implied a downward  
motion, this effect was enhanced, with participants misremembering the car to be  
significantly further down. But if language implied an upward motion, there was no  
significant memory difference from the actual (originally presented) location of the 
car. These results suggest that motion language can provide a cue to anticipate on  
motion.  
Meteyard, Bahrami, and Vigliocco (2007), found that language can also 
inhibit the ability to see motion. In their study, participants engaged in a motion 
detection task, while passively listening to two types of verbs, either implying 
motion or not. Results showed that when the direction of a motion verb was 
incongruent with the presented motion, participants performance on the motion 
detection task deteriorated. Although there was no difference in the detection task 
when words were congruent or non-motion-related, these results suggest that 
linguistic information directly influences perception.  
Coventry and colleagues (Coventry et al., 2013) tested the influence of object 
knowledge, situational knowledge, and language on the extent to which people 
mentally animate static images by measuring middle temporal/middle superior 
temporal motion processing activation using fMRI (see Figure 1.11). Results showed 
that mental animation is not driven by individual objects (e.g., a cereal box and a 
bowl on their own do not elicit mental animation), but suggested that mental 
animation can be driven by an expectation elicited regarding how objects usually 
interact (e.g., ‘a cereal box above a bowl’ does elicit mental animation where ‘a bowl 
above a cereal box’ does not). Language presented before images also affected 
motion processing. When the language verbalised the spatial relation between two 
objects (e.g., “the glass over the bottle”), more mental animation activation was 
found than in a comparative-adjective condition (e.g., “the packet is larger than the 
pan”). This shows that there is an influence of language that highlights a functional 
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relation, which is absent when the functional relation is not elicited by language. 
Furthermore, consistent with Gilbert et al. (2006), it was found that the language 
activation only worked in the left hemisphere, the hemisphere responsible for 
language processing in most typically developed individuals (Carey & Johnstone, 
2014).  
Revisiting the criticism of Firestone and Scholl (2015), rightfully stating that 
a research design should include conditions in which the effect should occur and 
conditions in which the effect should not occur, we see that Coventry et al. (2013) do 
this twice. First, they report that there is an effect in the left hemisphere – which 
predominantly processes language –, but not in the right, which supports the 
perspective that specifically language can induce this mental animation. If the effect 
is caused by language, the effect is expected to be weaker (if at all) in the right 
hemisphere. Second, the fact that language that highlights a functional relation does 
induce mental animation, but language that does not highlight this functional relation 
does not, shows that there is not just a language effect, but that it is an effect that 
occurs only in specific types of language.  
1.4.4 The influence of higher order cognition on perception: A cautionary 
note 
Despite the large body of literature on cognitive penetration of perception 
(i.e., Goldstone, 1995; Hansen et al., 2006; Lupyan et al., 2010; Meteyard et al., 
2007; Pinto, Gaal, Lange, Lamme, & Seth, 2015; Thierry et al., 2009), it has been 
 
                                     Spatial preposition: “the packet is over the pan”  
Language conditions:  Proximity preposition: “the packet is near the pan” 
                                     Comparative adjective: “the packet is bigger than the pan” 
 
Figure 1.11. Examples of the spatial lay-out used in different trials. Left, functionally 
congruent items (packet over a pan), in the middle functional incongruent layout (the pan 
over the packet), and on the right objects that are not functionally related. Participants had 
to judge whether the verbal description was true or false. (Coventry et al., 2013). 
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suggested that none of the many findings are evidence of top-down effects of 
cognition on perception (e.g., Firestone & Scholl, 2015; Pylyshyn, 1999). Firestone 
and Scholl identified a number of pitfalls to which they claim many – if not all – of 
the studies fall prey to. Previously, we mentioned potential confounds related to 
specific studies. Here we take a closer look at potential pitfalls. Among these pitfalls 
are mistakes by the experimenter, such as creating a design lacking a condition in 
which the effect they hypothesise should not occur (as we saw being addressed by 
for example Coventry et al. (2013) and Gilbert et al. (2006)). Without this condition, 
research designs are overly confirmatory - any time an effect occurs one can 
conclude that the condition caused the effect. Another example, specifically salient 
in the domain of colour, is confusing perception and judgment (cf. Goldstone, 1995; 
Hansen et al., 2006; Roberson et al., 2000). When participants have to judge whether 
two colours match, this is not a direct measure of their perception, but merely their 
judgement. Related to this, is failing to identify the factor memory plays in 
recognition tasks. When participants are quicker to recognize a stimulus in a specific 
situation, this could be due to a top-down facilitation of visual processing, but could 
be driven by memory (or a lack thereof) (cf., Lupyan et al, 2010). Other pitfalls 
regard the participants, for example if participants fall subject to demand or response 
biases, in which features of the experiments lead subjects to adjust their responds to 
suit the experimenters’ expected aim. Firestone and Scholl suggested that researchers 
use a checklist based on these pitfalls, to consider whether the effects do in fact 
suggest top-down effects of cognition on perception, or whether they can be 
attributed to any of the identified pitfalls (see Table 1.1). In the studies presented in  
Table 1.1. The checklist as proposed by Firestone and Scholl (2015). 
1. Uniquely disconfirmatory predictions: allow conditions both in which the 
effect appears and disappears. 
2. Perception versus judgment: disentangle postperceptual judgment from 
online processing. 
3. Demand and response bias: mask the purpose of manipulations and test 
whether participants discovered the aim upon debrief. 
4. Low-level differences (and amazing demonstrations): rule out explanations 
involving lower-level visual features by matching stimuli carefully. 
5. Peripheral attentional effects: measure patterns of attention directly. 
6. Memory and recognition: distinguish online perception from off-line 
memory  
SECTION 1 – The Influence of Language on Non-Linguistic Cognition 
 
28 
 
this thesis, we aim to avoid these pitfalls. In Chapter 5, section 5.3.1-5.3.3 we 
discuss this checklist with respect to the experimental chapters. 
1.4.5 Spatial memory  
Before we look at the influence of language on spatial memory, we review 
spatial memory itself. Our ability to memorize information is fundamental for 
cognition, all behaviour and every act is a product of the memory of a previous 
experience with a given situation (Thelen, 2005). Without spatial memory we would 
continuously be engaged in searching for our keys, phone, or glasses. Memory for 
object location can be decomposed in at least three different mechanisms: object 
processing, spatial-location processing, and the binding between object and location 
(Postma & Haan, 1996; Postma, Kessels, & van Asselen, 2008). For object identity 
processing, the object needs to be compared to representations of known objects and 
subsequent semantic properties. Then spatial location processing is needed to gain 
exact knowledge of object position, both via allocentric and egocentric information 
(King, Trinkler, Hartley, Vargha-Khadem, & Burgess, 2004). Space needs to be 
organised hierarchically so that object locations can be estimated (Huttenlocher, 
Hedges, & Duncan, 1991; Huttenlocher, Hedges, Corrigan, & Crawford, 2004). This 
creates a more general idea of locations (e.g., the cup is on the right side of the 
shelf).  
The binding of objects and locations has long been debated. For example, 
whether memory for object location is merely a feature remembered in object 
knowledge, or whether object location is a memory trace, separate from object 
knowledge (cf., Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Findings that locations and features can 
be stored interdependently suggest that they are separate systems (Treisman & 
Zhang, 2006). Participants depend more on object location when object bindings are 
tested, compared to when object features were tested (Hollingworth & Rasmussen, 
2010; Treisman & Zhang, 2006). Object locations are not remembered as absolute 
coordinates, but objects are remembered to be in the array-relative locations, relative 
to other objects or anchors in the array (Hollingworth & Rasmussen, 2010). The 
relational binding leads to misremembering the location of multiple objects as closer 
to each other (Jiang, Olson, & Chun, 2000; Pertzov, Dong, Peich, & Husain, 2012), 
or closer to a salient cue like a landmark or the border of a stimulus array (Nelson & 
Chaiklin, 1980).  
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Object location might be important in maintaining a visual memory. Pertzov 
and Husain (2014) found that location was memorized whether it was relevant for a 
specific task or not. In their study, participants were asked to memorise object 
features. Participants exhibited more feature identification errors when multiple 
objects were presented at the same location, suggesting that the binding of non-
spatial object features might be mediated through an object’s location. Furthermore, 
it has been argued that spatial memory is conceptualized as a motor plan, so that 
memory for object location is coded as a motor plan from a specific body position to 
the target object (cf. Smith & Samuelson, 2010). 
Memory for object location might be represented at two levels of detail, the 
absolute, perceived location of an object or event and the category it belongs to 
(Huttenlocher et al., 1991), a suggestion that relates to the representation of absolute 
coordinates and categorical knowledge in spatial cognition (Postma et al., 2008). The 
fine-grained stimulus values (absolute location) is inexact, leaving room for 
contextual information like category membership to add to the memory. 
Furthermore, memory seems to be biased to the centre of a category it belongs to 
under the influence of this contextual information (Crawford, Huttenlocher, & 
Engebretson, 2000; Hollingworth, 1910). This extends the probabilistic model we 
discussed in the colour domain to spatial memory (Cibelli et al., 2016; Regier & Xu, 
2017). In this probabilistic model, spatial memory consists of the actual perception 
of an objects’ location and the category the object belongs to (Huttenlocher et al., 
1991; Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Vevea, 2000). For example, memorizing the location 
of a dot in a circle, participants misplaced the dot towards a central location within 
the respective quadrant when the circle was divided into quadrants (Huttenlocher et 
al., 1991). The details of fine-grain values of memory can wear off, for example by 
memory loss over time or by interference from contextual information, for example, 
a longer delay before recall leads to an increased estimation error (Pertzov et al., 
2012). A conceptual replication of these studies supported the influence of category 
on spatial memory (Holden, Newcombe, & Shipley, 2013). A location memory task 
using a 3D environment showed memory to be biased towards the centre of a 
category, and that this bias increased with longer retention intervals. Different 
sources can affect memory by averaging integrated information from different 
sources, for example: haptic information (Ernst & Banks, 2002), categorical 
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knowledge (cf. Coventry, Griffiths, & Hamilton, 2014; Hemmer & Persaud, 2014) or 
linguistic information (see Chapter 2). The use of contextual knowledge could be to 
help maintain accurate memories (Huttenlocher et al., 2000, 2004).  
1.4.6 Language and Memory 
There are many examples of the effects of language on memory. It has been 
found that language can elicit memory effects consistent with the ‘self-reference 
effect’. This self-reference effect entails that memory is enhanced when one feels 
s/he owns an object (Cunningham, Turk, Macdonald, & Macrae, 2008). Cunningham 
and colleages had participants engage in a picture sorting task. The participants 
worked with a confederate in a task sorting cards, which represented shopping items, 
into their own or the confederate’s basket. At the end of the sorting task, they got a 
surprise memory task at which point their memory performance was better for items 
sorted in their basket. Object ownership hereby showed to elicit the self-memory 
advantage (cf., Cunningham, Vergunst, Macrae, & Turk, 2013; Turk, van Bussel, 
Waiter, & Macrae, 2011).  
This effect has been extended by merely presenting possessive pronouns in 
combination with objects (Shi, Zhou, Han, & Liu, 2011). Shi et al. manipulated 
whether Chinese nouns describing items were followed by a first-person pronoun 
(my) or third-person (his) pronoun. Then, using key responses, half the participants 
had to judge whether they liked the item or not (contextual encoding) and the other 
half had to judge whether the nouns were presented in green or blue (perceptual 
encoding). This distinction was added to emphasize ownership in the contextual 
encoding condition compared to the perceptual encoding condition. Directly 
following the trials, participants completed a surprise memory test in which they 
were asked to recall the nouns. It was found that participants responded quicker to, 
and memory performance was better for, nouns presented in the my condition than in 
the his condition. The effects were stronger in the contextual encoding condition 
compared to the perceptual encoding condition, explained by the fact that ownership 
was more salient in the contextual encoding condition. Shi et al. (2011) concluded 
that the use of language – the possessive pronoun – effectively developed a sense of 
ownership, creating a ‘self-related’ or ‘other-related’ content to the noun referred to 
by the pronoun.  
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Language can also lead to memory errors (Feist & Gentner, 2007; Gentner & 
Loftus, 1979). For instance, Feist and Gentner (2007) showed that recognition 
memory for spatial scenes was shifted in the direction of spatial relational language 
(spatial prepositions) presented with scenes at encoding (see Figure 1.12). In their 
study, they presented participants with ambiguous pictures depicting spatial relations 
accompanied with or without spatially related sentences. For example, a picture of a 
block was presented ambiguously located on top of a building, as in Figure 1.12. In a 
spatial language condition, participants heard the sentence “the block is on the 
building”. When participants responded in a later yes-no recognition task, spatial 
language at encoding was associated with more false positives (in cases where the 
spatial language at encoding was associated with a more prototypical version of the 
spatial relation than the relation in the picture). In the example, the picture on the left 
would have more false positives. Feist and Gentner (2007) argued this is a result of 
an interactive encoding of language and visual memory, in which language 
influences the way people encode visual scenes. More broadly, language can be used 
as a task-related tool to aid memory and/or processing of spatial information (see for 
example Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008; Li, Abarbanell, Gleitman, & 
Papafragou, 2011) consonant with weaker versions of linguistic relativity (for 
review, see Wolff & Holmes, 2011).  
 
Figure 1.12. An example of a spatial scene combined with a verbal description 
from Feist and Gentner (2007). Memory data showed that participants reported 
more false positives in the direction of the verbal description (e.g., the block is 
on the building when the standard image does in fact not show this).  
 
1.4.7 Verbal overshadowing 
Other effects of language on memory are found in verbal overshadowing 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). A body of literature on verbal overshadowing 
– recently replicated in a many-labs replication (Alogna et al., 2014) – showed that 
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whereas repetition typically improves memory, it is found that verbally describing a 
situation decreases memory accuracy. In the original study, participants saw a 30s 
video of a bank robbery, followed by a 20-min filler task. After the filler task, 
participants were randomly assigned to a face verbalisation or a control group. The 
face verbalisation group were given 5 minutes to write detailed descriptions of the 
bank robber’s face, and were encouraged to describe each facial feature as detailed 
as they could. The control group were given 5 minutes for an unrelated task. 
Afterwards, both groups were presented with a slide containing eight similar faces, 
plus an option to say the robber was ‘not present’ on the slide. The group that had to 
describe the individual performed worse on a recognition task than a control group 
that did not engage in memory verbalization. Follow up studies tested whether the 
effect was caused by language, or whether face visualization has a similar influence. 
Visualization did not impair face recognition (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990).  
Verbal overshadowing might interfere in memory recall, but also changes 
memory. In a series of studies, the concept of verbal overshadowing was extended 
(e.g., Gentner & Loftus, 1979; Loftus, 1975; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus 
& Palmer, 1974). For example, participants saw videos of car accidents, after which 
they had to answer questions. The manipulation in these questions focussed on 
which words described the impact of the two cars, for example: contacted, bumped, 
or smashed. If the question had been “about how fast were the cars going when they 
smashed into each other?”, participants estimated higher speeds and were more 
likely to report seeing broken glass in a follow-up question (Loftus & Palmer, 1974). 
Other participants saw a video of a car driving around a neighbourhood, in which at 
some point the car drives by a yield sign. After the visual information was presented, 
participants were asked different questions, for example whether another car passed 
by when the car stopped at the stop/ yield sign. After the questions, participants saw 
slides pairs, for example depicting the car next to a stop or a yield sign, and 
participants had to pick the slide they had seen before. The accurate selection of 
either slide decreased from 75% to 41% based on the consistent vs. misleading 
information, suggesting a semantic integration of the verbal information into the 
visual memory. This is consistent with the perspective we discussed above, in which 
information from different modalities is processed in a feedback system, in which 
pattern completion generates a full representation of an event.  
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1.4.8 Summary of the Influence of Language on Cognition and Perception 
In this section we reviewed the influence that language can have on cognition 
and perception. We saw that language can do so indirectly, by focussing attention or 
assigning an object (e.g., colour) to a specific category. Upon recollection of a 
memory, general objects knowledge, like category membership, can merge with the 
actual perception memory and thereby influence memory for colour (Cibelli et al., 
2016) and object location (Coventry et al., 2014; Huttenlocher, 2004).  
In this thesis, we will explore the influence of pronouns (demonstratives and 
possessives) on spatial memory, and test whether the mere use of language to assign 
an object to a category can influence memory similar to the actual category 
membership (e.g., ownership) (see Chapter 2 and 3). Furthermore, we tease apart 
different models predicting effects of language on memory for object location. In 
Chapter 4, we test whether reference frames as expressed in language (spatial 
prepositions) affect eye-movements in a structural way. Before we do so, we will 
discuss the language we focus upon, pronouns and spatial prepositions, in some 
more detail. 
1.5 Demonstrative pronouns and spatial prepositions 
So far, we have reviewed research on the relationship between language and 
non-linguistic cognition. In the experimental chapters of this thesis, we will explore 
the influence that language has on non-linguistic cognition. We use demonstrative 
pronouns and spatial prepositions as a vehicle, because these types of language are 
both very frequent, clearly map onto a non-linguistic domain, space, and vary 
considerably across languages. In Chapter 2, we will test how demonstrative 
pronouns affect memory for object location. In Chapter 3, we compare how 
demonstratives are used in English and Japanese, and how this relates to their 
influence on memory for object location. In Chapter 4, we test the effect of reference 
frames as expressed in spatial prepositions on visual attention. Before moving to the 
experimental chapters, we will introduce demonstratives and spatial prepositions. 
Spatial demonstratives (e.g., this, that, here, there, etc.) are a small class of 
referential expressions, but a growing body of research shows the important role they 
play in language use. Their importance can be inferred from findings that every 
language has demonstratives, that there is no evidence these were derived from 
content words (such as verbs or nouns) – suggesting they are an early, individually 
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developed linguistic class – and the fact that they are among the most frequent words 
in language use (Diessel, 1999, 2006, 2014; Heine & Kutteva, 2002).  
Demonstratives did not only emerge early in language evolution; they are 
also acquired very early on in language learning. Deictic words are among the first 
words children acquire (in the form of sounds) - although the proximal/non-proximal 
contrasts (e.g., here, there, this, and that) take longer to master and are usually 
present by age two-and-a-half years of age (Clark & Sengul, 1978). Demonstratives 
are often accompanied by a specific deictic pointing gesture, which is usually 
acquired when children are 1 year old (Capirci, Iverson, Pizzuto, & Volterra, 1996; 
Cooperrider, 2016). Deictic terms, such as that are used to pick out many different 
kinds of objects (such as general purpose terms like do are used to indicate many 
different actions) (Clark & Sengul, 1978). With this early use of demonstratives, and 
the accompanying deictic pointing behaviour, a joint focus of attention can be 
established (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Joint attention is one 
of the most basic aspects of social cognition, in which conspecifics overlap focus of 
attention to achieve a common understanding of a referent, but it is also argued that 
this joint attention is necessary for the acquisition of language (Bruner, 1983). It is of 
note, however, that there is little empirical research that has experimentally tested the 
function of spatial demonstratives.  
There are different theoretical views on of the function of demonstratives. 
Spatial demonstratives might contrast discrete zones of peri-personal (near) and 
extra-personal (far) perceptual space (Bowden, 2014; Clark & Sengul, 1978; 
Coventry, Valdés, Castillo, & Guijarro-Fuentes, 2008; Diessel, 2006; Enfield, 2003; 
Peeters, Hagoort, & Ozyürek, 2014; Stevens & Zhang, 2013; Talmy, 1975), although 
there is no consensus yet on this deictic contrast (Kemmerer, 1999; Peeters et al., 
2014). The proposed contrast between peri-personal and extra-personal space is 
flexible and graded. Near space can be contracted by weight use (Longo & 
Lourenco, 2006), and the use of this is similarly extended when participants use a 
stick to point to objects (Coventry et al., 2008). However, the choice of 
demonstrative can be based on multiple dimensions (e.g., spatial, temporal, and task 
performance) (Byron & Stoia, 2005). Alternatively, it has been argued that 
demonstrative use cannot be explained by a mere egocentric account (Jarbou, 2010; 
Peeters et al., 2014; Peeters & Özyürek, 2016), and it has been claimed that there are 
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more parameters that are important in demonstrative use (Burenhult, 2003; Coventry 
et al., 2014; Jarbou, 2010; Özyürek, 1998). For example, Özyürek (1998) reported 
that in Turkish, a language with a three-way demonstrative system, the ‘medial’ 
demonstrative is used to encode an object in a hearer’s territory (in this thesis we  
will use the word ‘territory’ to describe an interlocutors’ personal space).  
Another view of demonstratives is that of the schema of focus for 
demonstrative reference (Oh, 2001; Strauss, 2002) which suggests that 
demonstratives are used to indicate different levels of importance, see Figure 1.13. In 
the schema, this indicates the highest importance to a referent, thereby signalling a 
hearer should pay more attention compared to that (medium focus of attention) and it 
(low focus of attention). 
Sampling over 200 languages, Diessel (2005) found that, while most 
languages have a demonstrative system expressing a two-way contrast (54.4%) (e.g., 
English: this/ that), a large group of languages employ a three-way system (37.4%). 
An example three-way system is Spanish, which is often assumed to have a distance 
based demonstrative system (‘este/ese/aquel’). The different demonstratives are used 
to indicate referents at different distances from the speaker: este is used to refer to 
objects close by, ese for objects at medium distance (a place between close by and 
far away), and aquel for objects far away (empirically tested in Coventry et al., 
2008). Coventry et al. found that both English and Spanish languages showed a 
relation between distance and demonstrative use, in which distance of an object from 
the speaker is verbally encoded. However, while Spanish may be distance based like 
English, it is important to test whether languages maybe fundamentally different in 
 Form MEANING 
SIGNAL 
Hearer Referent 
 
 
Degree of the 
attention to pay 
to the referent 
This HIGH FOCUS New information 
(not shared) 
Important 
(to speaker) 
That MEDIUM 
FOCUS 

 

 
It LOW FOCUS shared 
information 
Unimportant 
Figure 1.13. The ‘Schema of Focus for Demonstrative Reference’ (Strauss, 2002), 
suggesting that demonstratives can be used to ascribe different levels of importance to a 
referent.  
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how they use demonstratives and/or structure space, as it has been argued that the 
principles underlying demonstratives are similar despite superficial differences (Luz 
& van der Sluis, 2008). In Chapter 3, we compare English with Japanese. It has been 
proposed that Japanese is among a group of languages that are ‘person-centred’ 
(Diessel, 1999), although this is still subject of debate.  
The other type of language we will focus on are spatial adpositions (e.g., in 
front of, behind, left, right). Just like demonstrative pronouns, this type of language 
is acquired early on in language and is high in frequency. Furthermore, across 
languages, there are only few prepositions that can be used to encode a wide variety 
of spatial relations. Next to that, languages vary massively in how they encode 
spatial relations using prepositions (Bowerman, 1996; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993). 
For example, in English the word ‘on’ would be used to encode many relations (e.g., 
the plate on the table, the painting on the wall, the passenger on the bus, the fly on 
the window, the napkinring on the napkin). In German and Dutch, these relations 
would be marked with different prepositions (e.g., the plate auf/op the table, the 
painting an/aan the wall, the passenger auf/in de bus, the fly an/op the window, the 
napkinring om/um the napkin) (example based on: Bowerman, 1996; Deutscher, 
2005). Another variation in preposition use is how relations are categorized. For 
example, English distinguishes whether an object is placed in containment or on a 
surface, whereas Korean makes a distinction on whether the relation is a tight-fit or 
loose-fit regardless of containment or support (Choi et al., 1999).  
In Chapter 4, we focus on how spatial prepositions influence visual attention 
by expressing a frame of reference (cf., Levinson, 1996), as discussed in Section 
1.3.4. Spatial prepositions can encode space based on different reference frames: 
intrinsic, relative, absolute (see Figure 1.14). For example, the marble can be located 
based on the intrinsic axis of the ladybird (“in front of”), the marble can be located 
relative to the ladybird (“to the left”), or by using an absolute reference frame (“the 
marble is south of the ladybird”). In Section 1.4.1, we reviewed how language can 
focus attention. In Chapter 4, we will present a study exploring whether there are 
differences between how spatial prepositions focus attention on a visual array.  
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Figure 1.14. Example of different reference frames. The marble is ‘in front of’ the 
ladybird, from an intrinsic perspective of the ladybird. However, the marble is to the left 
relative to the ladybird based on the perspective of the man. Using an absolute reference 
frame, based on cardinal directions, the marble is south of the ladybird.   
 
1.6 Précis of thesis 
So far we have seen that more research on the influence of language on non-
linguistic cognition and perception is needed. Not only are results mixed, there are 
also many pitfalls in the relevant studies (cf., Firestone & Scholl, 2015, see Table 
1.1). Even though it seems language can influence non-linguistic cognition, hitherto 
there has been limited consideration regarding how language affects cognition and 
perception. In this thesis, we explored the relationship via spatial cognition. In 
Chapter 2, we identified three models offering a mechanism as to how language 
might influence memory for object location. Over four experiments, we tested 
predictions of models suggesting the mechanism is driven by the expectation that 
language elicits (the Expectation model); that the influence is a function of 
congruence, in which performance is enhanced when language and perception are 
congruent and diminished when there is incongruence (the Congruence model); and 
that a difference is driven by the difference in the focus of attention elicited by 
language (the Attention Allocation model). To preview our results, across four 
experiments we find evidence supporting the Expectation model, which suggests that 
language affects spatial memory by the expectation of object location it elicits. 
However, as different languages carve up the spatial world in different ways, it is 
important to see how these supposed expectation values affect a language in which 
the use of demonstratives is not as clear; for example languages employing a three-
way demonstrative system. 
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In Chapter 3, we compare English and Japanese demonstratives, as Japanese 
is one of the languages with a three-way demonstrative system. In four experiments, 
we tested how Japanese demonstratives are used and what the influence of 
demonstratives on spatial memory is. Testing between four models explaining the 
use of Japanese demonstratives, we show that Japanese demonstratives encode both 
distance and territory. This ambiguity in language use manifests in the memory data, 
as the data does not reveal a clear pattern as we found with English in Chapter 2. 
However, interestingly, we did find an effect of the position of a conspecific in 
English, even though this parameter is not explicit in English. This could suggest 
that there are non-linguistic universal parameters underlying demonstrative use.  
In Chapter 4, we test the influence of language (specifically reference frames) 
on visual attention. We tested whether different reference frames (intrinsic: the 
marble is in front of/ behind; relative: the marble is to the left/right; and included a 
neutral condition: the marble is blahblah) expressed in English, influence the way 
we scan the world. We find distinctive eye-movement patterns of fixations between 
the two objects in a visual array, elicited by the different reference frames. These 
different patterns are consistent across prime and succeeding probe trials, suggesting 
a close relation between attention and verbal descriptions of visual scenes. Chapter 5 
is the concluding chapter in which we situate the findings in existing literature, 
discuss limitations of the presented work and suggest future directions.
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Chapter 2 – The Influence of Demonstratives and Possessives on Spatial 
Memory; Four Experiments  
2.1 Introduction 
The relationship between language and non-linguistic representations is a 
fundamental topic in the cognitive sciences. Often this relationship is approached 
from the standpoint of the extent to which non-linguistic representations are 
necessary for language comprehension (e.g., within the framework of ‘embodied’ 
cognition; cf. Barsalou, 1999). However, as reviewed in Chapter 1, the extent to 
which language can influence non-linguistic processes is equally important 
(Coventry, Christophel, Fehr, Valdés-Conroy, & Herrmann, 2013). Language can 
direct the attention of a conspecific to the spatial world; spatial expressions, such as 
these coins or the cup is on the table serve to direct the attention of a hearer to 
regions of space (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). The pairing of language with 
visual events and images also affects memory for the spatial world. For example, 
Loewenstein and Gentner (2005) found that children performed better in a mapping 
task when spatial relations were paired with spatial language at encoding (e.g., “I’m 
putting the book on the shelf”). They argue that relational language fosters the 
development of representational structures that facilitate cognitive processing (cf., 
Dessalegn & Landau, 2008, 2013; Farran & O’Leary, 2015; Hermer-Vazquez et al., 
1999).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, language presented with a spatial scene can lead 
to memory errors (Feist & Gentner, 2007; Gentner & Loftus, 1979). Feist and 
Gentner (2007) presented participants with a spatial scene, combined with spatial 
language and showed that recognition memory for spatial scenes was shifted in the 
direction of the spatial relational language (spatial prepositions) presented with 
scenes at encoding. Language can be used as a tool to aid memory and/or process 
spatial information (see for example Feist & Gentner, 2007; Frank et al., 2008; Li et 
al., 2011). 
The effects of language on memory are not limited to spatial cognition. It has 
also been found that presenting possessive pronouns in combination with a memory 
task enhances response times and memory for objects (Shi et al., 2011). Shi et al. 
presented Chinese nouns preceded by a pronoun (my/ his). Participants had to scale 
the presented nouns for likeability before completing a surprise memory test. In the 
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my condition, participants responded faster and showed a better memory 
performance for the nouns than in the his condition.  
Although language can influence memory, it has yet to be demonstrated how 
it does so. In this chapter, our focus is on the (possible) influence of spatial 
demonstratives and possessives on memory for object location. The continuous 
nature of spatial memory errors affords testing directly between different potential 
mechanisms regarding how language affects memory for object location.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, spatial demonstratives (specifically that) are 
among the earliest words children learn (Diessel, 2006) and have been shown to be 
associated with discrete zones of peri-personal (near) and extra-personal (far) 
perceptual space (Clark & Sengul, 1978; Coventry, Valdés, Castillo, & Guijarro-
Fuentes, 2008; Diessel, 2006; Lynott & Coventry, 2014; Peeters, Hagoort, & 
Ozyürek, 2014; Stevens & Zhang, 2013). However, this distinction is flexible and 
graded. Near space can be extended or contracted by tool or weight use (Longo & 
Lourenco, 2006), and the use of this is similarly extended when participants use a 
stick to point at objects (Coventry et al., 2008). In Coventry et al. (2008), the 
memory game was a cover to test how people used demonstratives to refer to objects 
at different distances. In this memory game, participants sit at a long table without 
any spatial cues (see Figure 2.15). Objects were placed at the different locations, and 
participants were told their memory for these object locations was tested. As they 
were in a language condition, they had to ‘verbally encode’ (with other people – not 
actually tested – in the no-language condition) the location of an object at different 
distances, using three words: a demonstrative (this/that), the colour, and name of the 
object (e.g., ‘this red circle). The ‘memory game’ cover meant that participants’ 
demonstrative use could be tested, while participants thought that the study was 
about spatial memory and were unaware of the significance of their demonstrative 
choice.  
In addition to distance, other variables affect demonstrative choice. 
Employing variations on this memory game procedure, Coventry et al. (2014) 
explored the relationship between object knowledge and distance on both 
demonstrative choice in English and memory for object location. Different 
parameters of objects knowledge were manipulated (e.g., whether the participant 
owned the object, was familiar with the object, and could see the object during 
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‘memory encoding’. Furthermore, Coventry et al. (2014) ran an actual memory 
study. In these experiments, participants memorized the respective location of 
different objects. On every trial, participants would get time to encode an objects’ 
location, and, after object removal, were asked to match the position of an indication 
stick to the location they remembered the object had been placed. The influence of 
object knowledge on memory for object location was tested by comparing the 
remembered location to the actual object location. Across seven experiments 
Coventry et al. (2014) found that object familiarity (i.e., familiar versus unfamiliar 
coloured shapes), object ownership (whether the participant owned the object or not) 
and object visibility (whether the object was covered with an opaque cover or not) all 
affected demonstrative choice to describe object location and had a similar effect on 
(non-linguistic) memory for object location. For example, unfamiliar objects (low 
frequency colour-shape combinations, such as a viridian nonagon) were 
preferentially referred to with that, and were misremembered as being further away 
than they actually were relative to familiar objects (e.g. red square). The other 
parameters provided similar results: when the participant owned or saw (during 
encoding) the used object they were more likely to say this and thought it was closer 
by compared to when they did not own or see (during encoding) the object. In other  
 
Figure 2.15. Schematic representation of the experimental setup in the memory game. Objects 
are placed on the coloured location marks on the table, each at 25cm further from the 
participant (Coventry et al., 2008).  
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words, results showed that referents that were preferentially referred to with this 
were remembered to be closer to the participant, relative to that. Based on these 
results, Coventry et al. (2014) proposed the expectation model.  
In the current studies, we aim to tease apart predictions about how language 
influences special memory contrasting three models: the Expectation model, the 
Congruence model, and the Attention allocation model. It is important to note that 
the Expectation model is presented previously by Coventry et al. (2014), whereas the 
Congruence model and the Attention allocation model are not in previous literature. 
We derived these models from previous findings and formulated them to enable 
comparisons between the respective lines of research.  
2.1.1 Expectation model 
In order to account for both the demonstrative choice data and the memory 
data, Coventry et al. (2014) proposed a model of the influence of object knowledge 
on both measures. In their Expectation Model, memory for object location is a 
concatenation of where an object is located and where an object is expected to be 
located (see Figure 2.16). The expectation of the objects’ location concatenates with 
the actual object location (with an associated estimation error) in memory, as 
follows: 
MD = f(Da,Dexp,Derr) 
where M = signed memory error, D = distance, a = actual, exp = expected and err = 
estimation error (Coventry et al., 2014).  
The expectation of object location can be elicited by object knowledge, for 
example from the parameters tested in Coventry et al. (2014). Participants 
preferentially referred to objects they owned, saw, or were familiar with using this, 
indicating a closeness to the objects, whereas if they did not own, saw, or were 
familiar with the objects, participants preferentially used that, marking a certain 
distance from the object. These results showed a parallel with the results in memory 
trials. Objects placed in conditions in which participants prefer to use this were 
remembered to be closer by compared to objects participants did not own, knew, or 
saw. The expectation model assumes that the information on which demonstrative 
contrasts are based, also influences the encoding or reconstruction of memory. 
Rather than memorizing the location of an object based on absolute coordinates 
derived from visual perception, it seems that different sources of information about 
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an objects’ location are combined to store and/or reconstruct this location. One of 
these sources is the actual perceived distance of an object, another source might be 
the knowledge one has about the object and where it is expected to be placed from 
long-term memory. A concatenation of these two sources, combined with an 
estimation error, is the memorized location of an object. The Expectation model does 
not specify whether this influence of different variables works during the original 
perception (and therefore influences memory at the encoding stage) or whether the 
influence works at the stage of retrieval. However, since the effects of the memory 
tasks are parallel to the effects of the language production task (Coventry et al., 
2014), one could speculate that a top down effect is already present during encoding. 
We will discuss this in Chapter 5. 
It might be noted that an effect of the distance between an observer and the 
object of which the location is remembered, is not explicitly encoded in the 
Expectation model (Coventry et al., 2014). This does however not mean that the 
Expectation model does not allow for an effect of this distance. For example, we 
could speculate that the distance of an object affects the precision in perception at the 
level of the actual distance. When objects are in peripersonal space, the need to make 
accurate moevements to manipulate these objects in reachable space may mean that 
object locations within peripersonal space should be remembered quite accurately. 
When objects are in extrapersonal space, the actual encoding of location is more 
noisy and the exact location of that object will be perceived less accurately (i.e., 
when one has to remember the location of an object placed at 50cm distance, 
distance estimation can be precise to the milimeter; when one has to remember the 
location of an object placed on the other side of a lake, distance estimation will be 
precise to the meter rather than milimeter). In other words, this scale difference 
would influence the precision of object location memory at the level of the actual 
perceived location of an object. Alternatively, the effect of distance might influence 
at the level of the estimation error: the further away an object is located, the larger 
the estimation error will be. As there is a general tendency to overestimate object 
location, distances become more marked as the object is positioned further away. 
Relevant to the current studies, is that Coventry et al. (2014) did not examine 
the influence of language on memory for object location. However, by extension, the 
expectation model makes predictions regarding how language might affect memory 
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for location. As this is associated with near space and that with far space, one can 
assume that the expected distance value associated with that would be greater than 
the expected value distance associated with this. Combined with the actual distance, 
the expectation model therefore predicts a main effect of language on memory for 
object location, with that associated with (mis)memory for objects further away than 
they actually were compared to this (Figure 2.16a).  
2.1.2 Congruence model 
In contrast to the expectation model, there is a considerable body of work 
within an ‘embodied cognition’ framework providing evidence for the importance of 
(in)congruence effects between language and space, that makes different predictions 
from the expectation model. For example, it has been shown that participants 
respond more quickly to positively valenced stimuli in a congruent high location 
than an incongruent low location, and vice versa for negative stimuli (e.g. Barsalou, 
2008; Meier & Robinson, 2004; cf., Lynott & Coventry, 2014). What one might term 
a ‘congruence account’ has been extended to movement planning, whereby 
movements are prepared based on given language (Bonfiglioli et al., 2009; see also 
Stevens & Zhang, 2013). For example, Bonfiglioli et al. (2009) required participants 
to grip an object after listening to an instruction that indicated whether the object was 
near or far. They found an interaction in which reaction times were significantly 
longer when language was incongruent with space compared to when language and 
space were congruent. In extending this congruence account to memory for object 
location, one would predict a similar interaction. Congruence in language and space 
enhances the accuracy of memory for location, with greater errors (without 
specification of direction) when there is a mismatch between the demonstrative and 
location, as follows: 
MD = f(Da,C,Derr) 
where M = signed memory error, D = distance, a = actual, C = congruence of 
language with location and err = estimation error (Figure 2.16b). 
In other words, the Congruence model predicts that language influences 
memory performance via the congruence between a linguistic (spatial) description 
and a spatial situation. Using the contrastive nature of demonstratives, this indicates 
an object is closer by compared to that. When the demonstrative use is appropriate 
for a spatial situation (e.g., this for objects close by, that for objects further away), 
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the linguistic cue enhances the memory compared to a situation where the used 
demonstrative is inappropriate for the spatial situation (e.g., that for objects close by, 
this for objects further away) - the incongruence between demonstrative and the 
situation distorts the memory and results in a larger memory performance error. The 
main difference between the Congruence model and the Expectation model is that 
the Congruence models predicts a specific interaction between language and 
location. Since this is the appropriate demonstrative for objects close by, but not for 
objects further away (whereas that is appropriate for objects further away, but not for 
objects close by), the effect of this will be different at different locations (mirrored 
by the effect of that). In contrast, the Expectation model predicts that the effects of 
this and that are similar across locations. Our results can therefore tease apart these 
two models. If the data show a cross-over interaction (as visualised in Figure 2.16b), 
this would be inconsistent with the Expectation model, but support the Congruence 
model. If the data does not show this type of interaction, this would falsify the 
Congruence model. 
2.1.3 Attention allocation model 
Distinct from both the Expectation and Congruence models, the effect of 
language on memory can work via the allocation of attention. A large literature 
shows that language affects where one looks in a visual scene, for example in terms 
of fixating particular objects when they are mentioned (e.g., Allopenna, Magnuson, 
& Tanenhaus, 1998; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). 
Building on earlier work, it is possible that language also affects the amount of time 
one spends looking at an object. This has been suggested to indicate high focus of 
attention, compared to that, which would indicate medium attention (Oh, 2001; 
Strauss, 2002). This importance could be driven by the fact that this is associated 
with proximity to a speaker. One might speculate that participants might look longer 
at an object at a location when preceded with this compared with that, as visual 
attention is allocated preferentially to near objects compared to objects further away 
(Garrido-Vásquez & Schubö, 2014). Following evidence that longer looking times 
are associated with better memory performance (e.g., Huebner & Gegenfurtner, 
2010), one might then predict better accuracy of recall for trials preceded with this 
compared with that.  
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Alternatively, we can look at the difference between demonstratives and a 
neutral determiner. Since it is argued that demonstratives encode more information 
than merely a proximal/distal distinction (Jarbou, 2010; Özyürek, 1998; Peeters & 
Özyürek, 2016), it would be expected that demonstratives elicit more attention than a 
determiner would – since the determiner does not convey any information about the 
referent. If this would be the case, it might be expected that fixation times are longer 
in demonstrative conditions (this/ that) compared to the determiner condition (the). 
In Experiment 4 we used eye tracking during the encoding phase, to investigate  
whether differences are driven by attention allocation (Figure 2.16c).   
Research is often subject to the trade-off between ecological validity and 
experimental control. Past methods used to determine the function, use, and 
understanding of demonstratives range from studies with high ecological validity, 
but low experimental control, to studies with high experimental control but low 
ecological validity (Cooperrider, Slotta, & Núñez, 2016; Enfield, 2003; Pederson & 
Wilkins, 1996; Peeters, Hagoort, & Özyürek, 2015; Stevens & Zhang, 2013, 2014; 
Wilkins, 1999). Observational studies like Cooperrider et al. (2016) and Enfield 
(2003) are high on ecological validity, but lower on experimental control. A bit 
further on the scale of experimental control are Wilkins (1999) and Pederson and 
Wilkins (1996). In these studies a structured questionnaire was used to ask 
   a
 
b    c  
Figure 2.16. Predictions by the different models, from left to right: a. Expectation Model, b. 
Congruence Model, c. Attention Allocation model. On the y-axis the signed memory error (the 
difference between the actual location and the remembered location) is presented, a higher 
value on the y-axis means an object is remembered as being further away than it actually was. 
The lines represent the performance with different demonstratives (this/that); in Experiment 3 
this and that are replaced respectively by my and your. In 2.16a and 2.16b, the six distances 
from the participant (in cm) used in Experiment 1, 2, and 3 are plotted. In 2.16c, the x-axis 
represents the total possible fixation time (10 seconds) for participants in Experiment 4. In 
Figure 2.16c more attention leads to a smaller memory error, and this is predicted to elicit 
more attention than that.  
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participants which demonstrative they would use in a number of hypothetical 
situations. This method increases experimental control, in the situations that are 
suggested, but are lower in ecological validity since participants have to imagine the 
hypothetical situations in which they would use demonstratives. Furthermore, asking 
participants about their intuitions about demonstrative use opens up the possibility of 
bias, in which participants could generate their own theory about demonstratives or 
what an experimenter might be looking for, thus not producing demonstratives 
naturally (cf., Firestone & Scholl, 2015). Studies with a high experimental control 
are lab studies, for example testing demonstratives while scanning brain activity 
using EEG (Peeters et al., 2015; Stevens & Zhang, 2013, 2014). These studies score 
high on experimental control – all images are exactly the same for participants and 
responses are time-locked per presented situation, while brain activity is measured, 
but the ecological validity is lower. For example, the use of photographs on which 
distance is manipulated is arguably not a fair test of the influence of distance on 
demonstrative use when the whole image on the screen is in peri-personal space. 
Methods used by the papers mentioned above each have their perks and the memory 
game we used is not meant to be a substitute any of these methods, but rather 
complementary, retaining the strengths of various approaches within one single 
paradigm. Key is that the method retains high experimental control while ensuring 
that participants use language naturalistically, in a real life, three-dimensional space, 
without being aware that researchers were exploring language. Our aim was to test 
whether language affects memory for object location, and to elucidate the 
mechanism involved. Specifically, we aimed to tease apart the three accounts by 
examining the effects of demonstrative and possessives on memory for object 
location. Experiment 1 and 2 tested whether spatial demonstratives affected memory 
for object location with contrasting predictions from two possible models of how 
language affects memory: congruence vs. expectation. Experiment 3 tests whether 
the effects found for demonstratives also occur for possessives (my/your) – terms 
that have also been associated with the peri-personal/ extra-personal space 
distinction. Experiment 4 tests predictions from the attention allocation model using 
eye tracking. 
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2.2 Experiment 1. The influence of demonstratives on spatial memory  
2.2.1 Method. 
2.2.1.1 Participants.  
Eighteen native English-speaking students took part, receiving either course 
credit or payment for their participation. Stereoacuity was measured using the 
Randot Stereotest (Stereo Optical Inc. Chicago, USA). Two participants were 
eliminated from analysis, as they did not have a threshold of 40” (arcseconds). This 
left 16 participants for the analysis, 8 males and 8 females, with an age range of 19-
30 years old (M = 20.5, SD = 2.8). 
2.2.1.2 Materials 
Six distinguishable, different coloured shapes on plastic discs (e.g. yellow 
triangle/blue heart), 6.5 cm in diameter, were placed on six different locations. The 
locations were spaced equidistantly along a midline from the participants’ edge of a 
large conference table (L = 320, W = 90cm), starting at 25cm from the participant up 
to 150cm. The three dots that were closest to the participants were located within 
peri-personal space, while the remaining three dots were within extra-personal space 
(confirmed for each participant). The table was covered with a black cloth so that no 
spatial cues were present. 
2.2.1.3 Procedure and design. 
Participants sat as close to the table as was comfortable, to ensure that all 
participants were approximately the same distance from the objects. Then, the 
memory version of the ‘memory game’ (described in section 2.1), pioneered by 
Coventry et al. (2014) was explained. As in previous variants of the memory game, 
participants were told the experiment was testing memory for object location. Each 
trial, the participant was asked to read out an instruction card indicating at which 
location to place a specific object. In this experiment, we used 6 different objects and 
combined those with the 6 locations closest to the participant, each 25cm further, 
starting at 25cm up to 150cm from the participant. In the current adaptation, we 
manipulated the language – demonstrative pronoun: this/that/the - used to instruct 
object placement. The instructions all had the form: “Place [demonstrative (3)] 
[object (6)] on the [colour (6)] dot” (e.g., “Place this/that/the red triangle on the blue 
dot”). Following the instruction, participants closed their eyes while the 
experimenter placed the object as instructed. The participant had 10 seconds to view 
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the object and to memorize the object location before the object and the dots were 
removed and the experimenter went behind a curtain to present an indication stick. 
Next, the participant verbally instructed the experimenter to match the near edge of 
the indication stick to the remembered near edge of the object location. Participants 
were then required to verbally indicate the demonstrative used on the instruction card 
to ensure they had attended to the instructions (see Figure 2.17). 
There were two demonstratives (this/ that) and a neutral determiner (the), six 
locations and six objects. Participants were presented with six practice trials, after 
which 54 experimental trials were conducted (consisting of three trials of every term 
on every location: 3×3×6). The indication stick was presented at a distance of 10cm 
(counterbalanced to be further or nearer) from the actual location. Within the first 10 
trials, there were three filler-trials in which the indication stick was presented at a 
distance of 20cm from the object location, to prevent the initial placement of the 
stick becoming a cue for the object location. Trials in which a participants’ estimate 
of the object location was >10cm from the original location were repeated. At the 
end of the experiment, reaching distance was measured for each participant. Every 
participant could reach only the first three dots. The ‘memory game’ cover meant 
that participants were not aware that we were interested in the differences between 
demonstratives (confirmed during debrief). 
 
Figure 2.17. The participant reads out the instruction card, memorizes the object location, 
and subsequently instructs the experimenter to move the indication stick so it is aligned 
with where the edge of the object was. Finally, the participant recalls the demonstrative 
used on the instruction card they read out at the start of the trial.  
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2.2.2 Results 
The memory data is presented in Table 2.2. A 3 × 6 (demonstrative × 
location) ANOVA was performed on the memory data (see Table 2.3). The memory 
data is expressed as the difference between the actual location and the memorized 
location, or the signed memory error.  
There was a strong main effect of location, F(5,75) = 4.32, p < .01, ηp² = .22, 
but no effect of demonstrative (p = .96) nor an interaction (p = .44), indicating that 
there is no effect of the use of demonstrative pronoun on memory for object location. 
Alternatively, it is possible that participants did not process the demonstrative on the 
instruction card. In the current procedure participants read out the instruction card 
with the demonstrative, but we cannot be sure participants actually attended to the 
demonstratives as they were reading them on the instruction card. To be sure 
participants attended the differences in language we ran the study again with a minor 
alteration. In Experiment 2, participants engaged in exactly the same memory game 
paradigm, but an extra task is introduced. At the end of each trial, participants 
recalled the demonstrative as presented on the instruction card. As a cover story, we 
told participants the additional task increased cognitive load and make the memory 
game more challenging.  
 
Table 2.2. Mean distance error memory errors (cm) in each condition by distance in 
Experiment 1. 
Experiment 1 condition 25 cm 50cm 75cm 100cm 125cm 150cm 
  (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) 
Demonstratives
* this 0.48 1 2.06 0.74 3.6 2.7 
  (0.55) (0.59) (0.73) (1.06) (0.63) (1.68) 
 that 0.42 1.21 0.99 1.94 1.7 3.93 
  (0.55) (0.68) (0.96) (0.92) (1.06) (1.02) 
 the 0.32 0.63 0.95 2.64 2.17 3.09 
  (0.4) (0.5) (0.67) (0.74) (0.87) (1.12) 
* mean distance error in cm, the 0 value represents the actual object location. 
 
Table 2.3. Results of the ANOVA on Memory for Object Location in Experiment 1. 
Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Demonstrative (D) F(2,30) = .042 0.407 0.958 0.003 
Location (L) F(5,75) = 4.324 51.463 0.002 0.22 
D x L F(10,150) = .970 8.86 0.472 0.061 
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2.3 Experiment 2: The influence of demonstratives on spatial memory (with 
demonstrative recall task) 
          Experiment 2 is similar to Experiment 1, with the exception for an added 
demonstrative recall task. This allows us to test whether participants actually 
remember the different demonstratives used in the instructions. 
2.3.1 Method. 
2.3.1.1 Participants.  
Thirty-six native English speaking students1 were tested, receiving either 
course credit or payment for their participation. Stereoacuity was measured using the 
Randot Stereotest (Stereo Optical Inc. Chicago, USA). Two participants did not have 
a threshold of at least 40” and were excluded. Two additional participants were 
excluded because they had more than 10% incorrect answers in the demonstrative 
recall task. This left 32 participants, 9 males and 23 females, with an age range of 18 
– 31 years old (M = 20.78, SD = 3.14). 
2.3.1.2 Procedure and design 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, but the demonstrative recall task 
was added. At the end of each individual trial participants recalled the demonstrative 
indicated on the instruction card. Failed recall of the demonstrative meant the trial 
was repeated at the end of the experiment2. However, if a participant could not recall 
the demonstrative at >10% of the trials, they were to be excluded from the analysis. 
Even though the demonstrative recall task emphasized the differences in language on 
                                                 
1 Sample size is based on Coventry et al., 2014 
2 Trials were repeated if the recalled location was >10cm from the original location 
as well. 
Table 2.4. Mean distance errors (cm) in each condition by distance in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
Con-
dition 
25cm 
(SEM) 
50cm 
(SEM) 
75cm 
(SEM) 
100cm 
(SEM) 
125cm 
(SEM) 
150cm 
(SEM) 
Demonstratives* This 
0.64 1.64 2.53 2.21 2.64 2.42 
(.38) (.5) (.63) (.78) (.77) (.71) 
 That 
2.04 2.18 2.36 3.3 3.42 4.33 
(.36) (.45) (.62) (.76) (.74) (.82) 
 The 
1.7 1.35 1.1 2.51 2.28 2.1 
(.28) (.55) (.63) (.74) (.75) (.95) 
* Mean distance error in cm, the 0 value represents the actual object location. 
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the instruction cards, participants were not aware of the aim of the study – this was 
confirmed during debrief.   
2.3.2 Results and discussion 
The memory displacement data – that is, the difference between the recalled 
distance and the actual distance between the recalled distance and the actual distance  
measured in centimetres – are displayed in Table 2.4. Note that the error is signed, a 
positive value indicates that an object was (mis)remembered as further away than it 
actually was (and a negative value was closer by). Generally speaking participants 
overestimated the location of an object, a phenomenon that has been found very 
early on in spatial cognition (Hollingworth, 1910).   
A 3 × 6 (demonstrative × location) ANOVA was performed on the memory 
displacements (see Figure 2.18). The assumption of sphericity was violated in both 
the location and the demonstrative × location analysis. We therefore used the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction for these analyses. There was a main effect of 
demonstrative, F(2,62) = 6.68, p < .01, ηp² = .18 (see Table 2.5), showing an effect 
of language on memory for object location: follow up (LSD) tests showed significant 
differences between locations accompanied by the that (M = 2.94, SE = .42) 
compared to both the this (M = 2.01, SE = .41) and the the (M = 1.84, SE = .47) 
conditions (both p’s < .01; see Figure 2.18). There was a marginal effect of location, 
F(5,155) = 2.33, p = .08, ηp² = .07, suggesting that memory for object location 
deteriorated with distance, consistent with the previous studies. Importantly, there 
was no interaction between demonstrative and location, F(10,310) = 1.4, p = .21, ηp² 
= .043. The results therefore support the expectation model rather than the 
congruence model; this leads to more accurate object location memory than that, 
irrespective of the congruence between the specific demonstrative and location. We 
                                                 
3 An exploratory analysis showed no interactions between demonstrative and gender, F(2,60) = 1.456, 
p = .241, ηp² = .046 nor demonstrative, location, and gender, F(10,300) = 1.398, p = .212, ηp² = .045. 
Table 2.5. Results of the ANOVA on Memory for Object Location in Experiment 2. 
Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Demonstrative (D) F(2,62) = 6.682 67.097 0.002 0.177 
Location* (L) F(5,155) = 2.325 59.266 0.078 0.07 
D × L* F(10,310) = 1.399 12.767 0.21 0.043 
*Greenhouse-Geisser correction  
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next considered whether the same pattern of results might emerge with a different 
language manipulation involving possessives. 
2.4 Experiment 3. The influence of possessives on spatial memory 
Some studies have shown that ownership improves memory for objects (S. 
Cunningham et al., 2008; Shi et al., 2011; Turk et al., 2015) and influences how 
people physically interact with objects (Constable, Kritikos, & Bayliss, 2011). For 
example, Cunningham et al. (2008) had a participant and a confederate sort cards 
with pictures of shopping items into their own basket or the other person’s basket. At 
the end of the trials participants completed a surprise memory test for the objects 
depicted on the cards. Participants had more accurate memories for self-owned 
objects than objects owned by a conspecific.  
In another study, specifically targeting memory for object location, Coventry 
et al. (2014), found that object ownership affected memory for object location (and 
demonstrative choice). Using the memory game paradigm participants were given a 
set of coins in payment at the start of the experiment, and the coins placed at 
different to-be-remembered locations were either those coins or coins owned by the 
experimenter of the same denominations. Participants misremembered the 
conspecific’s coins as being further away than their own coins.  
One of the problems with the ownership studies described above is that they 
cannot easily distinguish between an effect of the abstract concept of ownership and 
an effect of the possessives (my/your) used to indicate ownership during task 
instruction. For example in Coventry et al. (2014), coins were given to participants 
 
Locations (in cm) from participants 
Figure 2.18. Results of Experiment 2, error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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as participant payment at the start of the task to confer ownership, but language 
during the task itself involved by necessity the use of possessives (e.g. “Place your 
coin on the red dot”) in order to disambiguate which coin was to be placed during the 
task. It is therefore unclear whether language indicating ownership (possessives), or 
the conceptual representation of ownership itself, or a combination of the two drive 
the effect of ownership. Here we investigated whether possessives have the same 
influence on memory for object location as did the demonstratives in Experiment 2, 
whether personal possessives alone are able to drive memory effects, and again, 
whether the expectation vs. congruence models offer a better account as to how 
possessives affect memory for object location.  
2.4.1 Method. 
2.4.1.1 Participants.  
Thirty-nine native English speaking participants were tested, as in 
Experiment 2. Five participants were excluded as they did not score above the 
threshold of 40” (N=2), had more than 10% mistakes in the memory task (N=2) or 
could not reach the 50cm point (N=1). This left 34 participants; 14 male and 20 
female, with an age range of 18 – 44 years old (M = 23.76, SD = 4.87). 
2.4.1.2 Procedure and design 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 2, with the exception that the 
demonstratives were replaced with possessives (my, your; the the condition was 
retained). In order to able to distinguish between an actual ownership effect and a 
language effect of possessives, participants did not own any of the objects, and all 
objects were used in all language conditions. 
2.4.2 Results and discussion 
The memory displacement data are displayed in Table 2.6. A 3 × 6 
(possessive × location) ANOVA was performed on the difference (in centimetres) 
between the actual position of an object and the memorized position (See Table 2.7). 
There was a main effect of possessive, F(2,66) = 8.25, p = .001, ηp² = .2, showing 
that objects in the your condition (M = 1.89, SE = .43) were remembered as being 
significantly further away than objects in both the my condition (M = .81, SE = .34)  
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and the the condition (M = 1.11, SE = .34), both p’s < .01; see Figure 2.189). A 
significant effect of location was also found, F(5,165) = 3.47, p = .01, ηp² = .1,  
showing that accuracy deteriorated as the objects were placed further away. These 
results are compatible with earlier studies on ownership. However, as all objects 
were used in all language conditions, there was no actual sense of ownership over 
any of the objects; the ownership was only marked by the use of possessives. This 
shows that possessives on their own affect memory for object location. 
Additionally there was an interaction between possessive and location, 
F(10,330) = 2.25, p = .03, ηp² = .06. However, as can be seen in Figure 2.19, the 
interaction pattern is consistent with the Expectation model and is not consistent 
with the Congruence account: there is no crossover between peri-personal and extra-
personal space as would be expected in the congruence account. However, the effect 
of distance does seem to vary as a function of language. To further unpack this, we 
ran three one-way ANOVAs to test location effects by term, revealing that there was 
only a reliable peri-personal/extra-personal effect in the your and the conditions (p < 
.05). This effect was absent in the my condition (p > .05; see Figure 2.19). This 
Table 2.6. Mean distance errors (cm) in each condition by distance in Experiment 3 
Experiment 
3 
Condition 
25cm 
(SEM) 
50cm 
(SEM) 
75cm 
(SEM) 
100cm 
(SEM) 
125cm 
(SEM) 
150cm 
(SEM) 
Possessives* 
My 
0.2 1.05 0.67 1.08 0.63 1.25 
 (.3) (.55) (.49) (.39) (.61) (.72) 
 Your 
0.68 1.14 1.06 3.32 2.35 2.77 
(.27) (.62) (.7) (.72) (.77) (.68) 
 
 
The 
0.4 0.21 1.14 2.27 2.27 0.33 
(.3) (.53) (.47) (.56) (.72) (.8) 
* mean distance error in cm, a value of 0 represents the actual object location 
     
Table 2.7. Results of the ANOVA on Memory for Object Location in Experiment 3. 
Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Possessive (P) F(2,66) = 8.246 62.857 0.001 0.2 
Location* (L) F(5,165) = 3.471 62.71 0.013 0.095 
P × L* F(10,330) = 2.254 23.383 0.034 0.064 
*Greenhouse-Geisser 
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suggests that memory for owned objects maybe particularly enhanced, overriding 
any effect of peri-personal versus extra-personal space4. 
 
2.5 Experiment 4. The influence of attention on spatial memory (Eye-tracking 
method) 
So far the results are consistent the Expectation model. However, it is 
important to also consider the possibility that the results might be caused the 
influence that language has on attention allocation (Allopenna et al., 1998; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995). Visual attention is allocated preferentially to objects nearby, 
compared to objects further away (Garrido-Vásquez & Schubö, 2014) and longer 
fixation times lead to better memory performance (Huebner & Gegenfurtner, 2010; 
Naveh-Benjamin, 1987, 1988). Therefore, the predictions of memory error in the 
Expectation Model and what we have coined an “Attention Allocation Model” are 
similar, but differ in underlying mechanism. The Expectation Model predicts that 
memory for object location is a function of the language used to refer to the object 
(and the expectation of location associated with that language) combined with actual 
object location. The Attention Allocation model suggests memory for object location 
is a function of the fixation time and the object location. An alternative explanation 
for the results of Experiment 2 could therefore be the Attention Allocation Model, as 
                                                 
4 An exploratory analysis showed no interactions between possessive and gender, F(2,64) = 
1.241, p = .296, ηp² = .037; location and gender, F(5,160) = .928, p = .928, ηp² = .006, nor possessive, 
location, and gender, F(10,320) = 1.406, p = .208, ηp² = .042. 
 
Locations (in cm) from participants 
Figure 2.19. Results of Experiment 3, error-bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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driven by longer fixation times to objects paired with this versus that rather than 
differences in expectation values. In this experiment, we used eye tracking to 
measure participants’ looking time during encoding. That allowed us to measure the 
time a participant fixated on objects in each language condition to see whether 
attention might account for the main effect of language reported above.  
A second aim of Experiment 4 is to explore the connection between 
demonstratives and reference frames. As peri-personal space is the area within our 
grasp, this can be seen as an ‘action space’ in which objects are mapped onto an 
egocentric reference frame, compared to extra-personal space which may be mapped 
onto an allocentric reference frame (ter Horst, van Lier, & Steenbergen, 2011). If the 
language effect in the first two experiments is driven by the expectation raised by the 
specific use of language, then this expectation may result in different use of 
reference frames. We explored whether encoding object location onto an egocentric 
reference frame resulted in more searching behaviour along the sagittal line, to 
encode distance from the participant, compared to encoding onto an allocentric 
reference frame, which could result in more searching behaviour along the coronal 
line (see Figure 2.20). Results could help distinguish between models that predict 
solely an influence of egocentric representations on spatial memory versus ‘two-
system’ models that predict a parallel egocentric and allocentric representations in 
object location memory (see Burgess, 2006). 
2.5.1 Method. 
2.5.1.1 Participants.  
Nineteen participants were tested as in Experiment 2. Three participants were 
excluded from the analysis as the eye-tracker could not be calibrated. All participants 
showed a score of at least 40” in the depth perception task. This left 16 suitable 
participants for the analyses, 5 male and 11 female, with an age range of 18 – 22 (M 
= 19.19, SD = 1.17).  
2.5.1.2 Procedure and design 
The procedure was based on Experiment 2, but in this experiment, 
participants wore SMI eye-tracker glasses (30Hz binocular eye tracking glasses). For 
this reason, only 4 positions were used – two locations in peri-personal space and 
two in extra-personal space. (The location at 25cm was too close for the eye-tracker 
and the location 150cm too distorted). Before the experiment started, the glasses 
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were calibrated using marks on the wall. After that, we validated the calibration four 
times throughout the experiment by having participants look at the four different 
locations on the table. The eye-tracking data were coded using semantic gaze 
mapping5. As the angle from the participant to the object was different for every 
location, the standard error in calibration of the eye-tracker image was slightly 
different per location. These distortions had to be accounted for in the semantic gaze 
mapping. Therefore, the coding was slightly less stringent for further locations 
compared to closer locations. For the furthest location, any fixation within an area of  
6.5 cm (equivalent to the diameter of the object discs) around the object was marked 
as a fixation on the object. In the nearest location any fixation within an area of 3.25 
cm (half an objects’ diameter) was marked as a fixation on the object (see Figure 
2.21b). Although the coding was adjusted for the different distances, this does not 
detract from the results as the adjustments were conducted across the different 
language conditions. The gaze mapping data were used in a 3 × 4 (demonstrative × 
location) design, investigating the differences in total fixation time (ms) on the 
object. 
  
                                                 
5 This involves the manual coding of video-based eye-tracking data, by which 
fixations are coded on a gaze map. 
Figure 2.211b. 
Object area in 
semantic gaze 
mapping 
Coronal 
Figure 2.21a. 
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searching behavior 
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2.5.2 Results and discussion 
The memory displacement data and the fixation times are displayed in Table 
2.8. The memory data were analysed in a 3 × 4 (demonstrative × location) ANOVA.  
A main effect of demonstrative was found, F(2,30) = 5.77, p < .01, ηp² = .28, 
in which recalled distances for object location in the that condition (M = 1.77, SE = 
.68) were significantly further away than those in the this condition (M = -.07, SE = 
.79), p < .05. The this condition distances were also significantly closer than in the 
the condition (M = 1.2, SE = .59), p < .05 (see Figure 2.23). This replicates the result 
of Experiment 2. There was also a main effect of location, F(3,45) = 9.69, p = .001, 
ηp² = .39, in which participants’ accuracy deteriorated as locations were further 
away. There was no interaction effect between demonstrative and location, F(6,90) = 
1.61, p = .15, ηp² = .1, which means that the effect of language was the same across 
locations6.  
  
                                                 
6 An exploratory analysis showed no interactions between demonstrative and gender, F(2, 28) = .735, 
p = .488, ηp² = .05, nor demonstrative, location, and gender, F(6, 84) = 2.313, p = .077, ηp² = .142. 
Table 2.8. Mean distance errors (cm) in Memory data and fixation time (ms) for Gaze 
data, by distance 
Experiment 3 Condition 
50cm 
(SEM) 
75cm 
(SEM) 
100cm 
(SEM) 
125cm 
(SEM) 
Memory data* This 
-1.54 -0.28 0.55 1 
(.71) (.78) (1.59) (.92) 
 That 
-0.32 0.61 2.73 4.06 
(.79) (.81) (1.19) (1.09) 
 The 
-0.88 -1.06 2.29 4.77 
(.49) (1) (1.41) (1.06) 
Gaze data** This 
4179.2 5242.07 5525.92 5755.62 
(389.08) (406.67) (435.47) (436.49) 
 That 
4805.17 5216.23 5498.52 5403.98 
(348.06) (491.92) (445.73) (471.89) 
 The 
4826.967 5275.9 5621.11 5416.56 
(540.49) (468.50) (487.86) (606.53) 
* mean distance error (cm)     
** fixation time (ms)     
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To see whether the language effects found were driven by a mechanism as 
hypothesized by the Expectation Model or the Attention Allocation Model, we next 
examined the gaze data collected during encoding. A 3 × 4 (demonstrative × 
location) ANOVA was used to analyse object fixation time. We found no effect of 
language, F(2,30) = .13, p = .81, ηp² = .009 (this, M = 5175.70, SE = 345.44; that, M  
= 5230.97, SE = 257.65; the, M = 5285.14, SE = 416.76) suggesting that the 
language effect is not driven by differences in attention (See Figure 2.22). There was 
a location effect, F(3,45) = 4.66, p < .01, ηp² = .24, showing that participants fixated 
longer on locations further away. However, this location effect could be due to the 
differences in coding caused by distance, as explained in Figure 2.211b. There was 
no interaction effect between demonstrative × location, F(6,90) = .62, p = .71, ηp² = 
.04. 
  
Table 2.9. Results of the ANOVA on Memory and Gaze data in Experiment 4. 
  Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Memory 
data Demonstrative (D) F(2,30) = 5.771 57.81 0.008 0.278 
 Location* (L) F(3,45) = 9.69 288.487 0.001 0.392 
 D × L F(6,90) = 1.611 14.916 0.153 0.097 
Gaze 
data Demonstrative* (D) F(2,30) = .133 261845.06 0.812 0.009 
 Location (L) F(3,45) = 4.655 9297167.3 0.006 0.237 
 D × L F(6,90) = .622 896923.92 0.712 0.04 
*Greenhouse-Geisser     
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In a second analysis, we explored the connection between demonstratives and 
reference frames, and specifically to test whether people use different coordinate 
systems to remember object locations, based on spatial language. Fixations were 
coded as sagittal searching behaviour, if a sequence of two or more fixations fell 
within a range on either side (left/ right) of the white location stick, the range being  
 
Location (in cm) from participants 
Figure 2.22. Gaze data from Experiment 3, based on summed fixation time on the objects in the 
respective language condition at the respective locations averaged per trial (in ms). Total looking 
time is 10000ms. Error-bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Locations (in cm) from participants 
Figure 2.23. Behavioural data of Experiment 3, error-bars are 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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3.25cm from the sides for the closest location and 6.5cm from the furthest location. 
These distances were based on the size of an object on the respective location as 
represented on the screen (the actual objects had a diameter of 6.5cm). Fixations 
were coded as searching behaviour along the coronal line if a sequence of two or 
more fixations fell within a range above or below the object location. The range was 
half an objects’ size for the closest location and one objects’ size for the furthest 
location along the coronal plane. Fixations coded as fixations on the actual object 
were excluded from this analysis, so no fixation was used twice. After this coding, a 
ratio of fixations was calculated (coronal / (sagittal + coronal) (see Figure 2.21a. ). 
A 3 × 4 (demonstrative × location) ANOVA was performed.  There was no 
main effect for demonstrative, F(2,30) = .15, p = .86, ηp² = .01; this M = .42, SE = 
.07; that M = .4, SE = .09; the M = .42, SE = .08), nor location, F(3,45) = .2.25, p = 
.13, ηp² = .13, nor an interaction with distance, F(6,90) = .78, p = .59, ηp² = .05, 
suggesting that the language effect was not caused by differences in search-
behaviour7. Based on these data, we cannot distinguish between different models for 
the use of reference frames in memory for object location.  
2.6 General discussion 
Over four experiments, we tested the influence that language has on memory 
for object location. The results of Experiments 2, 3, and 4 (where the language 
manipulation was explicit) showed that language affects memory for object location, 
with main effects of language in all three studies. In all experiments, the language 
manipulation was the same for participants. However, in Experiment 1, we did not 
test whether participants attended sufficiently to the language manipulations as they 
were reading them out, and effects of language on memory were absent in this 
experiment. By adding the demonstrative recall task at the end of every trial, we 
controlled whether participants remembered the language manipulation throughout 
the trials. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a difference in results between 
Experiment 1 and the other experiments merits some further discussion. The 
difference between Experiment 2, 3, and 4, in which we found an effect of language, 
and Experiment 1, in which we did not, is that we did not include a demonstrative 
                                                 
7 In an exploratory analysis we did not find any interactions of gender with demonstrative, 
F(2,28) = .1.035, p = .368, ηp² = .069, location, F(3,42) = ..455, p = .715, ηp² = .031, demonstrative 
and location, F(6,84) = .717, p = .637, ηp² = .049.  
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recall task in the latter. The demonstrative recall task adds the possibility to control 
whether participants attended to the demonstrative on the instruction card. However, 
this extra control could have led to demand characteristics, in which participants 
guessed the aim of the study and behaved accordingly. To test for this, we tested 
upon debrief whether participants knew what the study was about. None of the 
participants named the possibility that we tested for the influence of demonstrative 
on memory for object location, indeed most participants seemed to buy into our 
cover story that the demonstrative recall added cognitive load to the memory task.  
The use of both demonstratives (Experiment 2 and 4) and possessives 
(Experiment 3) affected memory for object location. These results are consistent 
with previous studies showing an influence of language on memory for spatial 
relations (Feist & Gentner, 2007; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005), and also with the 
effects of object knowledge on object location memory reported by Coventry et al. 
(2014). We have found robust effects of language on object location memory, 
together with an effect of distance on memory for object location. We first consider 
explanations for these results prior to implications for theories of language and 
memory more generally.  
Three possible accounts of the influence of language on object location 
memory were set out prior to designing the present series of experiments: the 
congruence account, the expectation account, and an attention allocation model. The 
difference between the expectation and congruence models is the prediction of an 
interaction in the latter, and a main effect of language without an interaction in the 
former. The expectation model, proposed by Coventry et al. (2014), to explain object 
knowledge effects on memory, maintains that language elicits an expectation about 
an objects’ location, which is concatenated with actual object location, leading to the 
prediction that the language effect should be the same for objects in near space and 
far space. In contrast, the congruence account predicts that memory should be more 
accurate for trials in which language is congruent with the object location, predicting 
an interaction between language and location; congruent trials (where this/ that are 
respectively combined with near/ far space) should be remembered more accurate 
than incongruent trials (in which this/ that are respectively combined with far/near 
space). In Experiments 2 and 4 there was no interaction, supporting the expectation 
account. In Experiment 3 (possessives) there was an interaction, but this effect was 
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driven by the absence of a location effect for the my condition and not by 
congruence/incongruence contrasts. Thus, as a whole, results of the current 
experiments all support the expectation model. 
Experiment 4 tested the third possibility that different types of language 
might result in different amounts of attention paid to objects/locations, with 
associated differences in memory performance. Put simply, the longer one spends 
looking at an object, the better one’s memory for object location. The eye tracking 
data from this experiment revealed no differences in viewing time as a function of 
demonstrative. Participants did not present different searching behaviour based on 
different demonstratives, allowing us to rule out the attention allocation model.  
Given that the results support the expectation model, there are three key 
issues that merit discussion. First, we can consider the relationship between the 
expectation model and memory models more broadly. Memory for object location is 
often taken to involve memory for the location in which an object is positioned, 
memory for the object itself, and a binding between object location and object (see 
for example Postma & Haan, 1996). Previously, Coventry et al. (2014), finding 
effects of object knowledge on memory for object location, argued against memory 
models that prioritize object location over object knowledge (e.g. the model of Jiang 
et al., 2000, who argued that location may act as an anchor to which object properties 
are attached). However, the effects of language on memory for object location and 
the previous effects of object knowledge reported are consistent with variants of 
object file theory (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984; Treisman & Zhang, 2006), in 
which object location may or may not be one of the features integrated in the file. 
Location features appear not to be bound to an absolute location but are defined 
relative to an abstract representation, which leads to memory errors (see 
Hollingworth & Rasmussen, 2010; Pertzov, Dong, Peich, & Husain, 2012). This 
focus on relative location can explain how spatial language can cue memory for 
object location, via the expectation of the objects’ location relative to the speaker or 
another object. Wang and Spelke (2002) suggested that the human representational 
system depends in some way on language, by which humans can go beyond the 
limits of orientation systems as are found in animals. This influence of language 
skills may facilitate more flexible problem solving (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 2001). 
One can speculate that the advantage is that such a relative, dynamic system enables 
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us to mentally process arrays in different contexts (e.g. a desk or the universe), using 
the same language and concepts.  
Second, one needs to unpack in more detail how the expectation model 
works, and in particular, how the expectation values form and how they combine 
with the actual distance information available. Coventry et al. (2014) do not offer 
detail regarding this, but they assume that the expectation model works via the 
prediction of object location as a product of the history and context of past bindings 
between language, objects and location. For example, objects owned by people are 
more likely to be near people than equivalent objects owned by someone else. This 
likelihood is then used to predict future encounters with objects: if an object is 
owned, one would anticipate the object is nearer than if one does not own the object. 
This anticipation works similarly for the visibility and familiarity parameters 
Coventry et al. (2014) identified. Respectively, visible objects are usually closer than 
objects one cannot see, and familiar objects are more likely to be near us than 
unfamiliar objects. This anticipation-mechanism could be accommodated by 
correlational learning (see Pulvermüller, 2012) - the process in which neurons that 
fire together strengthen their connections and become more tightly associated (also 
known as potentiation). Such a mechanism has been implicated not only in mapping 
language to perception (Coventry et al., 2013), but also how one learns how words 
co-occur to form meaningful language structures during language learning (Saffran, 
Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Saffran, 2002). In the current experiments, language 
elicited the expectation. When participants memorised object location, they do not 
remember absolute coordinates, but they remember a construct of what they know 
about the object location, a construct build of the visual information and object 
knowledge they have about the object location. If a participant owned the object of 
which s/he was required to remember the location, the remembered object location is 
likely to be closer. The expectation raised by the object knowledge drives the 
difference in memory for object location. The predictive values would therefore be 
consistent with the concept of probabilistic learning, similar to how people learn 
language, as discussed at the start of this chapter (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 
2009; Clark & Sengul, 1978; Li et al., 2011; Saffran et al., 1996). 
The Expectation Model can also be extended outside spatial language, both in 
cases where language is explicit during a task (as in our studies), but also in cases 
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where language may not be explicit, but may nevertheless affect non-linguistic 
performance. For example evidence from colour perception (Jerome S. Bruner et al., 
1951; Delk & Fillenbaum, 1965) has shown similar effects of the influence of object 
knowledge on memory. Object knowledge influences categorization of objects, so 
that participants judge objects within a category to have a more similar hue than 
objects between categories. For example, in an array of letters and numbers, 
participants judged symbols within a respective category to be more similar in colour 
than between categories, even if the two, between categories, target symbols were 
identically coloured (Goldstone, 1995). In another series of studies, it was shown 
that colour memory and colour perception judgements are influenced by the 
characteristic colour of an object. These object knowledge effects were stronger in 
objects with a high colour diagnosticity (e.g. yellow for a banana) than in objects 
with low colour diagnosticity (yellow for a lamp) (Belli, 1988; Jerome S. Bruner et 
al., 1951; Hansen et al., 2006; Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). These ‘top down’ effects 
on colour perception are consistent with the idea that knowledge of expected hue 
combines with actual hue information leading to categorization errors. Such an 
account merits further testing in this domain.  
More broadly the Expectation Model is consistent with models of predictive 
coding (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2005; Lupyan & Clark, 2015). Clark (2013) describes a 
unifying model of perception and action, suggesting that the human brain 
continuously predicts a future state of the world. The brain prepares a response based 
on this prediction and only needs to process the error signal, the difference between 
the prediction and the updated visual input, once this new state emerges. This means 
that instead of processing or ‘creating’ a full response, the brain only needs to adjust 
the predicted response to be appropriate to the actual input. Friston described this as 
the free energy principle, suggesting that adjustments of the prediction error take less 
energy than surprise would (Friston, 2009). In the Expectation Model, the prediction 
is based upon learned associations between language, objects and locations (for 
example via statistical/ correlational learning), and it is these associations that can 
then reduce the work needed to process continually changing object location 
bindings on a moment to moment basis. In terms of spatial memory, the predictive 
coding account would suggest that by regenerating a spatial position of an object 
SECTION 2 – Experimental Chapters 
 
68 
 
based on parts of information (visual input, verbal descriptions), is a more efficient 
use of resources than memorizing the absolute coordinates of an object. 
A third issue that needs discussion is whether the effects of language operate 
at the level of encoding or retrieval. One possibility is that this, for example, actually 
activates peri-personal space more when looking at an object than that, and therefore 
that the memory differences are a direct result of differences in peri-personal space 
activation during encoding. Such a view is consistent with recent models of 
perception (e.g. Bar, 2009) that incorporate top-down predictions from memory as a 
mechanism during the act of perceiving. Alternatively, it is possible that the 
influence of language only occurs at retrieval, with remembered distances migrating 
in the direction of the remembered demonstrative/possessive. This would be 
consistent with effects found in verbal overshadowing (Alogna et al., 2014; Schooler 
& Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and eye-witness testimony (E. Loftus et al., 1978; E. 
Loftus & Palmer, 1974; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985) literature.  
Furthermore, to test between alternatives suggesting the effect takes place at 
encoding vs. retrieval, it is possible to run neuroimaging studies to measure the 
degree of peri-personal space activation while viewing objects under different object 
knowledge and/or language conditions (see Coventry et al., 2014 for discussion). A 
second way one can get at this issue relates to memory decay: if the influence of 
language operates at retrieval, then the longer the time interval, the greater the 
effects of language there should be. We are currently exploring these possibilities.   
In summary, we found a main effect of language (demonstratives and 
possessives) on memory for object location across experiments. We teased apart the 
predictions of three different models explaining this mechanism: the Expectation 
model, the Congruence model, and the Attention allocation model. Overall, results 
favoured the Expectation model, suggesting that the expected location of an object – 
cued by language (e.g., this for referents close by; that for referents further away) – 
and the actual location concatenate, leading to (mis)memory for object location.  
However, languages vary widely in how they encode space (Munnich, 
Landau, & Dosher, 2001; E Pederson et al., 1998). Therefore, cross-linguistic 
research needs to explore whether languages other than English encode via the same 
Expectation Model, for example, when those other languages use a different 
demonstrative system. Since 37.4% of the world’s languages employ a three-way 
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demonstrative system (Diessel, 2006), it is important to evaluate which both how 
these contrasts in different demonstratives systems work, and how they they might 
influence memory. In Chapter 3, we will run a cross-linguistic study in which we 
compare English with Japanese, a language in which the three-term demonstrative 
system is thought to encode either egocentric distance (from the speaker), or person 
centeredness. In two experiments, we will test how demonstratives are used in 
Japanese and how demonstratives affect memory for object location. We also 
compare the Japanese data with data from two new English experiments, to be able 
to compare Japanese and English data using a similar, slightly altered procedure.  
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Chapter 3 – The Use and Influence of Japanese Spatial Language on Spatial 
Memory 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we saw effects of spatial demonstratives on memory for object location 
in speakers of English. Using the ‘memory game’ method devised by Coventry and 
colleagues (Coventry et al., 2014, 2008), participants were presented with objects 
positioned at various distances in front of them on a table and had to direct a stick to 
where the object had been positioned following its removal. Instructions indicating 
which object to place and where to place it - e.g. place this/that/the red triangle on 
green dot – manipulated the demonstrative presented just prior to object placement. 
The results across experiments indicated strong effects of language on memory for 
object location. That is associated with (mis)remembering objects further away than 
they actually were (relative to this). Critically, however, the data also allowed 
teasing apart between different possible accounts as to how language affects memory 
for object location.  
 Coventry et al. (2014) originally proposed the ‘expectation model’ in order to 
account for the effect of object knowledge on memory for object location, and object 
knowledge effects on choice of language to describe objects placed at different 
distances. In the expectation model, memory for object location is a concatenation of 
where the object is and where it is expected to be. For example, when presenting the 
word that, it is assumed in the model that that is associated with a larger expected 
distance value compared to this. When combined with actual distance, this model 
predicts a main effect of demonstrative on memory for object location. In contrast, 
Gudde et al. (2016) considered two alternative models as to how language may 
impact upon memory for object location. The ‘congruence model’ assumes that the 
mapping between the demonstrative and distance determines memory errors. When 
there is a mismatch between demonstrative and location (i.e., this when an object is 
out of reach; that when an object is within reach), one might expect that there is a 
greater error associated with memory than when the demonstrative and location 
match. More specifically, one would expect an effect of demonstrative when 
incongruence occurs, but not when the term and location are congruent (see Chapter 
2, Gudde et al, 2016, for discussion). Finally, an alternative view of demonstratives 
is that the function of demonstratives is to direct the focus of attention of an 
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interlocutor to a location. This effect could be between contrasting demonstratives, 
for example, the ‘schema of focus for demonstrative reference’ suggests that this 
elicits the highest focus of attention, compared to that (medium focus) and it (low 
focus) (Oh, 2001, based on Strauss, 1993; Strauss, 2002). An alternative, (e.g., 
Peeters, Hagoort, & Ozyürek, 2014), is that demonstratives encode relative location. 
In this case, one would expect that the implicit information conveyed by 
demonstratives would elicit longer looking times compared to a neutral determiner. 
As memory is more accurate the longer one attends to an object (Huebner & 
Gegenfurtner, 2010), these hypotheses would predict behavioural results similar to 
the expectation model, but also predict different looking times either between 
demonstratives, or between demonstratives and a neutral determiner. 
The data in Chapter 2 (Gudde et al., 2016) favour the expectation model. In 
all experiments, there was a main effect of language on memory for object location, 
objects paired with that were misremembered as being further away than they 
actually were relative to objects paired with this or the. Crucially, demonstrative at 
encoding did not interact with distance or any other variables (as predicted by the 
congruence model), and demonstratives were not associated with paying differential 
attention to the placed object (as measured using eye tracking) as one might expect if 
demonstratives serve to draw attention to object locations or different territories (cf. 
Peeters et al., 2014).  
 Coventry et al. (2014) suggested that demonstrative systems across languages 
might reflect a common set of constraints, underlying non-linguistic perception and 
memory, which is explicit in the demonstrative systems of some languages but 
affects demonstrative usage in languages that do not employ these explicit 
distinctions. While the expectation model fits the data across ten experiments to date 
(seven in Coventry et al., 2014; three in Gudde et al., 2016 (Chapter 2)), the data 
thus far are for only one language, English. Given that there are 6,000-8,000 
languages used around the world, it would be both ethnocentric and premature 
(Evans & Levinson, 2009) to assume that language affects memory in the same way 
across languages. While demonstrative systems may be as good a candidate as any 
for semantic universal status (Deutscher, 2005; Diessel, 1999, 2006), it is the case 
that demonstrative systems vary considerably cross-linguistically. In the most 
comprehensive typological analysis to date, Diessel (2005) sampled over 230 
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languages, noting that approximately 54% show a binary demonstrative contrast 
(English among them), and approximately 37% exhibit a three-way demonstrative 
system, including Spanish (este, ese, aquel) (Coventry et al., 2008) and Japanese 
(kono, sono, ano) (Diessel, 2014). The remaining languages possess three or more 
demonstratives, affected by a range of parameters, including ownership, visibility 
and slope (uphill/downhill). The focus of this chapter is to explore how language 
influences memory for spatial location across two languages – Japanese and English.  
 Talmy (1983) observed two different explanations of how spatial language 
can code different conceptual domains, dependent on the mutual exclusivity of 
spatial prepositions. If spatial prepositions define clear boundaries, spatial 
prepositions could refer to a classification of the relationship between objects, using 
necessary and sufficient characteristics. This would mean that a spatial preposition is 
mutually exclusive of other spatial prepositions. If however spatial categories do not 
clearly define boundaries, Talmy suggested spatial prepositions could be 
representative of relationships. This would mean that multiple spatial prepositions 
could be used for the same spatial relation (see also Hayward & Tarr, 1995). This is 
directly applicable in exploring the difference between English and Japanese – if 
Japanese demonstratives can encode multiple parameters; Japanese offers a higher 
degree of uncertainty in demonstrative interpretation. 
 The variation in demonstrative systems across languages opens up the 
possibility that different demonstrative systems pose different constraints on memory 
when demonstratives are presented with objects at encoding. In particular, when a 
language has three or more lexical items in their demonstrative systems, involving 
dimensions that are not mutually exclusive, it is quite possible that the expectation 
model does not apply. For example, Japanese has a demonstrative system that might 
be either distance based and/or person-centred. The latter construct assumes that 
demonstratives are affected by the position of a conspecific, in which there would be 
a distinct speaker space, hearer space and space far from both speaker and hearer 
(e.g., Diessel, 2014). If this is the case (and we test this empirically in Experiment 5), 
then this presents an interesting problem for speakers when one considers the 
expectation model. As egocentric distance and distance computed from the hearer (if 
the hearer is opposite the speaker, for example) give two different (conflicting) 
expectation values, speakers may have to choose between egocentric versus other-
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centric perspectives in order to retrieve a single expectation value for the model to be 
operable. Alternatively, it is possible that speakers with more complex demonstrative 
systems do not behave according to the expectation model, with language either not 
affecting memory for object location at all, or alternatively affecting memory in 
accordance with one of the other models we discounted for English (see Chapter 2, 
Gudde et al., 2016).  
 In summary, our main goals are two-fold. First, we aim to understand how a 
three-term demonstrative system works using the memory game procedure. Japanese 
is the language of choice as it might be distance centred, person centred, or a 
combination of the two. Second, we test the influence of Japanese demonstratives on 
memory for object location in order to test whether the expectation model fits the 
pattern of data for a language with a more complex demonstrative system. To 
preview the results, we show that Japanese is both distance and person centred. 
Interestingly, the position of a conspecific also influenced English participants. Even 
though English does not explicitly encode the position of an interlocutor, English 
and Japanese data were consistent. Although we appreciate more cross-linguistic 
research is necessary before actual claims can be made, this tendency could suggest 
that there are universals underlying demonstrative use.   
3.2 Experiment 5. Spatial demonstrative use in Japanese 
Japanese uses three demonstratives: kono, sono, ano (built from the prefixes 
ko-, so-, a-), but it is unknown how these demonstratives map onto the world. They 
could encode the distance from a speaker, or the territory in which an object is 
located (near the speaker, near the hearer, or far from both). However, they might 
encode both distance and territory, as a function of the spatial configuration of 
interlocutors, or even contrast non-deictic parameters. We first discuss different 
possible models regarding the function of Japanese demonstratives before testing 
between them.  
Model 1: The distance model. This suggests that different demonstratives, as 
in English and Spanish (see Coventry et al., 2008), are used based on the referents’ 
(egocentric) distance from the speaker. Kono refers to an entity close to the speaker, 
sono is used for an entity at a greater distance, and ano is used to refer to an entity at 
a greater distance still (see Figure 3.24) (e.g., Ootsuki (1889), as read in Nakamura, 
2012).  
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Model 2: the territory model. This suggests that the Japanese demonstrative 
system encodes a referents’ distance based on interlocutors’ territories: encoding the 
speakers’ (kono) or hearers’ (sono) territory, or that the object out of both 
interlocutors’ territories (ano), (Sakuma, 1936; Sakata, 1971, as cited by Hasegawa, 
2012; Hattori, 1992; Niimura & Hayashi, 1994). The Japanese demonstrative system 
is often referred to as ‘person-centred’ assuming this underlying model (i.e., Diessel, 
1999).  
Model 3: Dual system (distance plus territory). In this model, speakers 
encode both distance and territory using demonstratives, choosing distance or 
territory as a function of the spatial configuration of interlocutors. When 
interlocutors are located opposite each other, demonstratives encode territory. But 
when they share a territory, demonstratives encode egocentric distance of a referent 
from their shared territory, as in the “theory of territory of information” (Kamio, 
1994).  This theory argues that psychological proximity between speaker/hearer and 
the referent determines the choice of one model over the other (cf. Hoji, Kinsui, 
Takubo, & Ueyama, 2003). Furthermore, an adapted version of this model 
(Yoshimoto, 1992, 1986) suggests a contrast between personal space (directly 
surrounding the speaker) and interactional space (the space around interlocutors) 
space (cf. Wilkins, 1999). In this model, sono is used to refer to reference in 
interactional space (irrespective of distance from speaker or hearer), instead of 
hearer’s territory.  
Model 4:  Double binary system. Mikami (1970, 1992, as cited by Hasegawa, 
2012) proposed that the three demonstratives contrast different parameters. In this 
model, space is carved up based on territory, speaker’s (kono) and hearer’s (sono), 
but ano cannot be used in this situation. When the speaker and hearer face the same 
direction, they perceive themselves together in opposition to others. The joined 
territory of speaker and hearer is expressed by kono, that of others by ano. In this 
model, there are two different contrasts in which kono and sono are opposites, and 
kono and ano, but in which sono and ano are never contrasted (Hasegawa, 2012).  
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Model 1: Distance model Model 2: Territory model  
 
 
 
Model 3: Dual-system model 
a) when speaker and hearer share territory 
  
   
 
 
 
b) when speaker and hearer do not share territory 
  
 
Model 4: Double binary 
a) when speaker and hearer share territory  
   
 
 
 
b) when speaker and hearer do not share territory
  
 
Figure 3.24. The four different models of Japanese demonstratives. In Model 1, 
demonstratives encode distance from speaker (irrespective of the position of the 
conspecific), whereas in Model 2 demonstrative is territory-based, encoding the location of 
an object in relation to hearers’ or speakers’ territory. Model 3 and 4 both include two 
possible spatial configurations: when speaker and hearer share territory and when they do 
not. Model 3 is the dual-system model, in which all three demonstratives can encode both 
distance and territory, as a function of the spatial configuration of interlocutors – when they 
share territory (a), demonstratives encode egocentric distance; when interlocutors are facing 
each other (b), demonstratives encode territory. Model 4 is the double binary model, in 
which distance (a) and territory (b) can both be contrasted using demonstratives, but in 
which only 2 demonstratives can be used in each contrast.  
 
Experiment 5 set out to test between these different models of Japanese 
demonstrative use. We adapted a version of the memory game paradigm to 
manipulate the position of a conspecific, with locations either within the participant’s 
or the conspecific’s territory (and therefore out of conspecific’s or participant’s peri-
personal space respectively), or far from both participant and conspecific. Note that 
this experimental setup can discriminate between the four different models. Since 
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Model 1 and 2 are mutually exclusive, the encoding of either distance (Model 1) or 
territory (Model 2) falsifies the other. If both distance and territory are encoded, we 
can tease apart Models 3 and 4 by examining demonstratives use in specific trials. If 
only two demonstratives are used at each of the conspecifics’ positions (kono and 
sono when territory is shared; kono and ano when territory is not shared), this is 
inconsistent with Model 3. If participants us all three demonstratives at both the 
conspecifics’ positions, this falsifies Model 4.  
In Experiment 6, we tested a group of English speakers (on their use of 
English demonstratives), allowing us to compare Japanese and English speakers. 
Previously, Coventry et al. (2008) found that the use of demonstratives in both 
English and Spanish is affected by distance from a speaker (peri-personal versus 
extra-personal space), but not the position of a conspecific. However, Coventry et al. 
manipulated the position of the conspecific between participants, with relatively 
small sample sizes, which may have reduced the chances of finding an effect of this 
variable. In Experiment 6, we manipulate the position of the conspecific within 
participants for English as well as Japanese. 
3.2.1 Method. 
3.2.1.1 Participants. Thirty-three native Japanese speakers were tested at the 
University of East Anglia, receiving payment for their participation. One participant 
did not engage in the experiment8 and performed poorly on the memory probe trials, 
and was therefore excluded from analysis. This left 32 participants (25 female) with 
an age range of 19-49 years old (M =26.5, SD = 8.25).  
3.2.1.2 Materials. Six distinguishable, different coloured shapes on plastic 
discs (e.g., yellow triangle/blue heart), 6.5 cm in diameter, were placed on 6 different 
locations. The locations were spaced equidistantly along a midline from the 
participants’ edge of a large conference table (L = 325, W = 122cm), starting at 
25cm from the participant up to 300cm (Coventry et al., 2008). We used six 
locations (see Error! Reference source not found.), divided over three spaces, b
ased on the territory and distance models describing Japanese demonstrative 
systems: peripersonal locations at 25cm and 50cm from the participant, in the 
participants’ territory and closest to the participant, extra-personal for both 
                                                 
8 Upon debrief, one participant stated to have produced demonstrative expressions randomly. 
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participant and conspecific at 150cm and 175cm, medium far in distance coding and 
out of both speakers’ and conspecifics’ territory in any condition, and furthest from 
participant at 275cm and 300cm, but peripersonal to the conspecific when the  
 conspecific took position opposite the  
participant. For each participant it was confirmed at the end of the experiment that  
they could reach (only) the closest two dots. The table was covered with a black  
cloth to eliminate any spatial cues other than the location marks. 
3.2.1.3 Procedure and design. From the moment the Japanese participants 
entered the lab up until debrief, all communication was in Japanese. Participants 
were seated at the table and told by the experimenter (who was the conspecific in the 
experiment) that they would play a ‘memory game’ and they were in the ‘language 
condition’. This meant that, following object placement, participants were asked to 
use both body language and verbal language to point (but not touch) and name each 
object, using a combination of three words: “[demonstrative (Japanese 
[kono/sono/ano]/ English [this/that]) [colour] [shape]”, for example [“この赤い丸” or 
“This red circle”]. Participants could only use this three-word structure, so that every 
participant in the ‘language condition’ experienced the same amount of verbal 
coding. They were encouraged to use all demonstratives across the trials. To 
maintain the ‘memory experiment’ cover, participants were asked to recall the most 
 
Figure 3.25. Schematic representation of the experimental setup. The participant (speaker) 
is on the right of the table. The conspecific (hearer) is positioned next to (position 1) or 
opposite (position 2) the participant. The three spaces are marked with a brown square, 
accompanied by the definition and predicted demonstrative according to the distance and 
territory (both in position 1 and position 2) model. 
SECTION 2 – Experimental Chapters 
 
78 
 
recent location of 4 of the objects, on six different occasions throughout the 
experiment (a total of 24 memory trials).  
On each trial, the conspecific instructed placement of one of the objects on 
one of the locations. The instructions contained the following information: “[Person 
(I [conspecific]/ You [participant])] place the [object] on the [location] dot” (e.g., “
あなたは緑の点に赤い丸を配置します” or “You place the red circle on the green 
dot”).  
The experiment employed a 2 (agent: participant, conspecific) x 2 (position 
of conspecific: beside participants, opposite participant) x 6 (location) repeated 
measures design (with 3 trials per cell of the design, totaling 72 trials).  
3.2.2 Results and discussion.  
The percentages of demonstrative use in Japanese are shown in Table 3.10. Kono 
was almost exclusively used when the object was placed at the nearest two locations, 
irrespective of the position of the conspecific. At 25cm and 50cm (within 
participants’ peri-personal space), kono was used in 96% of the trials. The use of 
kono in all other locations was extremely low (1.37% of the trials). Therefore we 
eliminated kono and the first two locations from the analysis, which allowed us to 
calculate percentages of ano use (ano/(sono+ano)* 100). A 2 (agent: 
conspecific/participant]) × 2 (position of conspecific: next or opposite participant]) × 
4 (locations) x 2 (gender) ANOVA was performed on these percentages. We 
included gender as a variable in this and the later experiment for two reasons. First, 
there is some evidence of gender differences in memory for objects and object 
location (see Voyer, Postma, Brake, & Imperato-McGinley, 2007, for a review), with 
some evidence also that women have a tendency to use this in English more than 
men (Coventry et al., 2014; Expt. 7). Second, as Experiment 1 established that  
Table 3.10. Percentages of Japanese demonstrative use at the different distances by 
conspecific position.  
 Position 25cm 50cm 150cm 175cm 275cm 300cm 
Kono Next to 98.96% 90.63% 2.08% 0.52% 0.52% 0.52% 
 Opposite 98.96% 95.31% 4.69% 1.56% 0.52% 0.52% 
Sono Next to 1.04% 9.38% 38.54% 30.21% 8.33% 8.85% 
 Opposite 1.04% 4.69% 58.85% 53.65% 44.27% 43.75% 
Ano Next to 0.00% 0.00% 59.38% 69.27% 91.15% 90.63% 
  Opposite 0.00% 0.00% 36.46% 44.79% 55.21% 55.73% 
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Japanese demonstratives are affected by territory (my space, your space, outside both  
spaces), we thought that gender might potentially be of relevance given literature  
suggesting that men have more of a sense of separateness from others, which is  
suggested to be a quest for independence or part of a competition for status,  
compared to women (cf. Baumeister & Sommer, 1997; Cross & Madson, 1997). 
Moreover, Hofstede (1980, 1998) has shown that Japan as a society scores highest 
on masculinity (out of 50 countries tested), and therefore one might expect more 
marked gender differences in Japanese than in English. 
In the analysis of location, and the interactions of agent × location, position × 
location, agent × position of conspecific × location the assumption of sphericity was 
violated, so we used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There was a main effect of 
position of the conspecific, F(1,30) = 11.737, p = .002, ηp² = .281 . Overall, ano was 
used more than sono (ano use M = 74.4%, SE = 5.6%, 95% CI [63%, 85.8%]) when 
participant and conspecific were side-by-side, with approximately equal use of ano 
and sono when the conspecific was at the opposite end of the table (M = 47.9%, SE = 
8.8%, 95% CI [30%, 65.8%]) (see also contrasts in Figure 3.26). There was also an 
effect of location, F(3,90) = 8.413, p < .001, ηp² = .219, showing that the use of ano 
increases the further away from the participant compared to the use of sono (see 
Table 3.10). There was no effect of agent, p = .16, ηp² = .064. Nor were the 
Table 3.11. Results of the ANOVA on the ratio-use of ‘ano’ in Experiment 5. 
Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Agent (A) F (1,30) = 2.040 880.734 .164 .064 
A × gender F (1,30) = .512 221.01 .48 .017 
Position (P) F (1,30) = 11.737 61471.466 .002 .281 
P × gender F (1,30) = .431 2255.736 .517 .014 
Location* (L) F (3,90) = 8.413 37380.856 .004 .219 
L × gender F (3,90) = .295 539.925 .829    .01 
A × P F (1,30) = 2.666 894.001 .113 .082 
A × P × gender F (1,30) = 4.064 1362.751 .053 .119 
A × L* F (3,90) = .102 26.212 .922 .003 
A × L × gender F (3,90) = .883 170.2 .453 .029 
P × L* F (3,90) = 1.859 1207.114 .172 .058 
P × L × gender F (3,90) = .698 253.996 .556 .023 
A × P × L* F (3,90) = .885 201.74 .437 .029 
A × P × L × gender F (3,90) = .367 69.679 .777 .012 
*Greenhouse-Geisser 
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interactions between, agent  × position, p = .113, ηp² = .081; position × location, p = 
.170, ηp² = .059, agent  × position × location, p = .437, ηp² = .029. 
 There was one marginally significant interaction involving gender – an agent  
× position of conspecific × gender interaction, F(1,30) = 4.064, p = .053, ηp² = .119 
(See Figure 3.26). Follow-up LSD tests showed a reliable effect of agent for male 
participants, when participant and conspecific were seated side-by-side 
(Experimenter places, M = 61.9%, SE = 10.5%, 95% CI [40.5%, 83.3%], Participant 
places, M = 73.8%, SE = 10%, 95% CI [53.5%, 94.1%]), but not when the 
conspecific was at the opposite side of the table (Experimenter places, M = 47.6%, 
SE = 15.6%, 95% CI [15.8%, 79.4%], Participant places, M = 45.2%%, SE = 15.9%, 
95% CI [12.8%, 77.6%], p = .02). In contrast, there was no effect of agent for female 
participants in either position of the conspecific. 
Returning to the four models we summarised earlier, the data help us tease 
apart the validity of each of them. When the participant and conspecific are sitting 
side by side, ano is preferred to sono when the object is out of reach, with ano 
increasingly preferred the further away the object is from the participant. On its own, 
one might argue that Japanese is distance based, with kono preferred for peri-
 
 
Figure 3.26. The marginal interaction between agent  × position of conspecific × gender. 
Female participants show the same percentage of ano use when the experimenter places 
the object or when they place it themselves, whereas men use sono more when the 
experimenter places. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals, contrasts are LSD. 
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personal space, and sono and ano for extra-personal space, with an increased 
preference for ano over sono as distance increases (distance model). In that regard, 
Japanese appears similar to Spanish when the participants are sitting side-by-side. 
However, there was a main effect of position of conspecific, and an interaction 
between agent, position of conspecific, and gender, showing that the Japanese  
demonstrative system is not just distal (distance model), but is also affected by 
territory (territory model). When the participant and conspecific are opposite each 
other, the effect of distance from the participant is smaller compared to when they 
are sitting side by side. The use of sono is larger when the two interlocutors are 
opposite each other, with approximately equal use of sono and ano when the objects 
are placed within the conspecifics’ peri-personal space and in the participants’ extra-
personal space. The results falsify Model 1, Model 2, and Model 4. 
The double binary distinction, Model 4, in which Japanese demonstratives 
function via two contrasts, kono can contrast territory with sono and distance with 
ano¸but sono and ano do not form a contrast. Most participants used all three 
demonstratives throughout the experiment, falsifying this double binary model. Our 
data are consistent with the third model, the dual-system model (Niimura & Hayashi, 
1994; Okazaki, 2011; Takahashi, 1992), in which Japanese demonstratives can 
encode both distance and territory, as a function of the spatial configuration of 
interlocutors. However, the use of sono was higher when the interlocutor sat opposite 
the participant, regardless of whether the object was placed within the interlocutor’s 
reach (note that all position differences in Figure 3.26 are highly significant). This 
suggests that our data fits the dual-system model with the adaptation of a 
interactional space, in which the space between interlocutors is coded with sono, 
best (Yoshimoto, 1992, 1986).  
3.3 Experiment 6. Spatial demonstratives in English 
In Experiment 5, we found main effects of location and position. The effect 
of location replicates earlier studies (Coventry et al., 2008; 2014), but the effect of 
position of a conspecific had not been tested before. In this chapter, we aim to 
explore potential cross-linguistic differences. Therefore, Experiment 6 employs the 
same experimental procedure as we used in Experiment 5, but this time with English 
participants.  
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3.3.1 Method. 
3.3.1.1 Participants. Thirty-five native English-speaking students were 
tested, receiving either course credit or payment for their participation. Two 
participants were excluded as their produced expressions were not in line with task 
instructions9, one participant chose to withdraw. This left 32 participants for the 
analysis (22 female), with an age range of 18-67 years old (M = 24.83, SD = 11.32). 
3.3.1.2 Materials. All materials were similar to Experiment 5. 
3.3.1.3 Procedure and design. The procedure was similar to the procedure in 
Experiment 5, the only difference being that this experiment was run in English. 
3.3.2 Results and discussion.  
We analysed the English data using a 2 (agent [conspecific/ participant]) × 2 
(position of conspecific [next or opposite participant]) × 6 (locations) x 2 (gender) 
ANOVA (see also Table 3.12). As participants could only use this or that, the use of 
this is the complement of that. As in Japanese, we therefore calculated the 
percentage use of that. The assumption of sphericity was violated for location and 
the interaction between position × location. For these analyses we used the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There was a significant effect of agent , F(1,30) = 
                                                 
9 Upon debrief, one participant stated to have used demonstratives counter-intuitively on 
purpose, another participant said to have strictly alternated demonstratives between trials instead of 
using them normally. 
Table 3.12. Ratio of 'that' use for each space, per gender, actor, and position of the conspecific. 
      
25cm 50cm 150cm 175cm 275cm 300cm 
   (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) 
Male Conspecific places next to 20.00% 23.33% 73.33% 70.00% 93.33% 96.67% 
   (10.18%) (11.17%) (8.31%) (15.28%) (4.44%) (3.33%) 
  opposite 16.67% 36.67% 70.00% 86.67% 90.00% 90.00% 
   (11.39%) (13.56%) (10.48%) (7.37%) (5.09%) (7.11%) 
 Participant places next to 10.00% 10.00% 60.00% 63.33% 83.33% 80.00% 
   (7.11%) (5.09%) (12.96%) (13.56%) (8.96%) (10.18%) 
  opposite 10.00% 10.00% 53.33% 73.33% 80.00% 73.33% 
   (7.11%) (7.11%) (13.33%) (11.97%) (10.18%) (11.97%) 
Female Conspecific places next to 6.06% 9.10% 74.20% 87.90% 98.50% 93.90% 
   (2.80%) (3.90%) (7.30%) (4.70%) (1.50%) (3.60%) 
  opposite 10.60% 16.70% 78.80% 95.50% 89.40% 92.40% 
   (4.00%) (6.10%) (6.80%) (2.50%) (6.40%) (4.90%) 
 Participant places next to 9.10% 9.10% 72.70% 89.40% 93.90% 98.50% 
   (4.50%) (3.20%) (7.20%) (4.60%) (2.80%) (1.50%) 
  opposite 6.10% 9.10% 77.30% 95.50% 93.90% 92.40% 
      (2.80%) (5.50%) (6.70%) (3.30%) (4.70%) (4.90%) 
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6.489, p = .016, ηp² = .178. Participants used that more often when the experimenter 
placed (M = 63.3%, SE = 2%, 95% CI [59.1%, 67.5%]) compared to when the 
participant placed (M = 56.4%, SE = 2.4%, 95% CI [51.5%, 61.3%]). There was also 
a significant main effect of location, F(5,150) = 99.567, p < .001, ηp² = .768; people 
mostly used this in the closest two, reachable, locations. Between the 50cm and 
150cm point, the border between peri-personal and extra-personal space, the use of  
 that quadruples from 15.5% at 50cm to 70.0% at 150cm, see also Figure 3.27.Figure 
3. 
 The results indicate that there is no effect of the position of the conspecific (p = .53, 
ηp² = .013), nor gender (p = .143, ηp² = .070) on the use of English demonstratives 
in the memory game task. There was an interaction between agent and gender, 
F(1,30) = 5.576, p = .025, ηp² = .157, in which male participants used that less 
frequently when they placed the object themselves (M = 50.6%, SE = 4%, 95% CI 
[42.5%, 58.6%]) compared to when the experimenter placed (M = 63.9%, SE = 
3.4%, 95% CI [57%, 70.8%]); there was no difference for women. There was also an 
interaction between location and position, F(3.382, 101.471) = 2.649, p = .046, ηp² = 
.081, in which participants used that less frequently for furthest locations when the 
objects were placed in near space of the conspecific. There was no interaction 
between agent and position, p = .318, ηp² = .033, agent and location, p = .326, ηp² = 
 
Figure 3.27. The interaction between agent × gender. Female participants show the same 
percentage of ‘that’ use when the experimenter places the object or when they place it 
themselves, whereas men use ‘that’ more when the experimenter places. Error bars are 
95% confidence intervals, contrasts are LSD. 
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.038, nor a three-way interaction between agent × position × location, p = .709, ηp² = 
.019.  
These results replicate the results of Coventry et al. (2008, 2014). There were 
effects of distance and agent on demonstrative use in which the use of this diminishes 
when the object is placed further from the participant, and this is preferred when the 
participants places. However, we also found interactions between location and position 
and between agent and gender, showing that participants in English consider position of 
a conspecific in demonstrative use, and evidence that the agent effect occurs for male 
participants and not females.  
Table 3.13. Results of the ANOVA on use of ‘that’ in Experiment 6. 
Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Agent (A) F (1,30) = 6.489 .79 .016 .178 
A × gender F (1,30) = 5.576 .679 .025 .157 
Position (P) F (1,30) = .403 .014 .53 .013 
P × gender F (1,30) = .061 .002 .807 .02 
Location* (L) F (2.560,76.813) = 99.567 29.161 <.001 .768 
L × gender F (3,90) = 2.116 .317 .067 .066 
A × P F (1,30) = 1.033 .03 .318 .033 
A × P × gender F (1,30) = .062 .002 .805 .002 
A × L F (3,90) = 1.171 .023 .326 .039 
A × L × gender F (3,90) = .633 .012 .675 .021 
P × L* F (3.382,101.471) = 2.649 .136 .046 .081 
P × L × gender F (5,150) = .613 .021 .69 .02 
A × P × L F (5,150) = .589 .016 .709 .019 
A × P × L × gender F (5,150) = .358 .01 .876 .012 
*Greenhouse-Geisser 
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 The Japanese data (Experiment 5), reveal that Japanese demonstrate use is 
affected by both distance and the position of the conspecific. These results confirm 
that Japanese has both distance and person-centred components. The results of 
Experiments 6, replicate both earlier studies (Coventry et al., 2008, 2014) providing 
strong evidence for a main effect of distance and agent, consistent with the 
Expectation model (which Coventry et al., 2014 argue underlies memory for object 
 
Figure 3.27. The interaction between agent × gender. Female participants show the same 
percentage of ‘that’ use when the experimenter places the object or when they place it 
themselves, whereas men use ‘that’ more when the experimenter places. Error bars are 
95% confidence intervals, contrasts are LSD. 
 
Figure 3.28. The marginal significant interaction between location and gender, indicating a 
tendency in which the location effect is stronger in female participants. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals. (Error bars for females scores are cut off at the 100% maximum 
value).  
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location and demonstrative choice in English). Interestingly, the results show a 
conceptual replication of the results in Experiment 5. English speakers seem to be 
sensitive to the position of a conspecific, even though the English demonstrative 
system does not make explicit contrasts as a function of hearers’ position. This 
finding is consistent with (Coventry et al., 2014), suggesting the existence of 
universal parameters affecting demonstratives, even when a language does not 
explicitly mark a contrast. An important question we cannot answer yet is whether 
the strength of a parameter is a function of the explicit marking of that parameter in a 
specific language. 
Both language groups show gender differences with respect to the agent 
manipulation, with men showing an effect of agent, consistent with those reported 
for the influence of object knowledge on demonstrative choice in Coventry et al. 
(2014). The effect for men alone for both languages may be a result of the enhanced 
sensitivity of men to status/competition (consistent with Baumeister & Sommer, 
1997; Cross & Madson, 1997).  
Next, we turn to the influence of language on memory for object location. 
Recall that previous studies on English support the expectation model as a model 
regarding how language affects memory for object location, as well as the effects of 
object knowledge on both language production and memory (Coventry et al., 2014; 
Gudde et al., 2016, Chapter 2). However, since Japanese demonstratives encode two 
parameters at the same time – distance and person-centeredness – it is not clear what 
expectation values would be associated with Japanese demonstratives. In particular a 
person-centred encoding means there are two sources from which distance can be 
coded (hearer and speaker), so person-centred and distance approaches might 
produce expectation values that conflict. It is therefore important to test the 
predictions of the Expectation model when considering the influence of Japanese 
demonstratives on memory for object location.  
3.4 Experiment 7. The influence of spatial demonstratives on memory 
for object location in Japanese 
Experiment 5 has shown that Japanese demonstratives map onto space 
governed by two parameters: person-centeredness and distance. In this study we 
explore how memory for object location is affected by the Japanese language – a 
language with a more complex (three-term) demonstrative system than English – and 
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specifically whether the expectation model may potentially account for the influence 
of language on memory for object location cross-linguistically.      
In order to compare Japanese to English speakers, we tested group of English 
participants in this specific setup (see Experiment 8). This also allowed us to test the 
possible influence of the position of a conspecific on memory for object location in 
English speakers for the first time.  
3.4.1 Method 
3.4.1.1 Participants. Thirty-five Japanese participants were tested. 
Participants were native Japanese speakers who received payment for their 
participation. Since the measure in this experiment was spatial memory accuracy, we 
tested participants for depth perception using the Randot Stereotest (Stereo Optical 
Inc. Chicago, USA). Participants who did not have a threshold of at least 40” 
(arcseconds) were excluded from the analysis (N = 1). Two other participants had 
more than 10% incorrect answers in the memory task and were therefore excluded. 
This left 32 participants for the analysis, 11 male and 21 female, with an age range of 
20-65 years old (M = 28.37, SD = 11.37). 
3.4.1.2 Materials. Similar to Experiment 5, six objects were placed at six 
locations on the table. The six locations were combined in pairs so there were three 
‘spaces’ in the analysis (near space participant, near space conspecific [only when 
conspecific sat on the other side of the table], space far from both); see Figure 3.25 
for an overview of the experimental procedure. 
3.4.1.3 Procedure and Design. In this experiment again a ‘memory game’ 
was played, but this time the influence of language on memory for object location 
was actually tested, following the method used in Chapter 2 (Gudde et al., 2016; 
adapted from Coventry et al., 2014). Participants read out instruction cards directing 
the conspecific to place one of six objects on one of six locations. Instruction cards 
contained the following information: “Place [demonstrative (3: Japanese [kono, 
sono, ano], English [this, that, the])] [object (6)] on the [location (6)]”10. The two 
active manipulations were the demonstrative presented on the instruction card and 
the position of the conspecific (next to or opposite the participant). Following the 
placement of the object – during which participants had their eyes closed - 
                                                 
10 For example, “この赤い丸を緑の点の上に置いてください”, or “Place the red circle on the green 
dot”. 
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participants had 10 seconds to memorize the object location before the participant 
closed his/her eyes again and the object and dots on which objects were placed were 
removed. The conspecific, as in Experiment 5, was the experimenter who was 
instructed by participants (see Figure 3.29). In addition to the experimenter running 
the trials, there was an assistant behind a screen responsible for producing and 
moving an indication stick directed by the participant to where s/he thought the edge 
of the object was. The indication stick started at a distance of 10cm (closer or 
further) from the actual object location, with the exception of 3 filler trials presented 
within the first 10 trials, in which the indication stick was presented at a 20cm 
distance (done to prevent the indication stick being a cue to the location). The 
assistant was standing permanently behind a curtain to prevent any (unintentional) 
cues to participants. At the end of every trial, participants recalled the  
demonstrative on the instruction card to check he/she was paying attention to the 
instructions. When the participant could not remember the demonstrative, the trial  
was repeated. 
The design was a 3 (demonstrative: kono, sono, ano) x 3 (space: near 
participant, middle, far from participant) x 2 (position of conspecific: beside or 
opposite participant) within participants design, with 3 trials per condition (totaling 
57 trials, including the 3 filler trials).  
 
 
Figure 3.29. Procedure for Experiment 8. The participant reads out an instruction card. While the 
participant has his/her eyes closed, an object is placed at the instructed location and participants get 
10 seconds to memorize the object location. After the 10 seconds, the participants closes his/her 
eyes again, the object and the locations are taken away and the participant is asked to verbally align 
the location of an indication stick with the memorized location of the object. 
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3.4.2 Results and Discussion 
A 3 (demonstrative [kono/sono/ano]) × 3 (space [25 and 50; 150 and 175; 
275 and 300 cm]) × 2 (position of conspecific [next to or opposite the participant]) × 
2 (gender) ANOVA was performed on the differences of the memorized location and 
the actual object location (in cm).  
The assumption of sphericity was violated in the analysis of space, the 
demonstrative × position of conspecific interaction, the space × position of 
conspecific interaction, and the three-way interaction between demonstrative × space 
× position of conspecific. In those analyses Greenhouse-Geisser correction was 
applied.  
There were no main effects (demonstrative, p = .315, ηp² = .038; space, p = 
.229, ηp² = .048; position, p = .134, ηp² = .073). There was however, a significant 
demonstrative × space interaction, F(4,120) = 4.906 p = .001, ηp² = .141 (see Figure 
3.30). As can be seen in the figure, in the space nearest the participant, there is no 
effect of demonstratives (using LSD multiple comparisons all p > .401). For space 2, 
the pattern of results is consistent with the expectation model, with greater errors for 
ano compared to kono (LDS follow-up, p = .012). In space 3, there is no significant 
difference (all LSD comparisons p > .197). However, there seems to be a tendency in 
which kono is misremembered to be further away than ano and sono, which would 
be consistent with the congruence model.  
The only other significant interaction was a position of conspecific × 
demonstrative × space × gender interaction, F(4,120) = 3.232, p = .015, ηp²= .097. 
We followed this interaction up with separate analyses for male and female 
participants.  
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Figure 3.30. Mismemory scores (in cm) of Japanese participants, per 
demonstrative and space (error bars are 95% confidence intervals). LSD follow up 
significance values are represented: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p <.001. 
 
In the analysis of male participants, the Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated 
that the assumption of sphericity was violated for the ‘space’ variable, so we used 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction to control for this. There was a strong main effect 
of position, F(1,10) = 6.642, p = .028, ηp²= .399, showing that objects were 
misremembered further away from the participant if the conspecific was sitting next 
to the participant (M = 2.481, SE = .52, 95% CI [1.330, 3.633]) compared to opposite 
the participant (M = 1.725, SE = .67, 95% CI [.224, 3.226]). There was also a 
significant demonstrative × space × position of conspecific interaction, F(4,40) =  
4.208, p = .006, ηp²= .296, see Table 3.14.  
 We followed up this interaction running two separate 3 (demonstrative) × 3 
(space) ANOVAs, one for each position. When participant and conspecific sit side-
by-side, there were no main effects (space, p = .579, ηp²= .053; demonstrative, p = 
.266, ηp²= .124), but there was a significant space × demonstrative interaction, 
F(4,40) = 2.703, p = .044, ηp²= .213. This difference was driven by space 2, in which 
ano (M = 3.909, SE = 4.162, 95% CI [1.320, 6.498]) differed from kono (M = .648, 
SE = .912, 95% CI [-1.383, 2.680]), p = .002 and sono (M = 1.521, SE = .828, 95% 
CI [-.323, 3.365]), p = .023. This effect at space 2 is consistent with the Expectation  
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model. When participant and conspecific sit opposite each other were no significant 
effects: space, p = .730, ηp²= .031; demonstrative, p = .494, ηp²= .068, space × 
demonstrative, p = .400, ηp²= .094. Regarding the use and function of demonstrative 
in Japanese, these results seem consistent with the dual-system model, as the effects 
show a distance-based result when participant and conspecific are seated side-by-
side, but this distance effect disappears when they sat opposite.  
            In the analysis of data from female participants, the assumption of sphericity 
was violated in the interactions between position of conspecific and space, position 
and demonstrative, and the three-way interaction between demonstrative, space, and 
position of conspecific. These analyses were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser. 
There were no main effects of demonstrative (p = .862, ηp²= .007), space (p = .338, 
ηp²= .053), nor position of conspecific (p = .972, ηp² < .001). There was an 
interaction between demonstrative and space, F(4,80) = 8.596, p < .001, ηp²= .301. A 
follow up analysis showed that the pattern of data mirrors the pattern found for this 
interaction in the main analysis. There is no effect of demonstrative for space 1 (all 
LSD pairwise comparisons are p > .715), in space 2 there is a difference between 
both kono and sono (LSD comparison, p = .016) and kono and ano (LSD, p < .001). 
In space 3 there are also significant differences between kono and sono (p < .001) 
and kono and ano (p < .001), but in contrast to the results in space 2, where kono was 
remembered to be closest by, kono is remembered to be furthest away in space 3. 
There were no other interactions (demonstrative × position, p = .59; space × position, 
p = .94; demonstrative × space × position, p = .32). These results suggest that, in 
contrast to male participants, female participants were not influenced by the position 
of a conspecific. Similar to the main analysis, the female pattern of results is only 
partly consistent with both the Expectation and Congruence model. In space 2, the 
Table 3.14. The mean distance error of male participants, by demonstrative, space, and position 
    space 1   Space 2   Space 3   
   position Mean (SE) 95% CI Mean (SE) 95% CI Mean (SE) 95% CI 
Kono next to 1.79 (.48) [0.72, 2.87] .65 (.912) [-1.38, 2.68] 3.79 (1.57) [0.29, 7.3] 
 opposite 1.18 (.7) [-0.38, 2.73] 1.59 (1.28) [-1.25, 4.43] 1.43 (1.51) [-1.94, 4.8] 
Sono next to 2.8 (.5) [1.73, 3.96] 1.52 (.83) [-0.32, 3.37] 2.47 (1.5) [-.87, 5.82] 
 opposite 1.52 (.78) [-0.22, 3.26] .53 (.77) [-1.18, 2.25] 2.79 (1.33) [-0.16, 5.75] 
Ano next to 1.97 (.6) [0.64, 3.3] 3.91 (1.16) [1.32, 6.5] 3.39 (1.29) [0.52, 6.25] 
 opposite 2.75 ( .97) [0.59, 4.91] 1.45 (1.13) [-1.08, 3.97] 2.29 (1.54) [-1.15, 5.72] 
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pattern is consistent with the Expectation model: objects placed with kono were 
remembered to be closer by than objects placed with ano or sono. However, in space  
three the direction has flipped and the results seem to resemble the congruence 
model. In space 3, objects placed with kono are misremembered to be further away.  
These are also the trials where the incongruence is largest. However, the data seems 
not overall consistent with Expectation nor Congruence model. It is possible that the 
ambiguity of Japanese demonstratives diminishes the incongruence effect. As the 
influence of language works (partly) via the information conveyed in the language, 
the ambiguity in Japanese demonstratives could mean that demonstratives convey 
less spatial information. If this is the case, the resulting expectation based prediction 
(Expectation model) incongruence from that information (Congruence model) could 
be weaker too. 
 
 
Table 3.15. Results of the ANOVA on Memory for Object Location in Experiment 7. 
  Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Male Position (P) F (1,10) = 6.642 22.977 .028 .399 
 Space* (S) 
F (1.146,11.465) 
= .610 38.24 .472 .057 
 Demonstrative (D) F (2,20) = 1.529 13.942 .241 .133 
 P × S F (2,20) = .133 1.786 .876 .013 
 P × D F (2,20) = .012 .067 .988 .001 
 S × D F (4,40) = 0.682 4.961 .609 .064 
 P × S × D F (4,40) = 4.208 15.568 .006 .296 
Female Position (P) F (1,20) = .059 .598 .811 .003 
 Space (S) F (2,40) = 1.167 34.523 .322 .055 
 Demonstrative (D) F (2,40) = 0.136 1.236 .873 .007 
 P × S* 
F (1.544,30.882) 
= 0.174 3.645 .785 .009 
 P × D* 
F (1.522,30.432) 
= 0.456 4.079 .585 .022 
 S × D F (4,80) = 8.596 53.729 <.001 .301 
  P × S × D F (4,80) = 1.758 12.886 .145 .081 
 *Greenhouse-Geisser    
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Figure 3.31. The mismemory scores (in cm) of female, Japanese participants, per 
demonstrative and space (error bars are 95% confidence intervals). Significance values are 
respresented: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. The significant interaction between 
demonstrative and space shows significant differences between kono compared to sono 
and ano. In space 2, kono is misremembered to closer by, but in space 3 it is 
misremembered to be further away. 
3.5 Experiment 8. The influence of spatial demonstratives on memory 
for object location in English. 
Experiment 7 showed that both the demonstrative and the space (distance) 
condition interacted with position of a conspecific for Japanese participants. This is 
consistent with findings in Experiment 5, in which we found that Japanese 
demonstrative use is influenced by the position of a conspecific. Since we found that 
the position manipulation also influenced English speakers in Experiment 6, we will 
test the influence of position on English speakers’ memory in Experiment 8. This 
experiment will be a replication of Experiment 7, but then with English speakers. 
3.5.1 Method 
3.5.1.1 Participants. The English group comprised 41 native English 
speakers, studying at the University of East Anglia, receiving payment or student 
credit for their participation. Four participants did not have a depth perception of 
40”, three participants had more than 10% incorrect answers in the memory task, and 
one participant did not engage with the instructions. This left 33 participants for the 
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analysis, 8 male and 25 female, with an age range of 18-55 years old (M = 23.12, SD 
= 8.26). 
3.5.1.2 Materials, Procedure, and design. This English experiment was 
similar to Experiment 7, with the exception that the entire study was in English. 
3.5.2 Results and Discussion.  
The English memory displacement data are displayed in Error! Reference source n
ot found.. A 3 (demonstrative [this/that/the]) × 3 (space [25 and 50 cm; 150 and 175 
cm; 275 and 300 cm]) × 2 (position of conspecific [next or opposite participant]) × 2 
(gender) ANOVA was performed on the differences of the memorized location and 
the actual object location (in cm). The assumption of sphericity was violated in the 
analysis of space, and the demonstrative × space interaction. In those analyses we 
used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There was a main effect of demonstrative, 
F(2,62) = 5.759, p = .005, ηp² = .157, showing that objects placed in the this 
condition (M = .108, SE = .38, 95% CI [-0.668, 0.883]) were remembered to be 
closer by, than objects in the that condition (M = .93, SE = .4, 95% CI [0.12, 1.73], p 
= .01) and the the condition (M = .77, SE = .4, 95% CI [-0.02, -1.57], p = .006). 
There was also a main effect of space, F(2,62) = 4.252, p = .034, ηp² = .121, showing 
that object were misremembered to be further away in space 3 (M = 1.78, SE = .77, 
95% CI [0.205, 3.36]), compared to space 2, (M = -.145, SE = .343, 95% CI [-0.844, 
0.554], (LSD comparison) p < .001), and space 1, (M = .168, SE = .417, 95% CI [-
0.684, 1.019], p = .003), but there was no difference between space 1 and 2 (p > 
.05). There was no main effect of position (p = .196) nor a significant space × 
demonstrative interaction (p = .14). There was no effect of gender (p = .281), nor 
Table 3.16. Mismemory data representing the main effects of demonstrative and 
space. 
Experiment 8 Space 1 2 3 
  (SEM) (SEM) (SEM) 
Demonstratives This .24* -.88 .96 
  (0.41) (0.35) (0.8) 
 That .22 .4 2.16 
  (0.44) (0.46) (0.77) 
 The .04 .05 2.24 
  (0.49) (0.51) (0.93) 
* values are represented as difference in cm from the actual location (positive value means 
the object was misremembered to be further away than it actually was. 
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were there interactions with gender (gender × demonstrative, p = .514, gender × 
space, p = .637, gender × position, p = .297). 
These results replicated the results from Chapter 2 (Gudde et al., 2016). The 
main effect of demonstrative and no interaction between demonstrative and location 
are consistent with the predictions of the Expectation Model (Coventry et al., 2014).  
The results from Experiment 5 and 7 show that Japanese demonstrative use is 
a function of the spatial position of an interlocutor, as well as distance from a 
speaker. Furthermore, in male participants we found an effect of this position on 
memory for object location. Even though English demonstratives do not encode an 
interlocutors’ position, we found that in English participants, position affects 
demonstrative use and memory for object location consistent with the Japanese data 
(Experiment 6 and 8). This suggests that even though language, or specifically  
spatial demonstratives, are used to contrast between different parameters, their usage 
might be based on a universal set of parameters. However, the effect was stronger in 
Japanese than in English. This could suggest that if demonstratives are influenced by 
universal parameters, the influence is stronger if a parameter is explicitly coded, 
compared to when it is implicit in a language. To test the nature of these differences, 
a future study needs to do a direct comparison between Japanese and English 
speakers. To test whether the effects are based on language, verbal interference can 
be used (modelled on Trueswell & Papafragou, 2010). If language is used as a tool to 
Table 3.17. Results of the ANOVA on Memory for Object Location in Experiment 8. 
Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Position (P) F (1,31) = 1.748 15.191 .196 .053 
P × gender F (1,31) = 1.126 9.787 .297 .035 
Space* (S) F (2,62) = 4.252 230.007 .034 .121 
S × gender* F (2,62) = .454 24.58 .562 .014 
Demonstrative (D) F (2,62) = 5.759 27.464 .005 .157 
D × gender F (2,62) = .672 3.205 .514 .021 
P × S F (2,62) = .742 7.647 .48 .023 
P × S × gender F (2,62) = .197 2.028 .822 .006 
P × D F (2,62) = 2.290 10.049 .11 .069 
P × D × gender F (2,62) = .480 2.106 .621 .015 
S × D* F (4,124) = 1.859 13.089 .144 .057 
S × D × gender* F (4,124) = .925 6.513 .43 .029 
P × S × D F (4,124) = 1.296 6.473 .275 .04 
P × S × D × gender F (4,124) = .838 4.182 .504 .026 
*Greenhouse-Geisser     
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remember object location, then the verbal interference should eliminate these effects. 
However, if the effect of an interlocutors’ position is still apparent, one can assume 
that spatial language and spatial memory are dependent on the same underlying 
processes.  
3.6 General Discussion 
In four experiments we examined how distance from a speaker and the 
position of a conspecific affect demonstrative choice in two differences languages – 
Japanese and English – and in relation to the influence of that language on memory 
for object location. Here we first consider the demonstrative systems of these 
languages, and then models of how language affects memory for object location. 
The results for English demonstrative choice, mirrors the results found 
previously (Coventry et al., 2014, 2008; Gudde et al., 2016). English demonstratives 
are affected by distance and by agent. Moreover, distance did not interact with any 
other variables, again consistent with previous results. However, we also uncovered 
two new effects. First, we found a significant interaction between agent and gender. 
Given that previous studies did not consider gender differences in language 
production (save for Experiment 7 in Coventry et al., 2014), the finding that men’s 
use of demonstratives is affected by agent and women’s demonstrative use is new. 
Second, we found an interaction between position and location, showing a larger 
effect of location when participant and experimenter are side-by-side rather than 
when they are sitting opposite one another. This pattern is consistent with the view 
expressed by Coventry et al. (2014) that demonstrative use across languages may be 
affected by a common set of parameters, with some explicit in a language and some 
not (a point we develop below). 
In relation to Japanese, there have been several proposals regarding how its 
demonstrative system operates, from claims that Japanese is entirely distance-based 
to proposals that Japanese is person-centred. The data from Experiment 5 show, 
under experimentally controlled conditions, that Japanese employs a dual-system 
model (Takahashi & Suzuki (1982), as read in Niimura & Hayashi, 1994; Okazaki, 
2011; Takahashi, 1992), in which demonstratives can encode both distance and 
person-centeredness, and the choice of demonstrative model is based on the 
configuration of interlocutors. When speaker and hearer were sitting side-by-side, 
participants preferred ano to sono when the object was out of reach, a preference that 
SECTION 2 – Experimental Chapters 
 
97 
 
increased as the object was further away. However, the significant main effect of 
position of the conspecific shows that distance is not the only parameter affecting 
Japanese demonstratives; territory affected use as well. In this respect, territory could 
be interactional space, in which the entire space between interlocutors is encoded as 
a territory (using sono), rather than a near ‘close to the hearer’ territory (Yoshimoto, 
1992, 1986). Finally, mirroring the result found for English, the presence of an effect 
of agent for men but not for women illustrates an increased sensitivity in men 
regarding who contacts an object. It is possible that this effect is related to territory, 
and effects of position of conspecific found across both languages (although for both 
languages we did not find significant gender differences for this variable).  
The commonalities across Japanese and English are consistent with the view 
expressed in Coventry et al. (2014), that demonstrative systems across languages 
may reflect a common set of constraints on languages, underlying non-linguistic 
perception and memory. While some of these constraints are explicit in the 
demonstrative systems of some languages, Coventry et al. (2014) have shown that 
they nevertheless affect demonstrative usage in languages that do not employ these 
explicit distinctions. For example, Coventry et al. (2014) found that visibility and 
ownership affect the choice of this and that, even though the English demonstrative 
system does not explicitly encode these parameters. The presence of an effect of 
position of conspecific in Japanese and English, and the same pattern of gender 
differences with respect to who places an object support a universal set of underlying 
non-linguistic parameters, irrespective of whether a parameter is linguistically 
encoded in both languages. However, the present data also reveal stronger effects of 
the position of conspecific in Japanese than in English, pointing in the direction of 
universal constraints, but with differential weightings of these constraints as a 
function of language. If a language makes an explicit contrast, then the data are 
consistent with the hypothesis that that language should then exhibit more influence 
of those parameters than a language that does not make an explicit contrast.  
Turning to the memory data, we set out to test whether the influence of 
Japanese language on memory for object location was similar to the influence of 
English language, teasing apart two memory models: the Expectation model and the 
Congruence model. The Expectation model predicts that language affects memory 
for object location via the expectation that language elicits – this refers to objects 
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closer by, object location is remembered to be closer by if the placement instruction 
used that. The Congruence model predicts that the influence works via a congruence/ 
incongruence of language and space: memory performance is more accurate when 
the two are congruent – if this refers to objects closer by, but is used to instruct the 
placement of an object further away, there is an incongruence between the 
instruction and the spatial situation. This incongruence should lead to larger memory 
errors. It is important to appreciate that the memory game setup can tease the models 
apart: the Expectation model predicts a main effect of language, whereas the 
Congruence model predicts an interaction between language and space. The results 
of English replicate previous studies showing a main effect of demonstrative on 
memory for object location in English (Coventry et al., 2014; Gudde et al., 2016, 
Chapter 2). Consistent with the Expectation model, we found a main effect of 
demonstrative, in which objects placed with that were misremembered to be further 
away. There was no interaction between location and demonstrative, which would 
have indicated a congruence/incongruence effect (as predicted by the congruence 
model).  
In contrast to the English results in Experiment 8, the influence of Japanese 
demonstratives on memory for object location (Experiment 7) show a pattern of 
results that does not sit so well with the Expectation model. In the Japanese analysis, 
we found intriguing gender differences. For Japanese female participants there was 
no main effect of demonstrative (as occurs in English), but rather an interaction 
between demonstrative and space. This interaction is not consistent with the 
expectation model, but only partly supports the congruence model. When there is a 
mismatch between the demonstrative and the space, participants misremember 
objects as being further away than they actually were, although this effect of 
incongruence was not apparent across locations. It is possible that the ambiguity of 
Japanese language diminishes the incongruence effect (as they would diminish any 
effect) - because of the uncertainty that is inherent to Japanese demonstratives, the 
predictive value of demonstratives and the possible incongruence they would elicit 
are lower. 
For Japanese male participants, on the other hand, the position of the 
conspecific mediated the influence of language on memory. When the participant 
and conspecific were seated side-by-side, there was an interaction between space and 
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demonstrative, in which ano was misremembered further away from kono in space 2, 
an effect that didn’t occur at any other combination of space and demonstratives. 
However, there was no interaction when the conspecific sat opposite the participant. 
This finding would suggest that the influence of language disappeared when territory 
was a factor. This is, although not necessarily indicative, consistent with a dual-
system model, in which distance is a less important parameter when demonstratives 
can code territory. Furthermore, male participants showed larger memory error 
values when participant and experimenter sat side-by-side, misremembering the 
location of the object to be further away compared to when the conspecific sat 
opposite the participants. The dual-system model would predict that in these latter 
cases, demonstratives would encode territory and not egocentric distance. If male 
participants encoded the object location partly relative to the conspecific, it might 
explain the fact that memory error was smaller: distance was relative to both 
participants’ and conspecifics’ territory, which could have led to a more balanced 
spatial memory. An explanation as to why Japanese males are more sensitive to a 
hearers’ territory might be found in social psychological research, showing that 
males are more focussed to separate themselves from others and therefore more 
likely to acknowledge interlocutors’ territory (Cross & Madson, 1997), a trait that 
could be stronger in a masculine society such as the Japanese (Hofstede, 1998). 
However, more research needs to be conducted to confirm any claims on this. This is 
the first time that we found gender differences in the memory game procedure. 
Future research could include questionnaires to find underlying causes for these 
gender differences, for example masculinity, personality, or social intelligence 
questionnaires.  
 The results over the four experiments showed interesting different patterns 
of the use of language and the influence of language use on memory for object 
location between Japanese and English speakers. Experiment 1 showed that Japanese 
spatial demonstratives are influenced both by the distance an object has from the 
speaker, as by the personal territory in which an object is located (speakers’ vs. 
hearers’ territory). There was an interaction between position and distance, showing 
that the distance effect was driven by trials in which participant and conspecific 
shared their territory. These results confirm the theoretical accounts of a dual-system 
model, in which Japanese demonstratives can encode both distance and person-
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centeredness Takahashi and Suzuki (1982, as read in Niimura & Hayashi, 1994; and 
Okazaki, 2011; Takahashi, 1992). When speaker and hearer have their own territory, 
language is predominantly based on a person-centred account; when speaker and 
hearer share a territory, demonstratives are based on distance from the speaker. In 
these situations, language is not ambiguous for the participant, as the participant is 
the speaker in these trials, and will therefore know on which parameters s/he based 
the information conveyed. However, the hearer will experience this ambiguity, since 
the hearer has to interpret how the speaker encoded demonstratives. 
The results of Experiment 7, in which we manipulated linguistic instruction, 
show this ambiguity. As the distance based and person-centred models are 
incompatible at any one given time, one has to choose the language parameter to 
interpret when encoding object position. There is a gender difference in the 
prioritization of parameters in a memory context. While female participants 
effectively ignored the person-centred component in their demonstrative system, 
male participants were influenced by the position of the conspecific when territory 
was not shared, and showed an interaction between language and space when 
territory was shared. The female participants however only showed an interaction 
between space and demonstrative. The reason of this gender effect is unclear; 
speculative this could be a result of a territorial attitude of men compared to women.  
The lack of main effects of Japanese language on spatial memory could be a 
result of the fact that demonstratives can encode multiple parameters. In English, 
demonstratives have a clear predictive value: objects referred to with this are closer 
by than objects referred to with that. However, since in Japanese this contrast is not 
as clearly defined using the three different demonstratives, the predictive value of 
demonstratives – if any – is lower. If one cannot know what a specific demonstrative 
encodes, there is no information to base an expectation on.  
To summarise, we replicated earlier results showing that memory for object 
location in English is influenced by language via an Expectation Model. Different 
parameters can affect Japanese demonstrative use (distance and person-
centeredness). The memory data of Japanese participants was too unclear to reach 
any strong conclusions, but a novel finding in this study is that the position of a 
conspecific affected English male participants similar to Japanese male participants. 
This suggests that demonstratives might be based on a universal set of parameters, 
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although the strength of the influence could vary based on whether the parameter 
was encoded explicitly or not. 
Future studies need to look further into the difference between Japanese and 
English. If this difference is facilitated by the differences in language, the 
behavioural outcome should be more similar when language is not a factor. To test 
this, the study needs to be replicated, including a verbal interference task. For 
example, by having participants repeat a sequence of meaningless sounds (Bo, Ba, 
Bi, etc.). This task was previously used in spatial tasks (Coventry et al., 2014; 
Garden, Cornoldi, & Logie, 2002). By preventing participants from using language, 
we can see whether the difference between Japanese and English participants is 
caused by the differences in their language.  
Another line of follow-up studies includes a broad range of different 
languages. In the current study we found, consistent with Coventry et al. (2014), that 
English is influenced by the manipulation of parameters that are not encoded in 
English. This might suggest universal parameters underlying demonstratives across 
different languages. To test this further, a greater number of languages need to be 
experimentally tested using the memory game paradigm. Parameters are yet to be 
determined, but it would be interesting to manipulate at least distance from the 
participant and the position of a conspecific. If there are universals in language, it 
would be expected that all languages exhibit similar effects, taking into account that 
effects might vary in strength as a function of whether or not a specific parameter is 
encoded in the language that is tested. Currently we are planning to run both these 
future study proposals.  
The past two chapters we have been looking into the relationship between 
language and spatial memory. However, another type of spatial language studied 
extensively because of its relation with spatial cognition are spatial prepositions 
expressing frames of reference. In Chapter 4, we will explore the effect that language 
(frames of reference) has on visual attention, using eye-tracking methodology. 
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Chapter 4 – The influence of spatial reference frames on visual perception 
In the previous two chapters, we explored the influence of language on 
spatial memory. Following previous research showing that choice of words – e.g., 
demonstratives - to describe a situation is affected by seemingly irrelevant cues (e.g., 
ownership, familiarity, and visibility) (Coventry et al., 2014), we saw that spatial 
language in turn influences spatial memory. In the final experiment of Chapter 2, we 
explored whether spatial demonstratives influence how participants focus their 
attention to an object, but found no influence of language on how participants 
scanned the environment to encode object location.  
In this chapter, we look at how language influences visual attention. Can a 
speaker’s choice of language (e.g., spatial prepositions associated with reference 
frame) influence how we look at the described visual world? And does a description 
from a previous speaker impact the language the hearer produces? In this experiment 
(N = 84), we presented a verbal description of a spatial scene and recorded 
participants’ eye-movements, revealing two findings: eye movement ‘signatures’ 
associated with distinct reference frames as expressed in language, and transfer of 
these eye-movement patterns just prior to spatial description for different (later) 
picture descriptions. The experiment adds to the current literature on reference 
frames (cf., Levinson, 1996), examining the relation between reference frames and 
eye-movement patterns, but will also be presented in a broader ‘interactional’ 
perspective. 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 The influence of language on visual attention 
We will explore the relation between perception, memory, and language, via 
reference frames as expressed in language. Eye-tracking studies have shown that 
language automatically drives attention to parts of the spatial world. The role overt 
attention has in the comprehension of spatial language can be tested in visual world 
tasks. In these tasks, participants are presented with a visual display while hearing 
utterances describing the array. Objects in the experimental display are usually 
mentioned in the description. Studies employing this visual world task showed that 
participants fixate on objects that are mentioned, and make fewer fixations on 
objects that are not named (e.g., Allopenna et al., 1998; Altmann & Kamide, 2007; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995).  
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In particular, as language unfolds in real time, it directs overt eye-movements 
towards objects (Burigo & Knoeferle, 2015). As listeners look at a visual array while 
presented with a verbal, auditory description of that array, their eye-movements are 
closely time locked to the specific referring words (Eberhard et al., 1995), suggesting 
a close relationship between language and visual attention. However, this automatic 
effect does not only occur online, but also in a predictive fashion. For example, there 
is evidence that people make anticipatory eye-movements to objects they expect to 
be named in a story (Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006). Consistent with theories of 
predictive coding, people seem to use language and world knowledge to anticipate 
future information and fixate on a predicted reference object. For example, a 
sentence like ‘the man has drunk’ vs. ‘the man will drink’ focusses attention on 
respectively an empty or a full glass (Altmann & Kamide, 2007).  
In the domain of spatial language, people use their world-knowledge to select 
a reference object in a sentence. For example, when participants were presented with 
the sentence “put the cube inside the can”, they used the information from the 
preposition (inside), to choose which object would be the object of reference fitting 
the relevant spatial properties (i.e., container-like objects with specific dimensions to 
be able to contain the cube - the can) before they heard the actual referent (can) (See 
Figure 4.32) (Chambers, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, Filip, & Carlson, 2002). The idea of 
an automatic predictive mechanism is supported by research showing participants do 
not only follow the onset of the actual words, they also ‘mis-predict’ if a presented 
distractor is (partially) rhyming or a homophone with the reference object (e.g., 
candy/ candle, beaker/ beetle) (Allopenna et al., 1998; Eberhard et al., 1995; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995).  
However, attention is not only driven by language. There is a similar effect 
the other way round, the way attention is directed to a visual scene. When attention 
 
Figure 4.32. Example of the table-top array used by Chambers et al. (2002).   
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is manipulated towards a specific character (via an attention-capture manipulation), 
this character is more likely to be the subject of the sentence. For example, when 
participants describe an array that shows two boxers (see Figure 4.33), attention can 
be focussed on either boxer by presenting a black square on the location of that 
boxer prior to showing the boxers. In Figure 4.33, the attention-capture manipulation 
is focussed on the losing boxer. This increases the likelihood participants use the 
losing boxer as object in the sentence, and not the winner (e.g., “the man lost the 
boxing match” vs. “the man won the boxing match”) (Gleitman, January, Nappa, & 
Trueswell, 2007).  
4.1.2 Spatial relations  
While looking at an array of two or more objects, one needs to make eye-movements 
to be able to verify spatial descriptions. For example, if an array is presented 
consisting of two objects, a marble and a ladybird, a spatial description could be ‘the 
marble is in front of the ladybird’. In order to verify whether this is the case, one 
needs to change the focus of attention from the marble to the ladybird. The direction 
of this attentional shift is predicted in the Attentional Vector Sum (AVS) (Regier & 
Carlson, 2001). The AVS consists of the summed strength of all attention vectors. 
This summation is represented in Figure 4.34. A located object (marked with TR, in 
our study we use a ‘marble’ as located object in the prime trial) is located with 
respect to a landmark (LM in the example, the ladybird in our study). To 
comprehend this description, attention needs to shift from the landmark to the 
located object. This attentional shift consists of different attentional vectors, directed 
from different locations on the landmark in the direction of the located object (these 
vectors are represented by arrows). The strength of these vectors depends on the 
amount of attention each individual vector receives. For example, attention will be 
 
Figure 4.33. Example of the attention-capture manipulation in the timeline in a trial 
(Gleitman et al., 2007). A fixation cross would be shown, then attention would be 
focussed by a black square on the position of one of the characters in the scene 
participants need to describe. 
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mostly focussed from the nearest part of the landmark to the located object, so the 
vectors closer to the located object are stronger than the vectors on the other side of 
the landmark. The overall attention bias is the combination of strength and directions 
of the different vectors.  
 4.1.3 Frames of Reference 
In the use of spatial language, interlocutors need to make sure they are talking about 
the same object, event, or, in the case of reference frames, direction. Therefore, both 
speaker and hearer have to choose a frame of reference, which they can express in 
language (see Figure 4.35). Across different fields of science (e.g., neuroscience, 
perception, development, linguistics), reference frames have been classified 
differently: speaker centred (deictic) vs. intrinsic (non-speaker centred) (e.g., Miller 
& Johnson-Laird, 1976), body-centred (egocentric) versus environment-centred 
(allocentric) coding (Burgess, 2008; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), or viewer- centred 
versus object-centred (Marr, 1982). Based on these categorizations across 
disciplines, Levinson (1996) identified three types of reference frames: intrinsic 
(object-centred: “the marble is in front of the ladybird”), relative (viewer-centred: 
“the marble is to the left of the ladybird”), and absolute (environment-centred: “the 
marble is north of the ladybird”) (See Figure 4.34). 
 
Figure 4.34. Visual representation of the AVS model. The located object (or trajector 
‘TR’) is located with respect to a landmark (LM). Panel b shows the vectors from the 
different points of the landmark, whereas panel c shows the strength of attention for each 
vector. The total vector sum is represented in panel d, leading to the orientation of the 
attentional shift in panel e. (Regier & Carlson, 2001). 
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Carlson-Radvansky and Irwin (1994; 1993) showed that different frames of 
reference are actively competing during spatial term assignment. In a 
sentence/picture verification task, participants were slower to respond if reference 
frames did not align. For example, in 4.35A), the tree in the middle square is 
presented upright, so the statement ‘the square is above the tree’ is appropriate for 
the same squares in an environment-centered reference frame and an object-centered 
(intrinsic) reference frame. However, in B) and C), the tree is rotated. The 
appropriateness of the term above now differs between the environment-centered 
reference frame (see Figure 4.35B) and the object-centered reference frame (see 
Figure 4.35C).   
Results of studies testing the use of reference frames indicated that 
participants build multiple spatial templates as a result of simultaneous activation 
(Carlson-Radvansky & Logan, 1997) and only certain components of non-selected 
reference frames can be inhibited (Carlson & Van Deman, 2008). In both of these 
studies, participants took part in a sentence verification task, in which they had to 
verify whether a presented sentence was an acceptable description of a picture (like 
the example in Figure 4.36). Carlson and Van Deman (2008) found effects of 
negative priming in which for example the use of front/back was inhibited when 
above/below/left/right were presented before. Their results suggest that during 
a) Intrinsic  
The marble is in front of 
the ladybird 
 
b) Relative  
The marble is to the left of 
the ladybird 
 
c) Absolute  
The marble is north of 
the ladybird 
 
Figure 4.35. In Figure a), the marble is in front of the ladybird locates the marble using 
the intrinsic axes of the ladybird. In Figure b), the marble is to the left of the ladybird, the 
marble is located with respect to the viewer looking at the picture. Finally, the objects can 
be located based on objective terms, such as cardinal direction the marble is north of the 
ladybird (although this is infrequent in English in small-scale space), see c). This figure is 
based on (Levinson, 1996). 
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spatial language comprehension, participants activate multiple spatial representations 
based on different possible reference frames. The presentation of a specific reference 
frame expressed in language, inhibited the mental availability of the spatial  
representations that were not expressed.   
In the present chapter, we focus on how the relationship between the use of 
reference frames in language and attention, whether language affects how 
participants look at spatial scenes and in turn whether the way participants look at 
special scenes corresponds with how they describe later scenes. We hypothesized 
that reference frames, expressed through spoken language, might affect how 
attention is allocated to a located object versus a reference object in a spatial array. 
In our study, we used three prime sentences to describe a spatial array with two 
objects (see Figure 4.35): intrinsic (the marble is in front of the ladybird), relative 
(the marble is to the left of the ladybird), and neutral (the marble is blah blah the 
ladybird). Since intrinsic descriptions locate an object in relative to intrinsic axes of 
a reference object (e.g., ladybird) - whereas relative descriptions provide information 
about the two objects relative to each other - we predicted that participants in the 
intrinsic condition would fixate more on the reference object to process the intrinsic 
axes of the reference object, compared to the relative description condition.  
If distinct eye movement patterns are present following the example 
description, we also wanted to test whether such eye movement patterns are 
“routinized” – that is if eye movement patterns are “replayed” when looking at a new 
   
Figure 4.36. Participants judged whether above the tree was an appropriate description for 
the different squares in the grid. In A), the tree is upright, all squares directly above the 
tree are good (g), all squares higher than the ‘tree square’ are acceptable (a), and all 
squares in the grid lower than the tree are bad (b). In B), the tree is rotated. From an 
environment centered reference frame, the appropriateness of ‘above the tree’ is the same 
as in A). However, using a reference frame intrinsic to the tree, the appropriateness of the 
description changes, see C). Example by Carlson-Radvansky & Logan (1997). 
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scene prior to producing a new description. This would provide evidence that 
language drives eye movement patterns (i.e., visual attention), which in turn might 
drive future spatial description choice.  
4.1.4 Dialogue 
A second goal of Experiment 9, was to examine the extend to which the use 
of reference frames in language are aligned to the use of previous reference frame 
use, and explore one possible mechanism by which it does so: attention. Research 
has shown that interlocutors tend to align linguistic representations during 
conversation, for example, lexical and syntactic representations, but it has been much 
debated how this alignment works.  
In conversation, answerers are more likely to use the utterance of the 
prepositional form of the question. For example, following the question ‘what time 
do you close’, responses are more likely to be ‘5 o’clock’, wherease a question like 
‘at what time do you close’ is answered with ‘at 5 o’clock’ (Levelt & Kelter, 1982). 
Similarly, participants in a picture description task were more likely to use a similar 
syntax as a previous descripition uttered by a conspecific. When an interlocutor 
would describe a situation (e.g., “the cowboy giving the banana to the burglar”), 
participants would copy this sentence structure, and use a prepositional object (e.g., 
“the girl gave the book to the boy”) instead of a double object (e.g., “the girl gave the 
boy the book”) (Branigan, Pickering, & Cleland, 2000). This dynamic is also found 
when the events participants need to describe are unrelated to prime events (Bock, 
Dell, Chang, & Onishi, 2007).  
It has been suggested that alignment is an automatic process (Garrod & 
Pickering, 2004; Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2006). Pickering and Garrod proposed 
an interactive alignment account, in which production and comprehension are tightly 
coupled. The advantage of a system of automatic alignment is that it simplifies 
language processing. If a speaker repeats expressions previously uttered by a 
previous speaker, there is a very low cost of processing. For example in Garrod and 
Anderson (1987), participants communicated about mazes, in which boxes were 
connected by horizontal and vertical pathways (see Figure 4.37). Participants were 
each presented with their own maze (e.g., A and B in Figure 4.37), and had to 
communicate to get from their individual starting location (X) towards their goal-
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box. In this communication, participants quickly agreed on terms to use, without 
explicitly discussing their use. Garrod and Anderson concluded that this alignment is  
a direct result of the need for joint action. For successful communication, 
interlocutors need to align their situation models (multi-dimensional representations, 
including dimensions of space, time, causality, intentionality (cf., Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998)). 
For example, if one tells a story about two uncles, they need to make sure 
that the hearer has the right situation model for each uncle so that s/he understands 
which uncle is doing what in the story. Therefore, it is usually not useful to refer to 
the two uncles as ‘uncle’, but one could for example specify Uncle John and Uncle 
Steve. If the story would have been about only about one of the uncles, it would not 
be problematic to refer to him as uncle. Because interlocutors are aware of the 
interactive nature of dialogue, they appreciate the practical need for a joint effort to 
successfully communicate (Garrod & Pickering, 2004). This has to be an implicit 
process, because it is not feasible to explicitly agree on all concepts and terms ahead 
of a conversation while engaging in that conversation (Garrod & Anderson, 1987; 
Pickering & Garrod, 2004).  
These effects are consistent with effects of priming or cueing, in which 
context, or a previous stimulus, activates a specific, related response on a succeeding 
stimulus. There is evidence that people align the spatial frames of reference they use 
 
Figure 4.37. Overview of the maze participant A and participant B saw in Garrod & 
Anderson (1987). Participants started at the X and had to communicate to each reach their 
respective goal position.  
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when communicating about object positions (Carlson-Radvansky & Jiang, 1998; 
Dobnik, Kelleher, & Koniaris, 2014; Johannsen & De Ruiter, 2013; Johannsen & 
Ruiter, 2013; Schober, 1993; Watson, Pickering, & Branigan, 2004). For example, 
participants use spatial perspectives differently when they are interacting with people 
vs. imaginary addressees (Schober, 1993). In a simple task, participants would point 
out the location of one object relative to another. Interestingly, participants used 
fewer words and locative expressions, and more egocentric perspectives when 
talking to an interlocutor, compared to when they were solo speakers. In line with  
Garrod and Anderson (1987), participant pairs usually kept using the type of  
descriptions that were first used. In a different study, response times where lower in 
a sentence verification task when a frame of reference at any given trial matched the 
frame of reference in the preceeding trial (Carlson-Radvansky & Jiang, 1998), 
supporting the account of interactive alignment.  
Watson et al. (2004) tested whether interlocutors align reference frames, 
using a confederate priming paradigm (see Figure 4.38). The confederate 
manipulates the frame of reference s/he uses in specific trials, to explore the 
likelihood of participants copying the used frame of reference. It was found that 
interlocutors align reference frames when describing objects’ locations; participants 
were 10% more likely to use the intrinsic frame if they heard a confederate use that 
 
Figure 4.38. A participant and a conspecific were shown an array with a camera and a dot, 
each on their own screen. The confederate would give a description of the location of the 
dot in relation to the camera (e.g., “the dot above the camera” or “the dot right of the 
camera”). Participants then had to choose between two camera – dot pairs which of the 
two (left or right) fitted the description best. In the next trial, the participant would 
describe the situation, Watson et al. (2004) 
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reference frame on the preceeding trial, compared to when the confederate used a 
relative frame of reference. This effect was robust; the priming was still apparent 
when a speaker used a different preposition compared to a previous utterance from 
an interlocutor, showing it was not merely an effect of lexical alignment (Watson et 
al., 2004). In this type of priming, it was found that successful communication is a 
function of the extent to which interlocutors aligned their methods to disambiguate 
frames of reference (Johannsen & De Ruiter, 2013).   
There are however theories that alignment effects are explicit and not based 
on automatic repetition (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Clark, 1996; Healey, Purver, & 
Howes, 2014). Moreover, speakers sometimes use references that their hearers 
would not agree to, enabling them to specify and control whether they used the same 
conceptualization, or situation model (Brennan & Clark, 1996). Only after 
interlocutors have established that they have a similar situation model do they tend to 
stick to a specific reference. This interactive misalignment, was supported in two 
large spoken dialogue corpora analyses (Healey et al., 2014). Healey and colleagues 
found that people tend to repeat syntactic constructions below chance level, and that 
people instead are more likely to diverge from one-another in syntactic 
constructions, enabling speakers to clarify misunderstandings (Healey, 2008; Healey 
et al., 2014). Healey and colleagues suggested that  successful communication is 
dependent on the ability to selectively repeat interlocutors’ expressions. In multiple 
studies, including Garrod and Anderson (1987), results show progression in the use 
of descriptions, in which initial descriptions are dropped after participants find better 
ways to describe locations (Mills & Healey, 2008). This is consistent with Brennan 
and Clark’s (1996) suggestion that interlocutors use deviating descriptions to 
confirm they use the same situation model.  
Combining the findings that people might align or mimic during successful 
conversation, and that language can drive visual attention, we hypothesised that if 
participants hear a different frame of reference describing a prime trial, they mimic 
this description and use a similar a reference frame in the succeeding probe trials. 
Previous studies using a confederate-priming paradigm typically employ a within-
participant design (Branigan et al., 2000; Watson et al., 2004). However, following 
Firestone and Scholl (2015), participants may understand the aims or manipulation 
of studies. Participants in these studies go through multiple trials, they might be able 
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to identifiy the manipulation that is used in those trials - the manipulation is the only 
thing that changes between trials. Therefore, it needs to be tested upon debrief 
whether participants had an understanding of the manipulation and/or aims of the 
study. If they do, participants might respond based on their beliefs of what the study 
is about or what the experimenter wants them to do. To prevent this from happening, 
we choose to use a between-participants design. Since participants only see one 
prime-trial, they cannot compare between trials, decreasing the likelihood of a 
participant discovering the manipulation and aim of the study.  
Our study aims to text one potential mechanism driving alignment, attention. 
Eye-movements are a potential realisation of automatic alignment. Our main aim in 
this study was to examine influence of prior linguistic descriptions on eye-
movements in a spatial description task. Participants were instructed to describe the 
spatial relation of two objects (e.g., the marble is to the left of the ladybird). They 
were presented with a prime-trial, in which either an intrinsic (in front of/behind), a 
relative (to the left/right), or no reference frame (blahblah) was expressed in 
language. It is important to note that our study, like in some of the reviewed papers, 
has a limitation regarding the free language use of participants. Since the prime-trial 
was prerecorded, there was no actual interaction and the instructions did prevent 
participants from using free spoken dialogue. 
4.2 Experiment 9: The influence of frames of reference as expressed in 
spatial language on visual attention  
The study we present in this chapter explores the effect of language 
(expressing frame of reference) on visual attention. We presented simple spatial 
scenes containing two objects (e.g., a marble and a ladybird), and primed participants 
with a verbal description, either matching an intrinsic (“the marble is in front of the 
ladybird”) or relative (“the marble is to the left of the ladybird”) reference frame, or 
a neutral description (“the marble is blahblah the ladybird”). We predicted that 
hearing an intrinsic description would draw attention towards the reference object, 
while hearing a relative description would lead to attention being divided more 
equally between located and reference objects.  
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4.2.1 Method. 
4.2.1.1 Participants. Participants were 84 students from the University of 
East Anglia (56 female, age range 18-50), who took part for course credits or 
monetary payment. 
4.2.1.2 Materials and Setup. Participants sat in front of the eye tracker. On 
the screen, simple spatial arrays consisting of two objects were shown (for the 
object-pairs used in the probe trials, see Figure 4.39). Every object had four interest 
areas (IA) assigned (Figure 4.399). An IA for the whole object, and a further division 
into three equal parts (left, middle, right). This allowed us to monitor both the 
objects and the areas within the objects participants were looking at prior to 
producing their spatial descriptions. 
Three different versions were used in an example trial: a relative reference 
frame (“The marble is to the left/right of the ladybird”), an intrinsic reference frame  
 (“The marble is in front of/behind the ladybird”) or no reference frame (neutral 
condition: “The marble is ‘blah-blah’ the ladybird”). After the example, prime trial, 
there were six probe trials with different spatial scenes. The participants verbally 
described each array while their response was recorded and saved as a .wav file.  
Eye movements were recorded with an SR research Eyelink 1000 eye tracker 
sampling at 1000 Hz (SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). Viewing was binocular, 
but we only tracked the position of one eye per participant. Stimulus presentation 
was programmed using SR research Experiment Builder software. The eye tracker 
and a 19” CRT display monitor (refresh rate of 140 Hz) were interfaced with a 3-
 
Figure 4.39. Interest areas of the reference and located object. IA 1 and 2 are the overall 
interest areas for respectively the reference and located object, fixations in these IAs are 
analysed for hypothesis 1. In this example, IA 3 and 5 are the front and back of the reference 
object, which were analysed for hypothesis 2.  
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GHz Pentium 4 PC, which controlled the experiment and logged the position of the 
eye throughout the experiment. Throughout the task, participants used a chinrest.  
4.2.1.3 Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, we used a nine-point 
sequence to calibrate and validate eye position. Instructions were presented to the 
participants both verbally (spoken by a native English narrator) and visually on the 
screen. Then we presented the objects used in the study so that participants would 
know the labels for each object, and could easily identify the objects when 
describing them. At the start of the experiment an example trial was presented, one 
of four combinations (intrinsic: in front of/ behind, relative: to the left/ right) of the 
two objects in Figure 4.399, followed by six probe trials. The order of trials was 
pseudo-randomized across 12 different lists. Participants were asked to look at each 
picture, wait for the question (Where is object A in relation to object B), and then 
answer out loud with a full sentence. 
The design consisted of a single variable with 3 levels (example trial: 
intrinsic, relative, neutral), and it was manipulated between participants. The 
dependent variables were the IA participants looked at on the example and the probe 
trials, and the type of reference frame produced by participants in the probe trials. 
4.2.2 Results. 
We first examined whether the linguistic example affected which reference 
frame participants chose across the six probe trials. We categorized participants’ 
responses for each probe trial as using either the intrinsic frame or the relative frame. 
We analysed the frequency of intrinsic and relative frame terms for all six probe  
trials separately. Table 4.18 shows the percentage of participants using each 
reference frame for each probe by condition. Note that all participants in this 
experiment used either an intrinsic or a relative description (two participants for 
which the microphone failed to record the response are eliminated from this 
analysis). There is a main (between participant) effect of condition, F(1,79) = 
16.775, p < .001, ηp² = .298, showing that participants in the intrinsic condition used 
the intrinsic reference frame more often that participants in both the relative and 
neutral condition. There was also a main effect of trial, but no interaction between  
trial and condition, p = .26, ηp² = .03. The data shows that the trial effect is driven 
by the relative and neutral condition, in which participants start using the intrinsic  
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condition more over time, although they never use it in an extent comparable to the 
intrinsic condition. 
We next examined the eye movement data. First, we examined fixations on the 
example trial. There were more fixations on the reference object in the intrinsic 
condition following the onset of the prepositional phrase compared to the relative 
and neutral conditions (see Figure 4.40). In order to examine the time spent attending 
the reference and located objects, we summed the fixation durations for the reference 
and located objects separately in the example and probe trials. In the example trial 
we calculated from the onset of the question (“Where is the marble in relation to the 
ladybird”) until the end of the trial; in the probe trials recording started at the onset 
of the question until the beginning of the response (onset of spatial description). 
These data were analysed with a 7 (trial: primer trial and 6 probe trials) × 3 
(condition: intrinsic, relative, neutral) × 2 (object: reference, located) mixed model 
ANOVA. This produced a main effect of object, F(1,81) = 19.37, p < .001, ηp² = 
.193. Overall, more time was spent looking at the reference object (M = 51%, SE = 
1.7%) compared to the located object (M = 37.5%, SE = 1.7%). The interaction 
between condition and object was also significant, F(2,81) = 3.3, p = .042, ηp² = 
.075. More time was spent looking at the reference object in the intrinsic condition 
(M = 57.6%, SE = 3.3%) compared to both the neutral (M = 46.4%, SE = 2.2%) and 
relative (M = 49% SE = 3.4%) conditions. We ran a separate 7 (trials) × 3  
 
                                                 
11 We planned to add more participants to the neutral condition in order to get meaningful 
group sizes of participants spontaneously choosing the intrinsic and the relative reference frame. 
However, the ratio of intrinsic : relative reference frame response was about 1:4, so that we got 
convinced that it was not feasible to add participants until a meaningful sample of spontaneous 
‘intrinsic’ responses was reached.  
Table 4.18. Percentage of intrinsic (Int) and relative (Rel) frame use for each probe for 
each condition. 
 Probe 1 Probe 2 Probe 3 Probe 4 Probe 5 Probe 6 
Primer  Int* Rel** Int Rel Int Rel Int Rel Int Rel Int Rel 
Intrinsic 
(21) 76% 24% 86% 14% 86% 14% 86% 14% 86% 14% 86% 
14
% 
Relative 
(19) 16% 84% 21% 79% 37% 63% 37% 63% 37% 63% 32% 
68
% 
Neutral 
(42)11 19% 81% 19% 81% 24% 76% 31% 69% 31% 69% 38% 
62
% 
* Int. = intrinsic; ** Rel = relative 
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(condition) ANOVA over fixations on the reference object, to test this difference 
between conditions. There was a main effect of condition, F(2,81) = 3.989, p = .022, 
ηp² = .09, but no main effect of trial p = .657, ηp² = .008 and no interaction between 
trial and condition, p = .794, ηp² = .016. 
This analysis shows that looking behaviour across conditions was consistent 
across example and probe trials, consistent with the view that eye movement patterns 
are maintained from the linguistic example across all probe trials. As the data on the 
probe trials are prior to the description produced by participants on each of these 
trials, these findings suggest that eye movement patterns are “replayed” across 
different and future visual scenes, which then likely influences future spatial 
descriptions. 
 
Figure 4.40. Interaction between condition and object with respect to looking time. Error 
bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Table 4.19. Results of the ANOVA on eye-movement data 
Source df and F value MS Significance ηp² 
Trial* (T) F(6,486) = .730 0.022 0.606 0.009 
T × condition* F(612,486) = .214 0.006 0.996 0.005 
Object (O) F(1,81) = 19.370 4.666 <.001 0.193 
O × condition F(2,81) = 3.300 0.795 0.042 0.075 
T × O F(6,486) = .778 0.15 0.587 0.01 
T × O × condition F(12,486) = .664 0.128 0.786 0.016 
*Greenhouse-Geisser         
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Finally, we analysed the amount of time spent looking at the parts of the 
reference object, separating areas that are diagnostic (front and back) vs. not 
diagnostic (centre) of object orientation. In order to do so, we summed the fixation 
durations at the front (one-third of the object) and back (one-third of the object) of 
the reference object and subtracted the time spent looking at the middle (one-third of 
the object). A 3 × 7 (condition: intrinsic, relative, neutral) × (trial: example, probes 
1-6) mixed model ANOVA showed no main effect of trial, p = .241, ηp² = .016, no 
main effect of condition, p = .211, ηp² = .038, nor an interaction between trial and 
condition, p = .139, ηp2 = .036. However, relatively more time was spent looking at 
the front and back of the reference object in the intrinsic condition (M = 53.2%, SE = 
7.7%) than in either the relative (M = 36.5%, SE = 8.1%) or the neutral (M = 37.7%, 
SE = 5.3) conditions. 
4.2.3 Discussion. 
We found effects of linguistic example on reference frame choice as 
expressed in language, robust across probe trials. In the neutral condition, there was 
a strong preference to use the relative frame. After an intrinsic prime, 84% of probe 
trials had an intrinsic description, compared to 27% in the neutral condition, and 
30% in the relative example condition. This represents a considerable influence of 
previous description on reference frame selection, persisting with impressive 
consistency across the extended duration of the experiment. More informative is the 
eye movement data regarding how participants looked at visual scenes following the 
example description and prior to their own descriptions across the probe trials. 
With respect to looking times on the reference and located objects, the data 
provide the first evidence that reference frames, expressed in language, are 
associated with different visual attentional patterns. Across all the trials (example 
trial and six probes) more time was spent looking at the reference object than the 
located object following the offset of the prepositional phrase (diagnostic of 
reference frame) when the example trial contained a preposition denoting an intrinsic 
reference frame compared to a relative or neutral frame. This is consistent with 
earlier work showing more coarse grained effects of prepositions on object reference 
using the Visual World Paradigm (Chambers et al., 2002), and is also consistent 
more broadly with a range of studies showing the rapid interplay between language 
and visual attention (for a review, see Henderson & Ferreira, 2004). It is particularly 
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striking that the looking time behaviour was consistent across the example trial and 
six probe trials, just as the verbal responses were consistent across trials. 
The analyses of looking behaviour to parts of the reference objects did not 
produce reliable results. This may well be a result of the size of objects used. The 
mean size of objects on the screen was 5 cm × 5 cm, so participants could apprehend 
the entire object within para-foveal vision, and thus, eye movements to left and right 
sides of the object were unnecessary to orient front and back. Future studies could 
increase the size of the objects to investigate how participants establish object axes 
across multiple fixations.  
4.3 General Discussion 
We examined effects of linguistic descriptions on the types of reference 
frames people use when describing simple spatial scenes. Our data are consistent 
with the view that language draws attention to the visual world in specific ways, 
consistent with other visual world paradigm studies. We consider the mechanisms 
involved below, and implications for theories of language production more 
generally.  
While sizeable increases in intrinsic frame use were following an intrinsic 
description of a spatial scene, it is notable that in the neutral condition there was a 
preference to use relative descriptions (71% across probes). There is considerable 
disagreement regarding general preference for reference frames in the literature. For 
example, some authors have argued that the ease of perceptual availability and 
reduction in computational effort makes the relative frame dominant/most preferred 
(e.g., Levelt, 1982; Linde & Labov, 1975), while others argued that the intrinsic 
frame is preferred (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1993; Miller & Johnson-Laird, 
1976). Discourse and task context effects can have a strong influence (cf. Tenbrink, 
2011). Indeed, reference frame choice has been shown to be affected by a range of 
situational influences, including the embedding of the objects in more complex and 
real-world scenes (Johannsen & De Ruiter, 2013a), and the communicative context 
in which the speaker is situated (Galati & Avraamides, 2013).  
Our results provide the first empirical evidence that more time is spent 
looking at the reference object following an intrinsic description compared to when a 
neutral or relative description is given. Reference frames have received much 
attention in the field of spatial language and spatial cognition, but thus far, eye-
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tracking data regarding reference frames has not been available. Not only are 
reference frames theoretically differentiable (cf. Levinson, 1996), but it would seem 
that they are associated with differential allocation of attention to the reference and 
located objects when one looks at a spatial scene following the use of a reference 
frame in a spatial description by an interlocutor.  
The novel and arguably most important finding in this study was that the 
same pattern of looking time differences occurred for each of the probe trials, prior 
to participants’ descriptions. Moreover, there was no interaction between trial 
(example trial, probes 1-6) and object (reference, located), which indicates that the 
same pattern held between the example and probe trials. These results suggest effects 
of priming. When participants were primed in a specific linguistic frame of 
reference, they were more likely to align to that reference frame. The lack of an 
interaction effect shows that participants did not switch between reference frames 
during the probe trials. In terms of the interactive alignment or misalignment models, 
our participants performed eye-movements consistent with the reference frame that 
was used and re-played these eye-movements when they were asked to describe the 
object arrangements themselves. In the interactive misalignment account one might 
hypothesise that participants perform different eye-movements. If alignment is based 
on a mechanism of mis-alignment, participants would be expected to test other 
possible descriptions upon hearing an example trial. However, the interactive 
misalignment model is based on interaction. Since dialogue and monologue have 
been shown to be different skills, it is important to recognize this limitation 
(Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Schober, 1993; Watson et al., 2004).Therefore, the lack 
of explorative eye-movements to consider other frame of references could be due to 
the lack of an interlocutor. The misalignment might be useful in interaction, but 
when there is no interaction, there is no reason to test whether a hearer has the same 
situation model, as there is no collaboration or end goal. A potential follow-up study 
to tease the interactive alignment and interactive misalignment accounts apart should 
combine the strengths of both types of study, including a confederate for actual 
interaction and a between-participant design.  
However, we know that language draws attention to the world in specific 
ways, and in turn, that looking at the world in a particular way affects choice of 
syntactic structure (e.g., Gleitman et al., 2007). Rather than regarding linguistic 
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descriptions and visual cueing as independent and different parameters, one can 
argue that there is a close interplay between language and visual attention, such that 
they support each other to maximise alignment between interlocutors. This leads to 
an increased likelihood of the same type of description being used as that used on the 
example (prime) trial. 
Finally, we can return to the range of influences on choice of language 
considered at the outset of this paper. Consistent with work on the influence of visual 
(cued) attention on syntactic structure (Gleitman et al., 2007), we have suggested 
that drawing attention to the intrinsic frame either through an intrinsic prior 
(example) description may direct visual attention to the reference object, increasing 
the likelihood of producing an intrinsic description compared to no-prime or relative-
prime conditions. This provides a parsimonious approach to the effect of multiple 
influences on spatial description, starting with the assumption that language and 
visual changes can direct the attention of the speaker in similar ways. It also affords 
a means to test whether a possible strategic route to spatial description, where for 
example people deliberately choose to ignore past information (systematic 
misalignment in dialogue; Healey, 2008), results in overriding visual attentional 
patterns (akin to dual process models of semantic priming; see Mummery, Shallice, 
& Price, 1999), or inhibition of the influence of past spatial description in the first 
instance. 
In summary, we have presented the first evidence (to our knowledge) for 
distinguishable looking behaviour patterns as a function of reference frames 
expressed in language. Using between-participants designs where past information 
can be systematically manipulated immediately prior to a probe trial description 
provides a clean way of testing how language choice is affected by multiple 
constraints.
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Chapter 5 – General Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Chapter overview 
The experimental work outlined in this thesis aimed to investigate the 
influence of language on cognition and perception, specifically the influence of 
spatial language on memory for object location, and the influence of language 
expressing reference frames on visual attention. In the present chapter, we will first 
summarize the main findings presented in this thesis, before considering how these 
findings advance theory within the field. Lastly, we discuss directions for future 
research. 
5.2 Summary of Results 
5.2.1 Chapter 2 
In the first series of experiments (see Chapter 2), we set out to test whether 
language affects memory for object location and to elucidate the mechanism 
involved. In our studies, we teased apart three different models, each having 
different predictions of the mechanism via which language might influence spatial 
memory: the Expectation model, the Congruence model, and the Attention allocation 
model. To do so, we used spatial demonstratives as a vehicle to test spatial memory 
using the memory game procedure (Coventry et al., 2008). 
We teased apart models explaning the mechanism underlying the influence of 
language on perception: Expectation, Congruence, and Attention. Our results 
favoured the Expectation model as an explanation as to how language influences 
spatial memory. The Expectation model is consistent with models of predictive 
coding, suggesting that people continuously predict future states in the world (cf., 
Clark, 2013). The Expectation model (Coventry et al., 2014) suggests that spatial 
language can elicit a specific expectation about a scene. This and my have a proximal 
predictive value, such that objects referred to with these words are linguistically 
encoded to be closer by compared to objects referred to with implicitly distal terms 
like that and your (e.g., Clark & Sengul, 1978; Coventry, Valdés, Castillo, & 
Guijarro-Fuentes, 2008; Diessel, 2006). The Expectation model takes these 
predictive values and predicts that, encoding objects with distal language will distort 
memory in a way that objects are misremembered to be further away, compared to 
objects encoded with proximal language terms.  
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In the Congruence model, it is not so much the language, but the congruency 
of language and space that influences memory. Research on congruency found that, 
for example, action performance is quicker and more accurate in tasks in which a 
spatial scene and spatial language are congruent compared to an incongruent 
situation (cf. Bonfiglioli et al., 2009; Stevens & Zhang, 2013). Following the Theory 
of Event coding (Hommel, Musseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001), suggesting that 
perception and action share an indistinguishable underlying representational 
medium, we extend these findings to spatial memory. If memory is more accurate 
when language describing a spatial situation is congruent with that situation, then 
memory for object location should be more accurate in trials in which an object is 
placed closer to a participant combined with this or my compared to memory for 
objects placed at the same locations combined with that or your. Similarly, memory 
should be more accurate for objects placed further away if the placement is verbally 
encoded using that and your compared to this and my. The crucial difference 
between the Expectation model and the Congruence model is that the latter predicts a 
cross-over interaction. Our results in Chapter 2 all showed a main effect, but no 
cross-over interaction, thereby supporting the predictions by the Expectation model. 
(In Experiment 3, we did find an interaction, but the interaction showed objects 
placed with your were misremembered less accurately when placed further away, an 
effect opposite to the prediction the congruence model would make). Language did 
have an effect on memory for object location, in which objects placed with that were 
systematically misremembered to be further away than objects placed with this, 
irrespective of distance.  
The third model we tested was the Attention allocation model. Since 
language focuses attention (Allopenna et al., 1998; Tanenhaus et al., 1995) and 
longer looking times are associated with better memory performance (Huebner & 
Gegenfurtner, 2010), objects placed under language conditions eliciting a stronger 
focus of attention will be remembered more accurately. People may spend more time 
looking at objects in closer proximity (Garrido-Vásquez & Schubö, 2014), a system 
that could be activated by proximal language. This could be consistent with the 
schema of focus for demonstrative reference (Figure 2.25), in which this allocates a 
higher focus of attention to a referent compared to that (Strauss, 2002). 
Alternatively, the definiteness of demonstratives compared to, for example, 
determiners means that demonstratives focus attention of a conspecific more strongly 
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to a referent (cf. Peeters & Özyürek, 2016). A model based on focussed attention, 
which we coined the Attention Allocation model, would have similar behavioural 
predictions as the Expectation model. If people spend more time looking at objects 
that are linguistically encoded to be closer by (e.g., this, my), compared to objects 
linguistically encoded distal (e.g., that, your), memory performance should be more 
accurate in the former and lead to a main effect of language. Furthermore, as 
participants tend to overestimate object location in memory (cf. Coventry et al., 
2014), the attention effect would have the same direction as the Expectation model. 
The difference is that in the Expectation model, language directly affects memory, 
whereas in the Attention allocation model, memory performance is affected by 
language via the amount of attention they elicit. If demonstrative pronouns (this/that) 
have a stronger effect on focus of attention compared to an indefinite referential 
expression (the), the data would show a difference between demonstratives and the 
determiner. To test the attention allocation account, we had participants engage in 
the memory game while wearing eye-tracker glasses. We found no difference in 
fixation times between the language conditions (although we did not find evidence 
there is no attention effect based on language). This suggests that attention is not 
driving the main effects that we found across experiments. 
In summary, results overall supported the Expectation Model. The driving 
mechanism of the Expectation model is consistent with accounts of predictive coding 
(Clark, 2013; Friston, 2005) and more broadly with the idea that prediction plays a 
major part in cognition. The theory of predictive coding suggests that people 
continuously predict possible future states based on current perceptual input 
combined with learned associations (Friston, 2009). The brain prepares a response 
based on this prediction and only needs to process the error signal, the difference 
between the prediction and the updated visual input, once the new state of the world 
emerges. Adjusting the prediction according to the error signal costs less energy than 
responding to surprises. Therefore, Friston (2009) coined this the free-energy 
principle. The associations that afford prediction might be learned via the principle 
of statistical learning (Newport & Aslin, 2004; Pulvermüller, 2012; Saffran et al., 
1996) – by learning co-occurrences of words and meaning or words and situations 
(see also Andrews et al., 2009).  
Our results are also consistent with a probabilistic inference model, as 
discussed previously (Cibelli et al., 2016; Huttenlocher et al., 1991, 2004; Regier & 
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Xu, 2017). Probabilistic inference models assume that memory systems are based on 
two tiers, the perceptual, ‘fine-grained’ representation of an object or event, and the 
more general category to which an object or event belongs. During memory retrieval 
(retrieval in itself resulting in lability of the memory trace), these two tiers merge, in 
which the strength of each tier is dependent on the amount of uncertainty in the 
‘fine-grained’ representation. That is, one is more certain about the fine-grained 
representation, the more general category knowledge has a lower impact. However, 
the more uncertainty there is on the ‘fine-grained’ representation, the stronger the 
category effect gets. This uncertainty can be caused by fading memory, fatigue, or 
any other factor inducing uncertainty in the mental representation. In our study, the 
linguistic encoding can elicit a specific categorical-representation of an object. If the 
meaning of demonstratives (this, that), is based on the numerous examples of 
situations in which people use demonstratives - as statistical learning theory suggests 
(Pulvermüller, 2012) - their meaning and therefore their predictive value is based on 
this common use, in which this refers to objects close by a speaker, or in a setup with 
two or more objects, this refers to the object closer by the speaker than other objects. 
Upon retrieval, this category could influence the memorized location of an object.  
Our results show that memory can be influenced by seemingly small 
differences in the spatial linguistic description of a situation. However, there is a 
myriad of ways in which the spatial world can potentially be carved up, and there are 
6,000-8,000 languages used around the world that do so in different ways (Evans & 
Levinson, 2009; Landau & Jackendoff, 1993). For example, more than a third 
(37.4%) of the worlds’ languages employs a three-way demonstrative system 
(Diessel, 2005). This variation opens up the possibility that different demonstrative 
systems may pose different predictions about object location in memory. In Chapter 
3, we tested the Expectation model in a language in which the use of the 
demonstrative system is more complex: Japanese.  
5.2.2 Chapter 3 
To explore potential limits of the Expectation model, we tested Japanese 
speakers, since Japanese employs a three-way demonstrative system (based on 
distance and/or position of interlocutors), opening the possibility of more complex 
demonstrative use and therefore a different influence of language on memory for 
object location. Over four experiments, our aim was twofold: we wanted to establish 
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the parameters Japanese demonstratives use to encode space, and second, we wanted 
to find out if and how Japanese demonstratives affect memory for object location. In 
addition to the two Japanese studies we ran two English studies, to replicate earlier 
findings (Coventry et al., 2008; Gudde et al., 2016, Chapter 2) and to afford 
comparison of the English and Japanese data.  
We identified four different theoretical models describing the Japanese 
demonstrative system. The first account is the distance model, suggesting that the 
three Japanese demonstratives (kono, sono, ano) encode egocentric distance of the 
referent from the speaker; kono for close to speaker, sono for medium distance, and 
ano for far distance (e.g., Ootsuki (1889), as cited in Nakamura, 2012). The second 
explanation is a person-centred account, in which demonstratives encode the 
interlocutor’s territory in which the referent is located; kono for close to the speaker, 
sono for close to the hearer, and ano for far from both (Sakuma, 1936; Sakata , 1971, 
as cited by Hasegawa, 2012; Hattori, 1992; Niimura & Hayashi, 1994; Sakata, 
1992). The two other possibilities suggest a combination of these two models. Model 
3, the dual-system model suggests that demonstratives encode distance or territory as 
a function of the spatial configuration of interlocutors. When hearer and speaker 
share a territory, demonstratives encode distance from this shared territory. When 
hearer and speaker do not share territory, demonstratives encode territory (Kamio, 
1994). A variation on this dual-system model is that sono can refer to a interactional 
territory instead of the hearers’ territory (Yoshimoto, 1992, 1986). In this case, sono 
would not be used for objects close to the hearer, but for objects within the 
interactional dyad, and objects out of the interactional area, further from 
interlocutors, would be encoded with ano. The fourth model is the double-binary 
model in which the three demonstratives form a double-binary contrast. For 
example, kono and sono can contrast space, kono and ano can contrast specific 
territories, but sono and ano are not a contrasting pair (Hasegawa, 2012).   
We found that Japanese demonstrative use is based on both distance and 
territory. This rejects the influence of either parameter on its own (Model 1 and 2). 
Furthermore, our data rejects the double binary model (Model 4) – most our 
participants used all three demonstratives, which is impossible in the double-binary 
model. Our results were consistent with the dual-system model (Model 3) with the 
idea of an interactional space. Participants used kono almost exclusively for near 
locations, and near locations were almost exclusively referred to with kono. Ano was 
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the preferred demonstrative for objects out of reach when speaker and hearer shared 
territory, but when the hearer sat opposite the speaker, the use of sono and ano was 
about 50/50. This was irrespective of whether the object was within or out of 
interlocutors’ reach. Therefore, the results were most consistent with the 
interactional space dual-system model: sono was used irrespective of the objects’ 
location relative to the interlocutor, and was used for objects located at all distances 
out of participants’ reach, but between participant and conspecific. Note that in our 
study, when participant and interlocutor sat opposite each other, all objects were 
within their interactional space. Therefore, using this specific setup, we cannot see 
whether encoding is different for objects within this interactional space and out of 
interactional space. The data also showed a gender effect, in which agent affected 
male participants, whereas agent did not affect female participants.  
The English results replicated previous findings, in which there was a main 
effect of agent and of location. Interestingly, results revealed an interaction between 
location and position, in which that was used less frequently for objects placed in the 
near space of the conspecific. This is of note, since English does not explicitly 
encode the position of an interlocutor. However, these results are consistent with 
Coventry et al. (2014), who found that other parameters which are not explicitly 
encoded in English do nonetheless influence English demonstrative use (e.g., 
ownership, visibility, familiarity). These results are important because they are 
inconsistent with the perspective of cross-linguistic differences, but support the 
perspective of universal systems of demonstrative pronouns.  
Turning to the influence of language on memory, data showed the increased 
complexity of Japanese demonstrative encoding. Whereas the English data replicated 
previous findings (both in the language and the memory experiment), showing a 
main effect of language but no interactions with space, the Japanese results were less 
clear. There were no main effects of language or space, but data showed an 
interaction of demonstrative and space, and there was an interaction of conspecific, 
demonstrative, space, and gender. The gender effect is interesting, as it has not been 
found before (we did not find a gender effect in the English memory studies in 
Chapter 2 nor 3). 
In the analysis of male participant data, we found an interaction between 
demonstrative and space when participant and conspecific were seated side-by-side, 
indicating an effect of language. This effect disappeared in trials in which the 
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conspecific was opposite the participant. These results are consistent with the dual-
system model, in which demonstratives encode distance when hearer and speaker 
share territory, but territory when they do not. Female data showed an interaction 
between demonstrative and space, but no three-way interaction with position. An 
explanation for the difference between male and female participants in Japanese 
could be that evolutionarily, males (across species) are more territorial. The 
differences between English and Japanese could be explained by the finding that the 
Japanese society scores higher on masculinity (Hofstede, 1980, 1998). The potential 
for cross-cultural differences could be picked up in future research.  
Overall, in Chapter 2 and 3 we have seen demonstratives encode distance 
from a speaker and can affect memory for object location: objects placed with that 
are misremembered to be further away than objects placed with this. Furthermore, 
we found that a parameter that is explicitly encoded in Japanese, but not in English - 
position of a conspecific – does influence English demonstrative use. This finding 
supports a universal view of demonstrative systems. It is important to note that the 
effect was stronger in Japanese than it was in English, which might suggest that the 
weighting of parameters varies across languages, so that parameters that are 
explicitly encoded have stronger effects.   
5.2.3 Chapter 4 
In Chapter 4, we explored  the influence that reference frames have on 
attention allocation. We set out to determine whether there are differences in how 
people look at the world based on linguistic cueing - the use of different reference 
frames in the description of a specific spatial scene. To do this, we ran an eye-
tracking study, presenting simple spatial arrays of two objects. We found that 
participants show different patterns of eye-movements when they are hear spatial 
descriptions employing different reference frames, and that these patterns persist 
throughout following trials. To our knowledge, it is the first time that specific 
patterns of eye-movements are found as a result of the use of different reference 
frames.  
In our study, we cued participants with an auditory description of a simple 
visual array (e.g., “the marble is in front of the ladybird”). During the succeeding 
probe trials, we presented different object pairs, and recorded participants’ eye-
movements and their verbal description of the scene. Results showed distinctive eye-
SECTION 3 – General Discussion 
129 
 
movement patterns based on the reference frame that were used in the prime trial. 
When the intrinsic reference frame is used (e.g., “the marble is in front of the 
ladybird”), participants paid most attention to the reference object. This is consistent 
with our hypothesis that the reference object requires the most attention in order to 
confirm the intrinsic axis (front/back). In contrast, in the relative condition we found 
attention more equally divided between both objects. Perhaps the most important 
finding however is, that these fixation patterns occurred for each of the probe trials, 
“prior” to participants’ descriptions. There was no interaction between trial (example 
trial, probes 1 – 6) and object (reference, located), indicating that the fixation pattern 
held between the example and probe trials. This offers a possible mechanism to 
explain the linguistic alignment effects: language draws attention to the world in 
specific ways, leading to looking at a new spatial scene in the same way. In turn, 
looking at the world in a specific way leads to the increased likelihood of the same 
type of description being used as was used on the example (prime) trial, consistent 
with the effects of endogenous and exogenous visual cueing on choice of syntactic 
structure (e.g., Gleitman et al., 2007). One can argue that there is a close interplay 
between language and visual attention, such that they support each other to 
maximize alignment between interlocutors. 
Consistent with the work on the influence of visual (cued) attention on 
syntactic structure (Gleitman et al., 2007), we suggest that drawing attention to the 
intrinsic frame through an intrinsic prior (example) description may direct more 
visual attention to the reference object compared to the relative reference frame, 
which increases the likelihood of the alignment in reference frame use (Watson et 
al., 2004).  
5.3 Methodological concerns 
A common pitfall in psychological research is the trade-off between 
ecological validity and control: the more experimental control, the lower the 
ecological validity, but the higher ecological validity, the lower the experimental 
control. This may especially affect the language production experiments in Chapter 
3. The dynamic environment in which language usually takes place is limited in a lab 
environment. Therefore, the ecological validity of these specific studies might have 
been traded for increased experimental control.  
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Previous research testing spatial demonstrative production or comprehension 
of demonstratives ranges between observational research with high ecological 
validity but low experimental control (e.g., Enfield, 2003), testing participants’ 
intuitions about demonstratives by asking which words they would use in 
hypothetical situations (e.g., Wilkins, 1999), and studies with high experimental 
control but low ecological validity, such as designs in which congruence of 
demonstratives and pictures is tested (Peeters et al., 2015; Stevens & Zhang, 2013). 
As we know that there are many different possible parameters on which language 
use is based, it is impossible to acquire data in real life environments while 
controlling for all these variables. In our experiments, we tested participants’ 
language use in a controlled lab-environment. This experimental control might 
however have influenced the ecological validity. When people have to choose their 
language, it is possible the controlled lab-environment limited the dynamic 
characteristics of language use that would occur in more naturalistic settings. For 
example, we cannot differentiate between distances on a scale bigger than our table 
using our lab setting. It has been suggested that the three-way distinction in Spanish 
demonstratives (este, ese, aquel) is difficult to capture in a lab setting, as aquel is 
used to refer to objects that are beyond a lab-environment. In that case, the use of 
aquel might be adapted to contrast between distances in a lab-environment, but the 
environment might limit the more natural use. On the other hand, the memory game 
procedure has shown to be a good procedure to tease apart other parameters 
(ownership, visibility, familiarity, language) under high experimental control.  
Some specific limitations occur in Chapter 4. For example, the ‘interaction’ 
participants experienced is subject to the same ecological vs. experimental trade-off. 
The verbal cueing and questions were pre-programmed instead of uttered in an actual 
two-way interactional setting as one would experience in everyday life. This could 
affect the use and interpretation of language (Pickering & Garrod, 2004; Schober, 
1993; Watson et al., 2004). This means that in terms of dialogue, the results might 
not be generalizable to free-dialogue. On the other hand, the between subject design 
does ensure that participants do not become aware of the aim of the study, which 
could increase the ecological validity. A procedure that could combine the strengths 
of both studies, for example an interactive design including a confederate and eye-
tracker glasses, might solve the limitations of both types of studies.  
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A second potential issue in Chapter 4, as discussed previously, has to do with 
our hypothesis that participants would fixate more on the front/back of the reference 
object compared to the middle; since the front and back are the areas that provide 
information on the intrinsic axes. Even though we found evidence based on an 
arguably crude analysis of fixations on the reference object or the located object, we 
could not find a difference of fixations within the interest areas of the reference 
objects. A methodological issue that could explain this is that the figures were 
relatively small. That means a participant could see the entire reference object within 
peripheral view if s/he fixated on any point on the reference object. Therefore, s/he 
did not need to shift fixations across the object to determine the direction of the 
intrinsic axis. Future studies could be run using larger objects in which participants 
cannot see the entire object within one fixation.  
More generally, the trade-off applies to the memory data in Chapter 2 and 3 
as well, although one could argue that to test the specific influence of languages on 
spatial memory, the lab-environment made the results cleaner. Since participants 
were aware of the spatial memory task they were performing, it would be expected 
that memory performance is more accurate in a controlled environment compared to 
the ‘real world’. Following the suggestion that memory for object location is a 
combination of the actual location and contextual information (Coventry et al., 
2014), the actual location memory should be stronger in an experimental setting, 
leaving less influence of contextual information. The fact that we are still able to find 
effects of language on memory could therefore imply that the effect is stronger in 
real-life environments. In real life, people do not necessarily focus on exact object 
location. Therefore, one would expect that real-life memory for object location 
suffers from more uncertainty, compared to when a participant knows s/he will be 
tested on fine-grained spatial memory.  
Another issue is the use of eye-tracker glasses in Experiment 4. We did not 
find any indication that languages have a different influence on fixation, but we did 
not find evidence that it does not. It is possible that different demonstratives elicit 
different reference frames or searching strategies when one is encoding a spatial 
memory, but that the ability of the current generation of eye-tracker glasses does not 
provide the fine-grained measurements needed to observe these. Moreover, there are 
some basic problems with the use of the eye-tracker glasses. For example, in our 
study we looked at fixations on objects placed at different distances. This means that 
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that the angle of vision, and therefore the standard calibration error, are different for 
each distance. In the manual coding, we needed some leniency to account for this, 
which might have introduced noise obscuring a potential effect.  
5.3.1 Chapter 2: Influence of Cognition on Perception Checklist (Firestone 
& Scholl, 2015) 
In Chapter 1.4.4 we discussed a set of problems that can be frequently found 
in studies testing the influence of top-down cognition on perception. Firestone and 
Scholl (2015) proposed a checklist of 6 items that should be considered (see Table 
1.1). In these subsections we will review these six considerations for each chapter. 
Research designs need to have uniquely disconfirmatory predictions. In the 
experiments presented in Chapter 2, we teased apart 3 different models with different 
predictions and tested which of these predictions matched our results best. One of 
these models was specifically based on the effect attention could have. In 
Experiment 4, we tested whether the differences were caused by differences in 
attention time, but we found no evidence for this while replicating the behavioural 
memory results. 
The final part of every tested participant was a structured interview, testing 
whether participants realised what the study was about and/ or whether they used 
unexpected strategies. Any participant who would have successfully answered this 
question would have been eliminated, but no participant did – all participants bought 
into the idea that the demonstrative recall task was to increase cognitive load. When 
participants do not realise what is being tested, they cannot adjust their responses to 
suit (or contradict) the hypothesis. 
We did not make any claims as to actual differences in perception. Since all 
trials were identical – save for the demonstrative used in the instruction – and 
counterbalanced, it is unlikely that results are shaped by structural differences in 
stimuli salience or memory performance other than the influence the language 
condition had on memory. 
5.3.2 Chapter 3: Influence of Cognition on Perception Checklist (Firestone 
& Scholl, 2015) 
Studies in Chapter 3 were similar to those in Chapter 2. Although we did not 
test for attentional effects in Chapter 3, results from Experiment 4 show that it is 
unlikely that specific attentional differences between language caused structural 
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effects. Apart from that, the same precautions discussed in section 5.3.1 hold for 
Chapter 3. We counterbalanced the same stimuli and locations between trials, 
minimizing the potential for random effects to have a structural influence on our 
results.   
5.3.3 Chapter 4: Influence of Cognition on Perception Checklist (Firestone 
& Scholl, 2015) 
In Experiment 9, we compared participants’ eye-movements in two different 
conditions. Attentional effects were not peripheral, but the main aim of the study. 
Furthermore, the design allowed for results that could support and contradict our 
hypothesis (or be inconclusive). Next to that, we used a between-participants design, 
minimizing the chance of participants realising they were in a specific condition, 
which was confirmed upon debrief. 
Participants were presented with counterbalanced but identical probe-trials, 
after only the linguistic description in the prime trial was manipulated, minimizing 
the influence of random low-level differences. 
We tested whether linguistic cueing influenced eye-movement patterns and 
succeeding linguistic descriptions, we made no claim regarding actual perceptional 
differences. Furthermore, the task was an online verbal description task, in which we 
again made no specific claims about top down effects on actual perception, merely 
on top down effects on attention focussing.. 
5.4 Theoretical implications 
The presented research advances the literature on memory, and the influence 
of language on non-linguistic processes. Our results support models of predictive 
coding while rejecting other models of cognition. Furthermore, we show for the first 
time that spatial prepositions elicit identifyable eye-movement patterns.  
In Chapter 2, results showed a robust effect of language on memory for 
object location, specifically the influence of demonstratives and possessives on 
spatial memory. In our study, the expectation, elicited by contextual knowledge – or 
language – concatenates with the actual object location and drives the memory error. 
This expectation is consistent with models of predictive coding. However, it is 
important to note that the Expectation model is currently underspecified regarding 
whether its effect occurs at encoding or retrieval. Our effects are also consistent with 
an extended probabilistic inference model as proposed by Regier and colleagues 
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(2016; 2017), suggesting that memory (in their studies for colour) is based on a two 
tier system of the actual perception and the category a colour belongs to. The 
probabilistic inference model, in contrast to the Expectation model, clearly 
implicates effects at retrieval, as uncertainty is needed for the tier of object 
knowledge to have an effect. There cannot be uncertainty while a participant still 
sees an object. If we extend their model to the domain of spatial memory 
(Huttenlocher et al., 1991, 2004), it would predict that uncertainty of the actual 
memory location opens the potential for contextual information to affect memory for 
object location. The continuous nature of a location memory error provides this 
uncertainty upon recall. Object knowledge could account for the difference in 
memorised location and actual location. In effect, the probabilistic inference model 
makes the same predictions as the Expectation model, and it might be argued that the 
probabilistic inference model would make similar predictions if extended to 
memory.  
The predictions of the Expectation model and the probabilistic inference 
model could be teased apart using fMRI. The difference between the two models is 
that the Probabilistic inference model takes effect at retrieval, whereas the 
Expectation model has no strong claim on whether the effect happens at encoding or 
retrieval. If we would find differences in activation between conditions (e.g., of 
ownership, familiarity, language) at encoding, this could not be due to uncertainty 
and might therefore help tease apart these two models.  
In Chapter 3, we found that Japanese demonstratives encode both distance 
and position of an interlocutor. These results align with only one of the identified 
models explaining the Japanese demonstrative system. Since most of our participants 
used all three demonstratives, and we found an effect of both distance from a 
participant and the position of the conspecific, we can falsify three models: the 
double binary, and both models suggesting influence of either distance or position. 
Our participants used all three demonstratives available to them in all different 
situations, consistent with both the parameter of distance and position of a 
conspecific (the territory model). The two most basic models, claiming that Japanese 
demonstratives are used either to encode distance or territory are thereby falsified. 
The fourth model we identified, described a double binary, in which kono and sono, 
and kono and ano contrast respectively territory and distance. However, our 
participants mostly used all three demonstratives for objects placed under different 
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conditions of distance and position of a conspecific. Thereby, our data are not 
consistent with the double binary model. Our results support the dual system model 
in which both distance and position are influencing demonstrative use. The effect of 
position was found in English as well – although the effect was stronger in Japanese. 
The finding that position of conspecific, not explicitly encoded in English 
demonstratives, does influence English demonstrative use supports the idea that 
despite seemingly explicit differences between demonstrative systems, 
demonstratives are based on a universal set of underlying non-linguistic parameters. 
The research makes advances in theoretical understanding.  
Further, Chapter 3 adds to the debate between universals in language vs. 
linguistic relativity. Coventry et al. (2014) identified a number of parameters which, 
despite not being explicitly encoded in English, affect English demonstrative use 
nonetheless (and memory for object location in a consistent manner). We found that 
position of a conspecific, explicitly encoded in Japanese but not in English, does 
affect English demonstrative use. This pattern seems to be consistent with universals 
in language. We could speculate that there are underlying universal mechanisms 
important in the use and contrasting function of demonstratives across languages, 
although this leaves open the possibility that parameters might be weighted 
differently across languages. We do however appreciate that great claims require 
great evidence, and many more languages need to be tested before language 
universals about demonstratives could be claimed as a position. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that the strength of the position effect was different between 
languages – Japanese speakers were affected more strongly by the position of a 
conspecific than English speakers. The different weightings of different parameters 
do however provide an interesting question for linguistic typology research: Is the 
effect of a parameter that is more frequently explicitly encoded in languages stronger 
than the effect of a parameter that is less frequently encoded explicitly. For example, 
physical distance is a parameter that is more commonly explicitly encoded than other 
parameters (e.g., ownership), and so far the effect of physical distance has been 
found to be rather strong compared to other parameters. If universal underlying 
parameters exist, parameters with a stronger effect on cognition and demonstrative 
use should more commonly be encoded explicitly.  
In Chapter 4, we saw that linguistic cueing influences the way people scan 
the visual world. To our knowledge, we showed for the first time that different 
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descriptions of the visual world lead to specific eye-movement signatures. Our data 
extend effects of visual cueing from syntactic structure to the conceptual domain. 
The choice of spatial language reflects the choice of an underlying frame of 
reference, which is usually taken to be at a conceptual level of representation rather 
than a lexical level. In most situations, multiple reference frames are appropriate for 
use (Carlson-Radvansky & Logan, 1997), and the speaker needs to select between 
these reference frames for language production. Verbal cueing affects this reference 
frame selection – how one talks about the world conceptually – consistent with the 
influence of past linguistic information on conceptualisation (Garrod & Anderson, 
1987; Watson et al., 2004).  
5.5 Future directions 
The mechanism via which language influences memory can be investigated 
further using different behavioural settings, neuro-imaging methodologies, and 
neural modelling.  
5.5.1 Behavioural methods. In Chapter 3, our results showed differences 
between Japanese and English participants. While their respective languages may 
cause these results, it is important to determine whether this is actually the case. To 
do so, we can run a follow-up study in which we vary, between participants, 
different versions of the memory game: a language production task, the memory 
version without language, and a memory version where language is manipulated. 
The procedure would look as follows. First, we replicate the language production 
experiment we used in Chapter 3. Second, we can use a no-language version of the 
memory version of the memory game, in which the participants perform a verbal 
interference task (Coventry et al., 2014; Garden et al., 2002), to test the strong 
version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. In this task, no language is used to 
instruct object placement – the experimenter just places an object at a specific 
location. During the encoding of object location, participants repeat a meaningless 
phonological sequence ‘Ba Be Bi Bo Bu’. If we find a difference between Japanese 
and English speakers, this would suggest that memory performance is different even 
when language can not be accessed. If the differences disappear, this would suggest 
that the differences found in the previous where language was manipulated, were a 
result of the language. Third, a replication of the language manipulation version 
(Experiment 5 and 6) can be run, to confirm the results we found in the experiments 
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presented in Chapter 3. These three parts can be run with the same participants. This 
within participant design allows us to test whether a specific use of demonstratives 
correlates with (the strength of) influence of demonstratives. For example, whether a 
stronger effect of position of a conspecific in demonstrative use is correlated with a 
stronger influence of position of a conspecific in the memory task. Furthermore, this 
design would help replicate the findings of the four experiments we currently ran, 
potentially providing more evidence for the differences between language and 
gender groups.  
Other studies regarding the universality of parameters underlying 
demonstrative systems could focus on other parameters that are encoded in specific 
languages but not in others. For example, it has been reported that some indigenous 
languages contrast demonstratives based on whether a referent is uphill or downhill 
(for example in Yupno, see Cooperrider et al., 2016). An experimental design testing 
this could for example make use of a table placed at an angle. English participants 
can be tested on their demonstrative use while referring to objects that are higher or 
lower on the table. 
Other variations on the procedure could inform the relationship between 
actual object location and expectation. A way to test the influence of the expectation 
or contextual information is by making the actual object location cue less strong. In 
previous research, a probabilistic model was suggested to underly memory. In this 
model, memory consist of two tiers, the actual perceptual memory, and a more 
‘general’ knowledge about an object or event. Upon recall, the memory is influenced 
by both tiers, as a function of uncertainty. When the actual representation is more 
certain, there is a lower influence of ‘general object knowledge’. When there is more 
uncertainty in the perceptual memory, there is more influence of general knowledge 
(Huttenlocher et al., 1991, 2004; Regier & Xu, 2017). This prediction is similar to 
Expectation models’ . Uncertainty can be caused by for example fading memory or 
fatigue. We can manipulate the perceptual memory by presenting the objects for a 
shorter time. Currently, all object presentations are 10 seconds, but if we, for 
example, cut this presentation time in half, the actual object location memory will be 
weaker, leaving more space for contextual influence. 
Alternatively, we can introduce a longer time-delay between encoding and 
retrieval. A longer timedelay might weaken the actual memory, again increasing the 
influence that contextual information could have on remembered object location  
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(i.e., Bae, Olkkonen, Allred, & Flombaum, 2015; Cibelli et al., 2016). 
Another line of studies could use a slightly different spatial configuration in 
the procedure (see Figure 5.37). In our study, we found an effect consistent with a 
dual-system model of Japanese demonstratives. However, there are two different 
versions of this model. The original model (Hoji et al., 2003; Kamio, 1994) suggests 
that objects near a hearer are referred to with sono only if they are within reaching 
distance from a hearer. A revised version of the model (Yoshimoto, 1992, 1986), 
suggested that sono would refer to all objects that are within the interactional dyad. 
Our study showed an effect of position, in which participants referred to an object 
moreoften with sono when the object was within the interactional dyad. However, 
this was regardless of whether the object was within the reach of the hearer, 
suggesting our data supports the updated version of the dual-system model. We can 
confirm this in a study in which the participant sits at the centre of the long side of 
the table, with the experimenter next to the participant, or on one of the short sides of 
the table (right in the example), so we can the influence of an interactional space 
(the space within the interactional dyad) and ‘out of either territory’. Objects can be 
placed within the participants’ reach (space 1), between participant and experimenter 
(space 2), but also out of reach of both participant and experimenter (space 3). By 
adding two locations marked with a red square, we would have objects within reach 
 
Figure 5.37. Procedural setup to tease apart the interactional space and far-from-both 
space.  
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of either interlocutor, but also out of reach of both interlocutors, both within 
interactional space and out of interactional space.  
 We could also adjust the spatial configuration of locations. In the current 
studies, we only used a horizontal plane (table) with distances along a midline from 
the participant to test memory. In Chapter 3, we added a conspecific, seated opposite 
or next to the participant. The orientation of locations could be varied; locations 
could for example be placed on a vertical instead of a horizontal plane. This way it 
could be tested how peri-personal space relates to the body. If peri-personal space is 
within arms’ reach, then objects placed at the same distance from the body, but on 
the floor, should be considered extra-personal space. If peri-personal space is the 
space surrounding the body, it would be expected that it does not matter at which 
height an object is placed (as long as the height does not exceed participants’ length. 
Furthermore, a three dimensional setup like this one could test peri-personal space, 
not only in front of the participant, but also to the sides or behind a participant.  
In this work we present data supporting the Expectation model (Coventry et 
al., 2014), consistent with theories of predictive coding (Bar, 2009; Friston, 2009) 
and the probabilistic model proposed by Regier and colleagues (2016; 2017). Next to 
exploring the influence of expectation as a result of demonstrative use in a cross-
linguistic study, it would be interesting to test the Expectation model across 
domains. As we saw in the domain of colour perception, there is a large body of 
research looking at the influence of top down cognition, suggesting a probabilistic 
inference model. However, the Expectation model can be tested in other domains. 
The Expectation model might work via a process of predictive coding. Accounts of 
predictive coding suggest that the brain continuously predicts future states, to avoid 
surprise and safe energy (Friston, 2009). To do this, only a baseline of perceptual 
information and deviations from prediction are encoded. If this is the case, one 
would expect that deviations are memorized more accurately, or in other words, that 
deviations have a memory enhancing effect. This means that, regardless of the 
domain tested, trials including an certain amount of surprise should be memorized 
better than trials that are in line with predictions. The enhanced fine-grained 
performance can be expected to lead to a reduced uncertainty, and therefore to a 
reduced influence of general knowledge.  
5.5.2 Neuro imaging methods. We can extend on our current findings 
concerning and extend the limits of the Expectation model within the domain of 
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spatial cognition, using brain imaging methodologies. As mentioned in the 
discussion comparing the Expectation model and the Probabilistic interference 
model (section 5.2.1), we cannot distinguish between language effects happening at 
encoding or retrieval in our current procedure. However, the theoretical implications 
of a potential effect at encoding would be strong. If the effect happens at encoding, 
this would show an online effect of higher-level processes on perception. Brain 
imaging methodologies, e.g., fMRI and TMS, could help elucidate the current 
findings and situate them in knowledge about neural correlates. fMRI scanning can 
identify the different brain areas involved. For example, literature suggests that the 
brain constructs multiple functionally distinct representations of space (di Pellegrino 
& Làdavas, 2015), which are centred around body parts in different primate species 
(e.g., hand-centred, head-centred, trunk-centred). Some areas that seem to be 
involved in the representation of visual peri-personal space in relation to the hand 
(peri-hand space) are the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and lateral occipital complex 
(LOC). A specific interesting finding was that visual perception is dominantly 
displayed in the posterior IPS and LOC, whereas the anterior IPS was more sensitive 
to a proprioceptive representation of the hand, showing tactile hand-specific 
activation, which suggests that the aIPS uses multisensory information (Makin, 
Holmes, & Zohary, 2007). This neurological distinction between peri-personal space 
and extra-personal space (di Pellegrino & Làdavas, 2015; Makin et al., 2007; 
Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Gallese, 1997) is of particular interest for this thesis 
and future research into the findings presented in this thesis. Findings of this 
distinction are also reported in a dissociation for peri-personal and extra-personal 
neglect (Lane, Ball, Smith, Schenk, & Ellison, 2013).  
Activation in the SPOC is strongest when interacting within reaching 
distance, or peri-personal space (Gallivan et al., 2011), even in the absence of overt 
responses. With regard to our studies, it would be interesting to see if the SPOC area 
is involved in memory for proximal object location. It could then be contrasted 
whether proximal language has similar effects to memory for proximal location. For 
example, proximal language could activate the SPOC area, as proximal language 
often indicates an action response. Furthermore, using TMS it is possible to explore 
causal relations between activated or inhibited brain areas and the effects we found 
so far.  
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5.5.3 Modelling. In Chapter 2, we tested the predictions of three theoretical 
models regarding the underlying mechanism via which language influences memory. 
While these models can represent mechanisms and relations underlying different 
cognitive processes, they are not themselves neural models – they cannot perform 
computations (c.f., Lipinski, Schneegans, Sandamirskaya, Spencer, & Schöner, 
2012; Logan & Sadler, 1996). Future research could focus on specifying neural 
models and teasing apart the models representing the interaction between memory 
and language.  
In previous chapters, we already introduced the Attentional Vector-Sum 
model (Regier & Carlson, 2001), and the probabilistic inference model (i.e., Cibelli 
et al., 2016; Regier & Xu, 2017). Two examples of neural models that we did not yet 
discuss, but are an interesting future direction of research are the Category 
Adjustment Model (CAM) (Huttenlocher et al., 1991) and models based on the 
Dynamic Field Theory (DFT) (e.g., Lipinski et al., 2012; Lipinski, Simmering, 
Johnson, & Spencer, 2010).  
The CAM is a class of probabilistic models ((i.e., Crawford, Regier, & 
Huttenlocher, 2000; Huttenlocher et al., 2000; Regier & Xu, 2017). The model 
suggests that memory is encoded at two levels, a fine-grained memory of the 
particular experience (e.g., an event or an object) and a general category in which the 
experienced object or event falls. A category is a bounded region that includes a 
range of fine-grained stimulus values, the end of a category is marked by a boundary 
value. The prototype value is the central value within a category (Huttenlocher et al., 
1991). The category (or prototypical value) can bias a memory towards a more 
categorical representation. In Chapter 1 we discussed probabilistic inference models 
with regards to colour perception. When there is an amount of uncertainty of the 
particular memory, the memory of the experience is merged with the prototypical 
value of the colour, via a process of probabilistic inference. This integration is 
suggested to work via a Bayesian framework (Deneve & Pouget, 2004). The CAM 
has also been applied to spatial cognition, for example if participants are asked to 
remember the location of a dot on an object, memory is biased towards the centre of 
the object (Crawford, Huttenlocher, et al., 2000; Holden et al., 2013).  
However, there are two problems for the CAM. First, as mentioned 
previously, the effect of a prototype of category would only be expected to work 
upon memory recall. After all, while you see an object there should be no uncertainty 
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regarding the exact location of an object. But in Chapter 3, we presented language 
production data that are parallel to the memory data – if an object is placed under 
conditions in which participants preferentially refer to objects using that, they are 
also remembered to be further away. This could suggest that the effect causing the 
bias in memory is also apparent in an online production task, when participants refer 
to an object while looking at it. The second problem is the constitution of the 
prototypical value. It is unclear how these prototypes or categories are generated. In 
the CAM, categories seem to be fixed. Applied to the results presented in Chapter 2, 
an a posteriori explanation of the data using the CAM would be that the prototype of 
an object placed with this would be a location close to the participants, whereas the 
prototypical location of a that-object would be away from the participant. Therefore, 
an object placed with that has a bias away from the person (and an object placed 
with this has a bias towards the person). This mechanism would predict, as the 
Expectation model does, that objects placed with that are misremembered to be 
further away than objects placed with this.  
A models that does include the potential for learning is based on the DFT. 
Dynamic neural fields represent neural population dynamics in which different levels 
of information are processed by the activation or inhibition within and between 
different neural levels. The dynamic nature of the model constitutes feedback 
mechanisms, enabling the model to integrate long-term memory traces with 
experience. For example in Lipinski et al. (2010), learning is presented to solve the 
problem of contrasting previous results found by Huttenlocher (1991, 2004) and 
Spencer and Hund (2002). Huttenlocher et al. (1991, 2004) showed that the use of 
spatial categories improves the overall accuracy of memory, as the use of spatial 
boundaries constrain the memory error within category boundaries. However, they 
argued that the distribution of the presented stimuli did not influence location 
estimation, whereas Spencer and Hund (2002) found that experience did bias 
performance. Lipinski et al. (2010) presented participants with multiple blocks of the 
same memory task, and found that in the first block of stimulus presentations 
performance (when participants did not have experience in the task), performance 
was unbiased by previous target presentation, as Huttenlocher et al (2004) stated. 
However, after additional experience biases shifted towards the previous target 
distributions as Spencer and Hund (2002) showed.  
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Based on DFT, an architecture of spatial language production can be 
modelled (Lipinski et al., 2012). Lipinski et al., presented a model that can perceive 
different objects (based on colour) and produce spatial language to express the 
relation of different object in relation to one another. The architecture of the model 
consists of different fields. There is a target field in which the location of the object 
(which itself is identified by colour-space fields and related colour-term nodes) is 
encoded. The location activation (which holds strong local excitation/ lateral 
inhibition, in order to end up with one single activity peak defining the specific 
location of the object) in the target field feeds back to other levels of representation, 
binding (for example) the colour and the location of an object. By mapping the 
location of multiple objects, the model is able to derive the spatial orientation of the 
objects in relation to each other via spatial relation nodes, and is able to assign 
spatial terms (e.g., above/below/left/right) describing this relation. Spatial relation 
nodes activate corresponding spatial term nodes, assigning a linguistic description to 
the spatial relation processed by the field. The heart of the model is the reference 
frame transformation field. The transformation field is a field in which all 
combinations of target and reference positions are defined, thereby creating a single 
combined representation of the information from the object-centred field (object 
location) and the reference field (spatial term). The coupling between target, 
reference, and object-centred fields is bidirectional, meaning that by having input of 
two of the three fields the accompanying representation the third field can be 
activated (Lipinski et al., 2012). This model could be consistent with our data, 
although there are some differences between the information the model uses and our 
procedure. In our procedure for example, only one object is present at any given time 
(although participants could be using the different locations that are visible that are 
between them and the object). Based on the object location and the location of the 
object relative to for example themselves, or the locations that are visible on the 
table, they might base their language production.  
It is interesting to note that if this model contains similar fields as a potential 
DFT memory model would, it might potentially explain our results via the reference 
field. This reference field holds an activation based on the spatial term that is used to 
describe the object location, and has a bi-directional inhibiting relation with the 
target field, which holds the objects’ location, while both fields feed into the 
transformation field. If memory for object location is derived from the activation and 
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the relational excitation/ inhibition between these fields, this could be a mechanism 
via which language biases memory for object location. In our memory-version of the 
procedure, the object location is biased by the spatial term (this/that). If the language 
use has an inhibitory effect on the object location, it effectively creates the 
uncertainty of the perceptual memory that opens the door for a biasing function of 
language. 
5.6 General conclusion 
To summarize, the work carried out in this thesis explored the relationship 
between language and non-linguistic processes. English demonstrative use 
influences spatial memory, consistent with predictions of the Expectation model. The 
Expectation model fits with current theories of predictive coding. Our results 
therefore add to the field of cognitive psychology, memory, and cognition. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that there might be universal mechanisms 
underlying demonstratives. Position of a conspecific influences both Japanese and 
English demonstrative use, whereas the position of a conspecific is not explicitly 
encoded in English. However, the level of explicitness of demonstratives can 
influence the strength of the parameters. In Japanese, the effect of the position of a 
conspecific was stronger than in English. These results add to the fields of 
psychology and linguistics. Finally, we found an association between distinctive eye-
movement patterns and frames of reference. Spatial descriptions influence the way 
someone looks at the world, showing eye-movement signatures for the different 
reference frames. In other words, we showed that language has a robust effect on 
non-linguistic processes, focussing on spatial memory and visual attention. The work 
has shed light on a mechanism explaining how memory works, via a two-tier system, 
in which language and prediction can play a part, and has suggested a mutual 
influence between attention and spatial language.
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Abstract 
In three experiments, we investigated the influence of two types of language on 
memory for object location: demonstratives (this, that) and possessives (my, 
your). Participants first read instructions containing demonstratives/possessives 
to place objects at different locations, and then had to recall those object 
locations (following object removal). Experiments 1 and 2 tested contrasting 
predictions of two possible accounts of language on object location memory: the 
Expectation Model (Coventry, Griffiths, & Hamilton, 2014) and the congruence 
account (Bonfiglioli et al., 2009). In Experiment 3, the role of attention 
allocation as a possible mechanism was investigated. Results across all three 
experiments show striking effects of language on object location memory, with 
the pattern of data supporting the Expectation Model. In this model, the expected 
location cued by language and the actual location are concatenated leading to 
(mis)memory for object location, consistent with models of predictive coding 
(Bar, 2009; Friston, 2003). 
 
Keywords: memory; object location; spatial demonstratives; possessives; 
peripersonal/ extrapersonal space 
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Language and Memory for Object Location 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between language and non-linguistic representations is a 
fundamental topic in the cognitive sciences. Often this relationship is approached 
from the standpoint of the extent to which non-linguistic representations are 
necessary for language comprehension (e.g. within the framework of ‘embodied’ 
cognition; cf. Barsalou, 1999). However, equally important is the extent to which 
language can influence non-linguistic processes (Coventry, Christophel, Fehr, 
Valdés-Conroy, & Herrmann, 2013). Language can direct the attention of a 
conspecific to the spatial world; spatial expressions, such as these coins or the cup is 
on the table serve to direct the attention of a hearer to regions of space (Miller & 
Johnson-Laird, 1976). And the pairing of language with visual events and images 
also affects what is recalled about the spatial world. For example, Loewenstein and 
Gentner (2005) found that children performed better in a mapping task when spatial 
relations were paired with spatial language at encoding (e.g. “I’m putting the book 
on the shelf”). They argue that relational language fosters the development of 
representational structures that facilitate cognitive processing (see also Hermer-
vazquez, Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999).  
Language can facilitate the binding and maintenance of color-location 
conjunctions (Dessalegn & Landau, 2008, 2013; Farran & O’Leary, 2015). For 
example, in a memory experiment, four-year olds performed a task in which a target 
(e.g. a square split in half by two different colors) was presented which they then had 
to find in an array. Performance was enhanced if the target was accompanied by 
spatial cues (e.g. “yellow is on top”). There was no additional benefit for children 
verbalizing the linguistic cue themselves over just hearing the cue, as long as they 
had a stable understanding of the spatial terms (Farran & O’Leary, 2015).  
As well as facilitating memory, language presented with a spatial scene can 
also lead to memory errors (Feist & Gentner, 2007; Gentner & Loftus, 1979). For 
instance, Feist and Gentner (2007) showed that recognition memory for spatial 
scenes was shifted in the direction of the spatial relational language (spatial 
prepositions) presented with scenes at encoding. In their study they presented 
participants with ambiguous pictures depicting spatial relations accompanied with or 
without spatial sentences. When participants responded in a later yes-no recognition 
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task, spatial language at encoding was associated with more false positives (in cases 
where the spatial language at encoding was associated with a more prototypical 
version of the spatial relation than the relation actually shown). Feist and Gentner 
(2007) suggest this is a result of an interactive encoding of language and visual 
memory, in which language influences the way people encode visual scenes. More 
broadly language can be used as a tool in a task to aid memory and/or processing of 
spatial information (see for example Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008; Li, 
Abarbanell, Gleitman, & Papafragou, 2011) consonant with some weaker variants of 
so-called ‘linguistic relativity’ (see Wolff & Holmes, 2011 for review).   
The effects of language on memory are not limited to spatial cognition. It has 
also been found that presenting possessive pronouns in combination with a memory 
task enhances response times and memory for objects (Shi et al., 2011). Shi et al. 
presented Chinese nouns preceded by a pronoun (my/ his). Participants had to scale 
the presented nouns for likeability and were given a surprise memory test. In the 
‘my’ condition, participants responded faster and showed a better memory 
performance for the nouns than in the ‘his’ condition.  
Although it has been shown that language can influence memory, it has yet to 
be demonstrated how it does so. In this paper, our focus is on the (possible) influence 
of spatial demonstratives and possessives on memory for object location. The 
continuous nature of object location memory errors affords testing directly between a 
number of possible mechanisms regarding how language affects memory for object 
location.  
Spatial demonstratives (e.g. this/ that) are among the earliest words children 
learn (Diessel, 2006) and have been shown to be associated with discrete zones of 
peri-personal (near) and extra-personal (far) perceptual space (Coventry, Valdés, 
Castillo, & Guijarro-Fuentes, 2008; Diessel, 2006; Maes & de Rooij, 2007; Stevens 
& Zhang, 2013; cf. Peeters, Hagoort, & Ozyürek, 2014). However, this distinction is 
flexible and graded. Near space can be extended or contracted by tool or weight use 
(Longo & Lourenco, 2006), and the use of this is similarly extended when 
participants use a stick to point at objects (Coventry et al., 2008). In addition to 
distance, demonstrative choice is also affected by other variables. Coventry et al. 
(2014) explored the relationship between object knowledge and distance on both 
demonstrative choice in English and memory for object location. Across seven 
experiments they found that object familiarity (i.e. familiar versus unfamiliar colored 
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shapes), object ownership (whether the participant owned the object or not) and 
object visibility (whether the object was covered with an opaque cover or not) all 
affected demonstrative choice to describe object location and (non-linguistic) 
memory for object location. For example, unfamiliar objects (low frequency color-
shape combinations, such as a viridian nonagon) were misremembered as being 
further away than they actually were relative to familiar objects (e.g. red square). In 
order to account for both the demonstrative choice data and the memory data, 
Coventry et al. (2014) proposed a model of the influence of object knowledge on 
both measures. In their Expectation Model, memory for object location is a 
combination of where an object is located and where an object is expected to be 
located (see Figure 1a). The expectation of the objects’ location is combined with the 
actual object location (with an associated estimation error) in memory, as follows: 
MD = f(Da,Dexp,Derr) 
where M = signed memory error, D = distance, a = actual, exp = expected and 
err = estimation error. 
Coventry et al. (2014) acknowledge that the model may operate at encoding 
of object location or at retrieval. If the former is the case, it is assumed that an object 
expected to be in peripersonal space (such as an object owned by the participant), 
activates peripersonal space as the participant encodes object location, and therefore 
that the actual representation of location at encoding, and later memory is a 
concatenation of expectation of where an object is most likely to be located and 
where it is actually located. The alternative possibility is that the location errors 
emerge only at retrieval, consistent with effects found in the verbal overshadowing 
(Alogna et al., 2014; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and eye-witness 
testimony literatures (E. Loftus et al., 1978; E. Loftus & Palmer, 1974; McCloskey 
& Zaragoza, 1985).  
Coventry et al. (2014) did not examine the influence of language on memory 
for object location, but by extension the expectation model makes predictions 
regarding how language might impact upon memory for location. As this is 
associated with near space and that with far space, one can assume that the expected 
distance value associated with that would be greater than the expected value distance 
associated with this. Combined with the actual distance, the expectation model 
therefore predicts a main effect of language on memory for object location, with that 
associated with (mis)memory for objects further away than they actually were 
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compared to this (Figure 1a). In addition the Expectation Model predicts an effect of 
location, in which memory for objects further away is worse than for objects closer 
by. 
In contrast to the expectation model, there is a considerable body of work 
within an ‘embodied cognition’ framework providing evidence for the importance of 
congruence/incongruence effects between language and space that makes different 
predictions from the expectation model. A growing body of literature suggests that 
participants’ performance is affected by congruence/incongruence between language 
or concepts and space. For example, it has been shown that participants respond 
more quickly to positively valenced stimuli in a congruent high location than an 
incongruent low location, and vice versa for negative stimuli (e.g. Barsalou, 2008; 
Meier & Robinson, 2004; cf. Lynott & Coventry, 2014). What one might term a 
‘congruence account’ has been extended to movement planning, whereby 
movements are prepared based on given language (Bonfiglioli et al., 2009; see also 
Stevens & Zhang, 2013). For example, Bonfiglioli et al. (2009) required participants 
to grip an object after listening to an instruction that indicated whether the object was 
near or far. A significant interaction was found in which performance was better 
when the descriptive language and space were congruent compared to incongruent 
situations - reaction times were significantly longer when language was incongruent 
with space compared to when language and space were congruent. Bonfiglioli et al., 
(2009) therefore concluded that they found interference effects from the used 
pronouns at the level of movement planning. In line with the Theory of Event-
Coding (TEC) (Hommel et al., 2001), we extend these findings in the action 
literature to memory. In the TEC, it is suggested that perception and action share an 
indistinguishable underlying representational medium. This would entail that, for 
example, memory and action are based on the same cognitive codes. Therefore, if an 
effect of interference due to incongruence is found in action planning, it should be 
found in memory (Hommel et al., 2001). When we extend the effects of congruence 
on action to memory for object location, we would therefore predict a similar 
interaction. Congruence in language and space would be expected to enhance the 
accuracy of memory for location, with greater errors (without specification of 
direction) when there is a mismatch between the demonstrative and location, as 
follows: 
MD = f(Da,C,Derr) 
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where M = signed memory error, D = distance, a = actual, C = congruence of 
language with location and err = estimation error (Figure 1b). This means that when a 
congruent demonstrative is used to describe an object’s location (e.g. ‘this’ for an 
object close by, or ‘that’ for an object further away), memory for object location is 
expected to be more accurate than when language and situation are incongruent (e.g. 
‘that’ for an object close by, ‘this’ for an object further away).  
Distinct from both the Expectation and Congruence models, the possible 
effect of language on memory should also be considered in relation to the allocation 
of attention. A large literature shows that language affects where one looks in a 
visual scene, for example in terms of fixating particular objects when they are 
mentioned (e.g., Allopenna, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 1998; Tanenhaus, Spivey-
Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). Building on this earlier work, it is possible 
that language also affects the amount of time one spends looking at an object. Given 
that this is associated with proximity to a speaker, one might speculate that 
participants might look longer at an object at a location when preceded with this 
compared with that, as visual attention is allocated preferentially to near objects 
compared to objects further away (Garrido-Vásquez & Schubö, 2014). Following 
evidence that longer looking times are associated with better memory performance 
(e.g. Huebner & Gegenfurtner, 2010), one might then predict better accuracy of 
recall for trials preceded with this compared with that. In Experiment 3 we used eye 
tracking during the encoding phase, to investigate whether differences are driven by 
attention allocation (Figure 1c).  The goal of the present studies was to test whether 
language affects memory for object location, and to elucidate the mechanism 
involved. Specifically, we aimed to tease apart these three accounts by examining the 
effects of demonstrative and possessives on memory for object location. The first 
experiment tested whether spatial demonstratives affected memory for object 
location with contrasting predictions from two possible models of how language 
affects memory: congruence vs. expectation. Experiment 2 tests whether the effects 
found for demonstratives also occur for possessives (my/your) – terms which have 
also been associated with the peripersonal/extrapersonal space distinction. 
Experiment 3 tests predictions from the attention allocation model using eye 
tracking. 
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2. Experiment 1: The influence of demonstratives on spatial memory 
This experiment tested whether spatial demonstratives paired with an object 
at encoding affected memory for object location, with objects placed at varying 
distances in front of participants on a table and then removed. The main goal was to 
test between the expectation and congruence models. Critically, the expectation 
model predicts a main effect of demonstrative on object location memory and the 
congruence account predicts an interaction between demonstrative and distance.  
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Participants.  
Thirty-six native English speaking students13 were tested, receiving either 
course credit or payment for their participation. Stereoacuity was measured using the 
Randot Stereotest (Stereo Optical Inc. Chicago, USA). Two participants did not have 
a threshold of at least 40 arcseconds and therefore were excluded. Two additional 
participants were excluded because they had more than 10% incorrect answers in the 
                                                 
13 Sample size is based on Coventry et al., 2014 
a
 
b           c  
Figure 1. Predictions by the different models, from left to right: a. Expectation 
Model, b. Congruence Model, c. Attention Allocation model. On the y-axis the difference 
between the actual location and the remembered location is presented, a higher value on 
the y-axis means an object is remembered as being further away than it actually was. In 1a 
and 1b, the six distances from the participant (in cm) used in Experiment 1 and 2 are 
plotted. In 1c, the x-axis represents the total possible fixation time (10 seconds) for 
participants in Experiment 3. The lines represent the influence of demonstratives 
(this/that). In Figure 1c more attention leads to a smaller memory error, and ‘this’ is 
predicted to elicit more attention than ‘that’.  
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memory task. This left 32 participants, 9 males and 23 females, with an age range of 
18 – 31 years old (M = 20.78, SD = 3.14). 
2.1.2 Materials 
Six distinguishable, different colored shapes on plastic discs (e.g. yellow 
triangle/blue heart), 6.5 cm in diameter, were placed on six different locations. The 
locations were spaced equidistantly along a midline from the participants’ edge of a 
large conference table (L = 320cm, W = 90cm), starting at 25cm from the participant 
up to 150cm. The three dots that were closest to the participants were located within 
peripersonal space, while the remaining three dots were within extra-personal space 
(confirmed for each participant). The table was covered with a black cloth so that no 
spatial cues were present. 
2.1.3 Procedure and Design  
Participants were asked to sit as close to the table as was comfortable, to 
ensure that all participants were approximately the same distance from the objects. 
Then, they played a ‘memory game’ as used previously by Coventry et al. (2014); 
participants were told the experiment was testing memory for object location. On 
each trial, the participant read out an instruction card indicating which object had to 
be placed on which location. The instructions all had the form: “Place 
DEMONSTRATIVE, OBJECT COLOR, OBJECT NAME, on the COLOR dot” 
(e.g. “Place this red triangle on the blue dot”). Following the instruction, participants 
closed their eyes while the experimenter placed the object as instructed. The 
participant was then given 10 seconds to view the object and to memorize the object 
location before the object and the dots were removed and the experimenter went 
behind a curtain to present an indication stick. Next, the participant verbally 
instructed the experimenter to match the near edge of the indication stick to the 
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remembered near edge of the object location. Participants were then required to 
verbally indicate the demonstrative used on the instruction card to ensure they had 
attended to the instructions (see Figure 2).  
There were two demonstratives (this/ that) and a neutral determiner (the), six 
locations and six objects. Participants were presented with six practice trials, after 
which 54 experimental trials were conducted (consisting of 3 trials of every term on 
every location: 3×3×6). The indication stick was presented at a distance of 10cm 
(counterbalanced to be further or nearer) from the actual location. Within the first 10 
trials, there were three filler trials in which the indication stick was presented at a 
distance of 20cm from the object location, to prevent the initial placement of the 
stick becoming a cue for the object location. Every trial in which a participant could 
not remember the demonstrative was repeated at the end of the experiment (if a 
participant couldn’t remember >10% of the trials s/he was excluded). Also trials in 
which a participants’ estimate of the object location was >25cm from the original 
location were repeated. If the criterion was not met after repeating the trial was 
eliminated.  At the end of the experiment, reaching distance was measured for each 
participant. Every participant could reach only the first three dots. The ‘memory 
“
Place that 
black cross 
on the 
yellow dot” 
“
Further” 
Figure 2. The participant reads out the instruction card, then 
memorizes the object location and finally instructs the experimenter 
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game’ cover meant that participants were not aware that we were interested in the 
differences between demonstratives (confirmed during debrief). 
 2.2 Results and Discussion 
 The memory displacement data – that is, the difference between the recalled 
distance and the actual distance between the recalled distance and the actual distance 
measured in centimeters – are displayed in Table 1 (see supplementary data). Note 
that a positive value indicates that an object was (mis)remembered as further away 
than it actually was. A 3 × 6 (demonstrative × location) ANOVA was performed on 
the memory displacements. The assumption of sphericity was violated in both the 
location and the demonstrative × location analysis. We therefore used the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction for these analyses. There was a main effect of 
demonstrative F(2,62) = 6.68, MSE = 10.04, p < .01, ηp² = .18, showing an effect of 
language on memory for object location: follow up (LSD) tests showed significant 
differences between locations accompanied by the that (M = 2.94, SE = .42) 
compared to both the this (M = 2.01, SE = .41) and the the (M = 1.84, SE = .47) 
conditions (both p’s < .01; see Figure 3). There was a marginal effect of location 
F(5,155) = 2.33, MSE = 25.49, p = .08, ηp² = .07, revealing that memory for object 
location deteriorated with distance, consistent with the previous studies. Importantly, 
there was no interaction between demonstrative and location F(10,310) = 1.4, MSE = 
9.13, p = .21, ηp² = .04. The results therefore support the expectation model rather 
than the congruence model; this leads to more accurate object location memory than 
that, irrespective of the congruence between the specific demonstrative and location. 
We next considered whether the same pattern of results might emerge with a  
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different language manipulation involving possessives.  
 
3. Experiment 2: The influence of possessives on spatial memory 
Some studies have shown that ownership improves memory for objects (S. 
Cunningham et al., 2008; Shi et al., 2011; Turk et al., 2015) and influences how 
people physically interact with objects (Constable et al., 2011). For example, 
Cunningham et al. (2008) had a participant and a confederate sort cards with pictures 
of shopping items into their own basket or the other person’s basket. At the end of 
the trials participants completed a surprise memory test for the objects depicted on 
the cards. Participants had more accurate memories for self-owned objects than 
objects owned by a conspecific.  
In another study, specifically targeting memory for object location, Coventry 
et al. (2014), found that object ownership affected memory for object location (and 
demonstrative choice). Using the memory game paradigm participants were given a 
set of coins in payment at the start of the experiment, and the coins placed at 
different to-be-remembered locations were either those coins or coins owned by the 
 
Locations (in cm) from participants 
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 1, error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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experimenter of the same denominations. Participants misremembered the 
conspecific’s coins as being further away than their own coins.  
One of the problems with the ownership studies described above is that they 
cannot easily distinguish between an effect of the abstract concept of ownership and 
an effect of the possessives (my/your) used to indicate ownership during task 
instruction. For example, in the study of Coventry et al. (2014), coins were given to 
participants as participant payment at the start of the task to confer ownership, but 
language during the task itself involved by necessity the use of possessives (e.g. 
“Place your coin on the red dot”) in order to disambiguate which coin was to be 
placed during the task. It is therefore unclear whether the effect of ownership is 
driven by the language indicating ownership (possessives in all cases), the 
conceptual representation of ownership itself, or a combination of the two. Here we 
investigated whether possessives have the same influence on memory for object 
location as did the demonstratives in Experiment 1, whether personal possessives 
alone are able to drive memory effects, and again, whether the expectation vs. 
congruence models offer a better account as to how possessives affect memory for 
object location.  
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants  
Thirty-nine native English speaking participants were tested, as in 
Experiment 1. Five participants were excluded as they did not score above the 
threshold of 40 arcseconds (N=2), had more than 10% mistakes in the memory task 
(N=2) or could not reach the 50cm point (N=1). This left 34 participants; 14 male 
and 20 female, with an age range of 18 – 44 years old (M = 23.76, SD = 4.87). 
3.1.2 Procedure and Design  
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The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, with the exception that the 
demonstratives were replaced with possessives (my, your; the the condition was 
retained). In order to able to distinguish between an actual ownership effect and a 
language effect of possessives, participants did not own any of the objects, and all 
objects were used in all language conditions. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
The memory displacement data are displayed in Table 1 (see supplementary 
data). A 3 × 6 (possessive × location) ANOVA was performed on the difference (in 
centimeters) between the actual position of an object and the memorized position. 
There was a main effect of possessive F(2,66) = 8.25, MSE = 7.62, p = .001, ηp² = 
.2, showing that objects in the your condition (M = 1.89, SE = .43) were remembered 
as being significantly further away than objects in both the my condition (M = .81, 
SE = .34) and the the condition (M = 1.11, SE = .34), both p’s < .01; see Figure 4). A 
significant effect of location was also found F(5,165) = 3.47, MSE = 18.07, p = .01, 
ηp² = .1, showing that accuracy deteriorated as the objects were placed further away. 
These results are compatible with earlier studies on ownership. However, as all 
objects were used in all language conditions, there was no actual sense of ownership 
over any of the objects; the ownership was only marked by the use of possessives. 
This shows that possessives on their own affect memory for object location. 
Additionally there was an interaction between possessive and location 
F(10,330) = 2.25, MSE = 10.37, p = .03, ηp² = .06. As can be seen in Figure 4, the 
interaction pattern is consistent with the expectation model and is not consistent with 
the congruence account: there is no cross-over between peripersonal and 
extrapersonal space as would be expected in the congruence account. However, it is 
the case that the effect of distance does seem to vary as a function of language. To 
further unpack this, we ran three one-way ANOVAs to test location effects by term, 
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revealing that there was only a reliable peri-personal/extra-personal effect in the 
“your” and “the” conditions (p < .05). This effect was absent in the “my” condition 
(p > .05; see Figure 4).  This suggests that memory for possessed objects maybe 
particularly enhanced, overriding any effect of peripersonal versus extrapersonal 
space.  
 
 
Locations (in cm) from participants 
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 2, error-bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
4. Experiment 3: The influence of attention on spatial memory 
So far the results are consistent the expectation account. However, it is 
important to also consider the possibility that the results might be driven by the 
allocation of attention. Visual attention is allocated preferentially to objects nearby, 
compared to objects further away (Garrido-Vásquez & Schubö, 2014) and longer 
fixation times lead to better memory performance (Huebner & Gegenfurtner, 2010). 
Therefore, the predictions of memory error in the Expectation Model and what we 
have coined an “Attention Allocation Model” are similar, but differ in underlying 
mechanism. The Expectation Model predicts that memory for object location is a 
function of the language used to refer to the object (and the expectation of location 
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associated with that language) combined with actual object location. The Attention 
Allocation model suggests memory for object location is a function of the fixation 
time and the object location. The results of Experiment 1 could therefore be 
alternatively explained by the Attention Allocation Model as driven by longer 
fixation times to objects paired with “this” versus “that” rather than differences in 
expectation values. In this experiment, we used eye tracking to measure participants’ 
looking time during encoding. That allowed us to measure the time a participant is 
focused on the object in each language condition to see whether attention might 
account for the main effect of language reported above.  
A second aim of Experiment 3 is to explore the connection between 
demonstratives and reference frames. As peri-personal space is the area within our 
grasp, this can be seen as an ‘action space’ in which objects are mapped onto an 
egocentric reference frame, compared to extra-personal space which may be mapped 
onto an allocentric reference frame (ter Horst et al., 2011). If the language effect that 
was found in the first two experiments is driven by the expectation raised by the 
specific use of language, then this expectation may result in different use of 
reference frames. We explored whether encoding object location onto an egocentric 
reference frame resulted in more searching behavior along the sagittal line, to encode 
Coro
Figure 5. Coronal 
and Sagittal plane 
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distance from the participant, compared to encoding onto an allocentric reference 
frame which could result in more searching behavior along the coronal line (see 
Figure 5). Results could help distinguish between models that predict solely an 
influence of egocentric representations on spatial memory versus ‘two-system’ 
models that predict a parallel egocentric and allocentric representations in object 
location memory (see Burgess, 2006) 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants  
Nineteen participants were tested as in Experiment 1. Three participants were 
excluded from the analysis as the eye-tracker could not be calibrated. This left 16 
suitable participants for the analyses, 5 male and 11 female, with an age range of 18 
– 22 (M = 19.19, SD = 1.17).  
4.1.2 Procedure and Design  
The procedure was based on Experiments 1 and 2, but in this experiment, 
participants wore SMI eye-tracker glasses (30Hz binocular eye tracking glasses). For 
this reason, only 4 positions were used – two locations in peripersonal space and two 
in extrapersonal space. (The first location was too close for the eye-tracker and the 
furthest location was not useable because the area of interest was too distorted). 
Before the experiment started, the glasses were calibrated using marks on the wall. 
After that, calibration was validated four times throughout the experiment by having 
participants look at the four different locations on the table. The eye-tracking data 
were coded using semantic gaze mapping14. As the angle from the participant to the 
object was different for every location, the standard error in calibration of the eye-
tracker image was slightly different per location. These distortions had to be 
                                                 
14 This involves the manual coding of video-based eye-tracking data, by which fixations are 
coded on a gaze map. 
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accounted for in the semantic gaze mapping. Therefore, the coding was slightly less 
stringent for further locations compared to closer locations. For the furthest location 
any fixation within an area of 6.5 cm (equivalent to the diameter of the object discs) 
around the object was marked as a fixation on the object. In the nearest location any 
fixation within an area of 3.25 cm (half an objects’ diameter) was marked as a 
fixation on the object (see Figure 6)15. The gaze mapping data were used in a 3 × 4 
(demonstrative × location) design, investigating the differences in total fixation time 
(ms) on the object.  
 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
The memory displacement data and the fixation times are displayed in Table 
1 (see supplementary data). The memory data were analyzed in a 3 × 4 
(demonstrative × location) ANOVA. A main effect of demonstrative was found 
F(2,30) = 5.77, MSE = 10.02, p < .01, ηp² = .28, in which recalled distances for 
object location in the that condition (M = 1.77, SE = .68) were significantly further 
away than those in the this condition (M = -.07, SE = .79), p < .05. The this condition 
distances were also significantly closer than in the the condition (M = 1.3, SE = .59), 
                                                 
15 Although the coding was adjusted for the different distances, this does not detract from the 
results as the adjustments were conducted across the different language conditions. 
Figure 6. Object 
area in semantic 
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p < .05 (see Figure 7). This replicates the result of Experiment 1. There was also a 
main effect of location F(3,45) = 9.69, MSE = 29.77, p = .001, ηp² = .39, in which 
participants’ accuracy deteriorated as locations were further away. There was no 
interaction effect between demonstrative and location F(6,90) = 1.61, MSE = 9.26, p 
= .15, ηp² = .1, which means that the effect of language was the same across 
locations.  
 
Locations (in cm) from participants 
Figure 7. Behavioral data of Experiment 3, error-bars are 95% confidence 
intervals 
 
To see whether the language effects found were driven by a mechanism as 
hypothesized by the Expectation Model or the Attention Allocation Model, we next 
examined the gaze data collected during encoding. A 3 × 4 (demonstrative × 
location) analysis of object fixation time showed no effect of language, F(2,30) = 
.13, MSE = 1974647.31, p = .81, ηp² = .009 (“this” M = 5175.70, SE = 345.44; 
“that” M = 5230.97, SE = 257.65; “the” M = 5285.14, SE = 416.76) suggesting that 
the language effect is not driven by differences in attention (See Figure 8). There 
was a location effect F(3,45) = 4.66, MSE = 1997163.36, p < .01, ηp² = .24, showing 
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that participants fixated longer on locations further away. However, this location 
effect could be due to the differences in coding caused by distance, as explained in 
Figure 6. There was no interaction effect between demonstrative × location F(6,90) 
= .62, MSE = 1442394.41, p = .71, ηp² = .04.  
In a second analysis, we explored the connection between demonstratives and 
reference frames, and specifically to test whether people use different coordinate 
systems to remember object locations, based on spatial language. Fixations were 
coded as sagittal searching behavior, if a sequence of two or more fixations fell 
within a range on either side (left/ right) of the white location stick, the range being 
3.25cm from the sides for the closest location and 6.5cm from the furthest location. 
These distances were based on the size of an object on the respective location as 
represented on the screen (the actual objects had a diameter of 6.5cm). Fixations 
 
Location (in cm) from participants 
Figure 8. Gaze data from Experiment 3, based on summed fixation time on the 
objects in the respective language condition at the respective locations averaged 
per trial (in ms). Error-bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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were coded as searching behavior along the coronal line if a sequence of two or more 
fixations fell within a range above or below the object location. The range was half 
an objects’ size for the closest location and one objects’ size for the furthest location 
along the coronal plane. Fixations coded as fixations on the actual object were 
excluded from this analysis, so no fixation was used twice. After this coding, a ratio 
of fixations was calculated (coronal / (sagittal + coronal) (see Figure 7). A 3 × 4 
(demonstrative × location) ANOVA was performed.  There was no main effect for 
demonstrative F(2,30) = .15, MSE = .05, p = .86, ηp² = .01; “this” M = .42, SE = .07; 
“that” M = .4, SE = .09; “the” M = .42, SE = .08), nor location F(3,45) = .2.25, MSE 
= .16, p = .13, ηp² = .13, nor an interaction with distance, F(6,90) = .78, MSE = .05, 
p = .59, ηp² = .05, suggesting that the language effect was not caused by differences 
in search-behavior. Based on these data, we cannot distinguish between different 
models for the use of reference frames in memory for object location.  
5. General Discussion 
The results of all three experiments show that language affects memory for 
object location, with main effects of language in all three studies. The use of both 
demonstratives (Experiment 1 and 3) and possessives (Experiment 2) affects 
memory for object location. These results are consistent with previous studies 
showing an influence of language on memory for spatial relations (Feist & Gentner, 
2007; Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005), and also with the effects of object knowledge 
on object location memory reported by Coventry et al. (2014). We have found robust 
effects of language on object location memory together with an effect of distance on 
memory for object location. We first consider explanations for these results prior to 
implications for theories of language and memory more generally.  
Three possible accounts of the influence of language on object location 
memory were set out prior to designing the present series of experiments: the 
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congruence account, the expectation account, and an attention allocation model. The 
difference between the expectation and congruence models is the prediction of an 
interaction in the latter, and a main effect of language without an interaction in the 
former. The expectation model, proposed by Coventry et al. (2014), to explain object 
knowledge effects on memory, maintains that language elicits an expectation about 
an objects’ location which is concatenated with actual object location, leading to the 
prediction that the language effect should be the same for objects in near space and 
far space. In contrast, the congruence account predicts that memory should be better 
for trials in which language is congruent with the object location, predicting an 
interaction between language and location; congruent trials (where this/ that are 
respectively combined with near/ far space) should be remembered better than 
incongruent trials (in which this/ that are respectively combined with far/near 
space). In Experiments 1 and 3 there was no interaction, supporting the expectation 
account. In Experiment 2 (possessives) there was an interaction, but this effect was 
driven by the absence of a location effect for the “my” condition and not by 
congruence/incongruence contrasts. Thus, as a whole, results of the current 
experiments all support the expectation model. 
Experiment 3 tested the third possibility that different types of language 
might result in different amounts of attention being paid to objects/locations, with 
associated differences in memory performance. Put simply, the longer one spends 
looking at an object, the better one’s memory for object location. The eye tracking 
data from this experiment revealed no differences in viewing time as a function of 
demonstrative. Also participants did not present different searching behavior based 
on different demonstratives, allowing us to rule out the attention allocation model.  
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Given that the results support the expectation model, there are three keys 
issues that merit discussion. First, we can consider the relationship between the 
expectation model and memory models more broadly. Memory for object location is 
often taken to involve memory for the location in which an object is positioned, 
memory for the object itself, and a binding between object location and object (see 
for example Postma & Haan,1996). Previously, Coventry et al. (2014), finding 
effects of object knowledge on memory for object location, argued against memory 
models that prioritize object location over object knowledge (e.g. the model of Jiang 
et al., 2000, who argued that location may act as an anchor to which object properties 
are attached). However, the effects of language on memory for object location and 
the previous effects of object knowledge reported are consistent with variants of 
object file theory (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984), in which object location is one of 
the features integrated in the file. Location features appear not to be bound to an 
absolute location but are defined relative to an abstract representation, which leads to 
memory errors (see Hollingworth & Rasmussen, 2010; Pertzov, Dong, Peich, & 
Husain, 2012). This focus on relative location can explain how spatial language can 
cue memory for object location, via the expectation of the objects’ location relative 
to the speaker or another object. Wang and Spelke (2002) suggested that the human 
representational system depends in some way on language, by which humans can go 
beyond the limits of orientation systems as are found in animals. This influence of 
language skills may facilitate more flexible problem solving (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 
2001). One can speculate that the advantage is that such a relative, dynamic system 
enables us to mentally process arrays in different contexts (e.g. a desk or the 
universe), using the same language and concepts.  
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Second, one needs to unpack in more detail how the expectation model 
works, and in particular, how the expectation values form and how they combine 
with the actual distance information available. Coventry et al. (2014) do not offer 
detail regarding this, but they assume that the expectation model works via the 
prediction of object location as a product of the history and context of past bindings 
between language, objects and location. For example, objects owned by people are 
more likely to be near people than equivalent objects owned by someone else. This 
likelihood is then used to predict future encounters with objects: if an object is 
owned, one would anticipate the object is nearer than if one does not own the object. 
This anticipation works similarly for the visibility and familiarity parameters 
Coventry et al. (2014) identified. Respectively, visible objects are usually closer than 
objects one cannot see, and familiar objects are more likely to be near us than 
unfamiliar objects. This anticipation-mechanism could be accommodated by 
correlational learning (see Pulvermüller, 2012) - the process in which neurons that 
fire together strengthen their connections and become more tightly associated (also 
known as potentiation), and such a mechanism has been implicated not only in 
mapping language to perception (Coventry et al., 2013), but also how one learns how 
words co-occur to form meaningful language structures during language learning 
(Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Saffran, 2002).  
The Expectation Model can also be extended outside spatial language, both in 
cases where language is explicit during a task (as in our studies), but also in cases 
where language may not be explicit, but may nevertheless affect non-linguistic 
performance. For example evidence from color perception (Jerome S. Bruner et al., 
1951; Delk & Fillenbaum, 1965) has shown similar effects of the influence of object 
knowledge on memory. Object knowledge influences categorization of objects, so 
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that participants judge objects within a category to have a more similar hue than 
objects between categories. For example, in an array of letters and numbers, 
participants judged symbols within a respective category to be more similar in color 
than between categories, even if the two, between categories, target symbols were 
identically colored (Goldstone, 1995). In another series of studies, it was shown that 
color memory and color perception judgements are influenced by the characteristic 
color of an object, these object knowledge effects were stronger in objects with a 
high color diagnosticity (e.g. yellow for a banana) than in objects with low color 
diagnosticity (yellow for a lamp) (Belli, 1988; Jerome S. Bruner et al., 1951; Hansen 
et al., 2006; Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). These ‘top down’ effects on color perception 
are consistent with the idea that knowledge of expected hue combines with actual 
hue information leading to categorization errors. Such an account merits further 
testing in this domain.  
More broadly the Expectation Model is consistent with models of predictive 
coding (A. Clark, 2013; Friston, 2005). Clark (2013) suggests that people use 
prediction to minimize energy costs (the free-energy principle, Friston, 2009). In his 
model, the brain receives input from the perceptual system and uses existing 
knowledge to predict or anticipate the new state of the world based on that 
perceptual input (A. Clark, 2013; Friston, 2003). The brain prepares a response based 
on this prediction and only needs to process the error signal, the difference between 
the prediction and the updated visual input, once the new state of the world emerges. 
This means that instead of processing or ‘creating’ a full response, the brain only 
needs to adjust the predicted response to be appropriate to the actual input. In the 
Expectation Model, the prediction is based upon learned associations between 
language, objects and locations (for example via statistical/ correlational learning), 
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and it is these associations that can then reduce the work needed to process 
continually changing object location bindings on a moment to moment basis.  
A third issue that needs discussion is whether the effects of language operate 
at the level of encoding or retrieval. One possibility is that this, for example, actually 
activates peripersonal space more when looking at an object than that, and therefore 
that the memory differences are a direct result of differences in peripersonal space 
activation during encoding. Such a view is consistent with recent models of 
perception (e.g. Bar, 2009) that incorporate top-down predictions from memory as a 
mechanism during the act of perceiving. Alternatively, it is possible that the 
influence of language only occurs at retrieval, with remembered distances migrating 
in the direction of the remembered demonstrative/possessive. In order to test 
between these alternatives, it is possible to run neuroimaging studies to measure the 
degree of peripersonal space activation while viewing objects under different object 
knowledge and/or language conditions (see Coventry et al., 2014 for discussion). A 
second way one can get at this issue relates to memory decay: if the influence of 
language operates at retrieval, then the longer the time interval the greater the effects 
of language there should be. We are currently exploring these possibilities.   
In summary, we found a main effect of language (demonstratives and 
possessives) on memory for object location across experiments. We teased apart the 
predictions of three different models explaining this mechanism: the Expectation 
model, the Congruence model, and the Attention allocation model. Overall, results 
favored the Expectation model, suggesting that the expected location of an object – 
cued by language (e.g., this for referents close by; that for referents further away) – 
and the actual location are combined, leading to (mis)memory for object location.  
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Abstract 
In this study, the influence of two types of language on memory for object location was investigated: 
demonstratives (this, that) and possessives (my, your). Participants read instructions (containing 
this/that/my/your/the) to place objects at different locations. They then had to recall those object locations. 
Experiments 1 and 2 tested the contrasting predictions of two possible accounts of language on memory: the 
expectation model (Coventry et al., 2014) and the congruence account (Bonfiglioli et al., 2009). In Experiment 
3, the role of attention as a possible mechanism was investigated. The results across all three experiments 
show striking effects of language on object location memory; objects in the “that” and “your” condition were 
misremembered to be further away than objects in the “this” and “my” condition. The data favored the 
expectation model: expected location cued by language and actual location are concatenated leading to 
(mis)memory for object location.  
 
Keywords: memory for object location; spatial demonstratives; possessives  
 
Introduction 
Language is often used to direct the attention of a conspecific to the spatial 
world, and the pairing of language with visual images affects what is recalled about 
those images. For example, Loewenstein and Gentner (2005) found that children 
performed better in a mapping task when spatial relations were paired with spatial 
language at encoding. Relational language fosters the development of 
representational structures that facilitate mental processing (see also Hermer-
Vazquez, Spelke, & Katsnelson, 1999). But language presented with a spatial scene 
can also lead to memory errors. For instance, Feist and Gentner (2007) showed that 
recognition memory for spatial scenes was shifted in the direction of the spatial 
relational language (spatial prepositions) presented with scenes at encoding. 
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Although these studies show an effect of language on memory, it is not yet known 
how language affects memory. Here we focus on spatial demonstratives and 
possessives, and the possible effect these terms might have on memory for object 
location. In doing so, the continuous nature of object location memory errors allows 
us to contrast different possible mechanisms regarding how language affects memory 
for object location. 
Demonstratives (this, that) have been shown to be associated with discrete 
zones of peri-personal and extra-personal (near and far) space (Diessel, 2006). 
However, this distinction is flexible. Near space can be contracted or extended by 
weight or tool use (Coventry et al., 2008; Longo & Lourenco, 2006), and the use of 
“this” is similarly extended when participants use a stick to point at objects 
(Coventry et al., 2008). Object knowledge also affects both perception and memory 
for object location. For example, Balcetis and Dunning (2010) showed that 
participants perceived desirable objects as being closer to themselves than less 
desirable objects. Previous research has also shown that several object properties, 
including ownership, visibility, and familiarity, influence the use of spatial 
demonstratives in English and memory for object location (Coventry et al., 2014).  
In order to account for the influence of object knowledge on memory for 
object location (and by extrapolation, language), Coventry et al. (2014) proposed an 
expectation model. In this model, memory for object location is a function of the 
actual object location concatenated with where an object is expected to be (with a 
constant estimation error). For example, an object owned by the participant is 
expected to be nearer than an object owned by someone else. This results in the 
participant misremembering an object owned by someone else as further away than 
an object they owned at the same location. This expectation model also makes a 
prediction (tested below) regarding the direction of memory errors when 
demonstratives occur with objects at encoding. Specifically, it might be expected 
that “this” activates near space and “that” activates far space, and when conjoined 
with actual location, should lead to objects paired with “that” being 
(mis)remembered as being further away than they actually were (relative to objects 
paired with “this”). 
In contrast to the expectation model proposed by Coventry et al. (2014), there 
is a considerable body of work within an embodied cognition framework providing 
evidence for an alternative “congruence account” between language and space that 
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makes different predictions from the expectation model. For example, it has been 
shown that participants respond more quickly to positive stimuli in a congruent high 
location than an incongruent low location, and vice versa for negative stimuli (e.g. 
Barsalou, 2008; Meier & Robinson, 2004; cf. Lynott & Coventry, 2014). Moreover, 
this congruence account has been extended to movement planning where movements 
were prepared based on language (Bonfiglioli et al., 2009). Participants were 
required to grip an object after listening to an instruction that indicated whether the 
object was near or far; RTs were significantly longer when language was 
incongruent with space compared to when language and space were congruent. In 
extrapolating this congruence account to memory, congruence in language and space 
would be predicted to enhance the accuracy of memory for location. 
The goal of the present study was to test whether language affects memory 
for object location, and to unpack the mechanism involved. Specifically, we aimed to 
tease apart these two accounts by examining the effects of demonstratives and 
possessives on memory for object location. The first experiment tested whether 
spatial demonstratives affect memory for object location with contrasting predictions 
from the two different accounts of how language affects memory: congruence v. 
expectation. Experiment 2 tests whether similar effects occur for possessives (my, 
your) – terms which have also been associated with the peripersonal/ extrapersonal 
space distinction. Experiment 3 tests whether the effects found in Experiment 1 
might be a result of a third variable – i.e. language affecting the amount of attention 
paid to an object at a given location.  
 
Experiment 1 
This experiment tested whether spatial demonstratives paired with an object 
at encoding affected memory for object location. The main goal was to test between 
the expectation and congruence models. Critically the expectation model predicts a 
main effect of demonstrative on object location memory and the congruence account 
predicts an interaction between demonstrative and distance, such that memory 
should be more accurate when language and object location are congruent.   
Participants 
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In this study, 36 participants were tested. All were native English speakers receiving 
either course credit or payment for their participation. Stereoacuity was measured 
using the Randot Stereotest (Stereo Optical Inc. Chicago, USA) and participants who 
did not have a threshold of at least 40 arcseconds were excluded (N=2). Two 
additional participants were excluded because they produced more than 10% 
incorrect answers in the demonstrative memory task (see below). This left 32 
participants for the analyses, 9 male and 23 female, with an age range of 18 – 31 
years (M = 20.8, SD = 3.1). 
 
Materials 
Six distinguishable, different colored shapes on plastic discs (e.g. yellow triangle, 
blue heart), 6.5 cm in diameter, were placed on six different locations. The locations 
were spaced equidistantly along a midline from the participants’ edge of a large 
conference table (L = 320cm, W = 90cm), starting at 25cm from the participant up to 
150cm (Coventry, Valdés, Castillo, & Guijarro-Fuentes, 2008). The three dots that 
were closest to the participants were located within their peri-personal space, while 
the remaining three dots were within their extra-personal space (this was confirmed 
for each participant). The table was covered with a black cloth so that no spatial cues 
where present on the table. 
“Place that black 
cross on the yellow 
dot” 
“Further” 
Figure 1. The participant reads out the instruction card, then memorizes the object location 
and finally instructs the experimenter verbally to match the indication stick to the object 
location. 
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Procedure and Design 
Participants were asked to sit as close to the table as was comfortable, to ensure that 
all participants were approximately the same distance from the objects. Participants 
were told the experiment was testing memory for object location. On each trial, the 
participant read out an instruction card indicating the placement of an object on a 
location. The instructions all had the form: “Place DEMONSTRATIVE, OBJECT, 
on the COLOR dot” (e.g. Place this red triangle on the blue dot). Following the 
instruction participants closed their eyes while the experimenter placed the object as 
instructed. The participant was then given 10 seconds to memorize the object 
location, before the object and the dots were removed and the experimenter went 
behind a curtain to present an indication stick (to prevent the experimenter from 
cueing the participant). The participant verbally instructed the experimenter to match 
the near edge of the indication stick to the remembered near edge of the object 
location (thus ensuring that participants didn’t move and kept the same distance from 
the table throughout the experiment). At the end of each trial, participants were 
required to verbally indicate the demonstrative used on the instruction card to ensure 
they had attended to the instructions (see Figure 1). 
There were two demonstratives (this, that) and a neutral determiner (the), six 
locations and six objects. Participants were presented with six practice trials, after 
which 54 experimental trials were conducted (consisting of 3 trials of every term on 
every location: 3×3×6). The indication stick was presented at a distance of 10cm 
(counterbalanced to be further or nearer) from the actual object location. To prevent 
the initial placement of the indication stick becoming a cue for object location there 
were three filler trials within the first 10 trials, in which the indication stick was 
presented at 20cm from the object location. Remembered distance was measured in 
millimeters. When a participant couldn’t remember the demonstrative the trial was 
repeated at the end of the experiment (unless a participant couldn’t remember >10%, 
in that case s/he was excluded). At the end of the experiment reaching distance was 
measured to check that every participant could reach only the first three dots but not 
the furthest three dots. The “memory game” cover meant that participants were not 
aware that we were interested in the differences between demonstratives (confirmed 
during debrief). 
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Results and Discussion 
A 3 × 6 (demonstrative × location) ANOVA was performed on the difference (in 
millimeters) between the remembered position of the object and the actual position. 
There was a main effect of demonstrative F(2,62) = 6.68, p < .01, ηp² = .18, showing 
a direct effect of language on memory for object location: follow up t-tests showed 
significant differences between locations accompanied by the demonstrative “that” 
(M = 2.94, SD = .42) compared to both the “this” (M = 2.01, SD = .41) and “the” (M 
= 1.84, SD = .47) conditions (both p’s < .05; see Figure 216). There was a marginal 
effect of location F(5,155) = 2.33, p = .08, ηp² = .07, revealing that memory for 
object location deteriorated with distance. More importantly, there was no significant 
interaction between demonstrative and location F(10,310) = 1.4, p = .21, ηp² = .04. 
The results therefore support the expectation model rather than the congruence 
model; “that” leads to objects being misremembered as further away compared to 
“this”, irrespective of the congruence between the specific demonstrative and 
location. 
 
 
Experiment 2 
Some studies have shown that ownership influences memory for objects 
(Cunningham et al., 2008) and how people interact with objects (Constable, Kritikos, 
                                                 
16 On the Y-axis, the absolute difference is presented (cm). A positive value means that 
objects were remembered as being further away than they were.  
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& Bayliss, 2011). Coventry et al. (2014), using the memory game, found that object 
ownership affected memory for object location and demonstrative choice. In 
Experiment 2, we investigated whether possessives (my, your) have the same 
influence on memory for object location as demonstratives, with the prediction that 
“your” objects would be associated with misremembered distances further away 
compared to “my” objects. 
 
Participants 
In this study 39 participants were tested. All participants were native English 
speakers receiving either course credit or payment for their participation. 
Stereoacuity was measured as in Experiment 1. Two participants did not score a 
threshold of 40 arcseconds, two participants had more than 10% errors in the 
possessive memory task and one participant could not reach the second (50cm) dot. 
These participants were excluded from analysis, leaving 34 participants; 14 male and 
20 female, with an age range of 18 – 44 years (M = 23.8, SD = 4.9). 
 
Procedure and Design 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1, with the exception that the 
demonstratives were replaced with possessives (my, your).  
 
Results and Discussion 
A 3 × 6 (possessive: my, your, the × location) ANOVA was performed on the 
difference (in millimeters) between the actual position of an object and the 
memorized position. There was a main effect of possessive F(2,66) = 8.25, p = .001, 
ηp² = .2, showing that objects in the “your” condition (M = 1.89, SD = .43) were 
remembered significantly further away than objects in both the “my” condition (M = 
.81, SD = .34) and the “the” condition (M = 1.11, SD = .34), both p < .05; See 
Figure 3). A significant effect of location was found F(5,165) = 3.47, p = .01, ηp² = 
.1, showing that accuracy deteriorated as the objects were placed further away. 
Additionally there was an interaction between possessive and location F(10,330) = 
2.25, p = .03, ηp² = .06. This effect indicates that the influence of language is 
different at different locations. To unpack this interaction three one-way ANOVAs 
were performed, to test location effects per term. These showed that there was only a 
reliable peri-personal/extra-personal effect in the “your” and “the” conditions (p < 
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.05). This effect was absent in the “my” condition (p > .05; see Figure 3). This 
suggests that memory for possessed objects maybe particularly enhanced, overriding 
any effect of peri-personal versus extra-personal space. Note that this interaction 
effect is not as predicted by the congruency account (congruence between language 
and space should lead to more accuracy; this is not what was found). 
 
Experiment 3 
So far the results support the expectation account. However, there is a third, 
alternative account that we have thus far not considered. It could be the case that 
“this” causes participants to look at an object and object location for longer than 
“that”, leading to better accuracy of recall. In this experiment, we used eye tracking 
to investigate this alternative hypothesis.  
 
Participants 
In this experiment, 19 participants were tested. All participants were native English 
speakers receiving either course credit or payment for their participation. 
Stereoacuity was measured as in Experiment 1; all participants had appropriate depth 
perception and their reach stretched between the 75cm and 100cm location. For three 
participants the eye-tracker could not be calibrated. These participants were excluded 
from analysis. This left 16 suitable participants for the analyses, 5 male and 11 
female, with an age range of 18 – 22 years (M = 19.2, SD = 1.2).  
 
Procedure and Design                                                                  
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The procedure was based on Experiments 1 and 2, but in this experiment, 
participants wore SMI eye-tracker glasses (30Hz binocular eye tracking glasses). For 
this reason, only 4 positions were used (the first location was too close for the eye-
tracker and the furthest location was not useable because the area of interest was too 
distorted). Before the experiment started the glasses were calibrated using marks on 
the wall. After that, calibration was validated four times throughout the experiment 
by having participants look at the four different locations on the table. The eye-
tracking data were coded using semantic gaze mapping17. As the visual angle from 
the participant to the object was different for every location, the standard error in 
calibration was slightly different per location. These differences in error had to be 
accounted for in the semantic gaze mapping. Therefore the coding was slightly less 
stringent for further locations compared to closer locations. For the furthest location 
any fixation within 6.5 cm of the object was marked as a fixation on the object. In 
the nearest location any fixation within half an object’s size of the object was marked 
as a fixation on the object (see Figure 5). The gaze mapping data were used in a 3 × 
4 (demonstrative × location) design, investigating the differences in total fixation 
time (ms) on the object. 
 
Results and Discussion 
The memory data was first analyzed in a 3 × 4 (demonstrative × location) ANOVA. 
A main effect of demonstrative was found F(2,30) = 5.77, p < .01, ηp² = .28, in 
                                                 
17 This involves the manual coding of video-based eye- 
tracking data, by which fixations are coded on a gaze map. 
   Location (in cm) from participants 
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 3. Error-bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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which recalled distances for object location in the “this” condition (M = -.07, SD = 
.79) were closer than in the “that” condition (M = 1.77, SD = .68) and the “the” 
condition (M = 1.2, SD = .59), both p < .05 (See Figure 4). The significant difference 
between the “this” and “that” condition is consistent with the results of Experiment 
1. There was also a main effect of location F(3,45) = 9.69, p = .001, ηp² = .39, in 
which participants’ accuracy deteriorated as locations were further away. There was 
no interaction effect between demonstrative and location F(6,90) = 1.61, p = .15, ηp² 
= .1, which means that the effect of language was the same across locations.  
Regarding the gaze data; there was no significant difference in the amount of 
time objects were fixated as a result of language condition F(2,30) = .13, p = .81, ηp² 
= .009, suggesting that language doesn’t change the amount of time participants 
attended to a specific object/location. There was a location effect F(3,45) = 4.66, p < 
.01, ηp² = .24, showing that participants fixated longer on locations further away, 
although the lack of measurement accuracy in the far locations may have influenced 
this effect. There was no interaction effect between demonstrative × location F(6,90) 
= .62, p = .71, ηp² = .04, meaning that the influence of language was similar across 
different location conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
The results of all three experiments show that language affects memory for object 
location, with main effects of language in all cases. The use of both demonstratives 
(Experiment 1 and 3) and possessives (Experiment 2) affects memory for object 
location. These results are consistent with previous studies showing an influence of 
language on memory for spatial relations (Feist & Gentner, 2007; Loewenstein & 
Gentner, 2005), but our results show the first evidence of the influence of language 
Figure 5. Object area in 
semantic gaze mapping 
 
Appendices 
206 
 
on memory for object location. The results are also consistent with the manipulations 
of object knowledge on object location memory reported by Coventry et al. (2014). 
In addition to the influence of language on object location memory, the 
experiments also revealed effects of location (the effect was marginal in Experiment 
1), suggesting that participants’ memory for object location deteriorates as the object 
is further away. These results again replicate effects of distance found in Coventry et 
al. (2014), and provide further evidence of the mapping between perceptual space 
and language and memory.  
In these experiments, we have also been able to test between rival accounts of the 
influence of language on object location memory - the congruence account and the 
expectation account. We also considered a further possibility that language might 
affect the amount of time participants fixate an object. The difference between the 
expectation and congruence models is the prediction of an interaction effect in the 
latter, and the absence of an interaction effect in the former. The expectation account 
maintains that language elicits an expectation about an objects’ location which is 
concatenated with actual object location, leading to the prediction that the language 
effect should be the same for objects in near space and far space. In contrast, the 
extended congruence account predicts that memory should be better for trials in 
which language is congruent with the situation, predicting an interaction effect 
between language and location; congruent trials (where this/ that are respectively 
combined with near/ far space) should be remembered better than incongruent trials 
(in which this/ that are respectively combined with far/near space). In Experiments 1 
and 3 there was no interaction, supporting the expectation account. In Experiment 2 
there was an interaction. However, this effect was driven by the absence of a location 
effect for the “my” condition and not by congruence/incongruence contrasts. Thus, 
as a whole, results of the current experiments all support the expectation account.  
Experiment 3 tested the third possibility that different types of language might 
result in different amounts of attention being paid to objects/locations, with 
associated differences in memory performance. Put simply, the longer one spends 
looking at an object, the better one’s memory for object location. The eye tracking 
data from this experiment revealed no differences in fixations on objects as a 
function of demonstrative, allowing us to discount this third possibility.  
Overall the results support the expectation model. However, it remains to be 
established if this model operates at the level of encoding or at retrieval. One 
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possibility is that “this”, for example, actually activates peripersonal space more 
when looking at an object than “that”, and therefore that the memory differences are 
a direct result of differences in peripersonal space activation during encoding. Such a 
view is consistent with recent models of perception (e.g. Bar, 2009) that incorporate 
top down predictions from memory as a mechanism during the act of perceiving. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the influence of language only occurs at retrieval, 
with remembered distances migrating in the direction of the remembered 
demonstrative/possessive. In order to test between these alternatives, it is possible to 
run neuroimaging studies to measure the degree of peripersonal space activation 
while viewing objects under different object knowledge and/or language conditions 
(see Coventry et al., 2014 for discussion). We are currently exploring this possibility.  
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Appendix C 
Abstract published for the 39th annual conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society (Gudde & Coventry, in press): 
 
Demonstratives are among the most frequent words in all languages, but 
demonstrative systems vary considerably between languages. In two experiments, 
we tested demonstrative use and the influence of demonstratives on spatial memory 
in Japanese and English – languages with purportedly very different demonstrative 
systems. Participants engaged in a ‘memory game’, tapping their use of 
demonstratives to describe objects located on the sagittal plane (Experiment 1) and 
the influence of demonstratives on memory for object location (Experiment 2). In 
addition to distance from speaker, the experiments also manipulated the position of a 
conspecific (next to or opposite participants). Distance and position of conspecific 
both affected demonstrative choice and memory in Japanese, with similar effects in 
English even though English does not explicitly encode the position of a conspecific. 
We discuss possible universals underlying demonstrative systems and the influence 
of language on memory. 
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Appendix D 
Information sheets for the memory game. 
 
  
Memory for Object Location 
 
Participant Information Sheet  
         
Thank you for your interest in this study. Before you decide whether to take part, 
please read the following information carefully (this sheet is for you to keep). You 
may ask me any questions if you would like more information. 
 
What is this research looking at? 
The aim of this study is to look at memory for objects and their location when they 
are no longer in view. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and go through 
this information sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to sign a 
consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. This 
would not affect you in any way. 
 
What will happen if I agree to take part? The task involves watching objects being 
placed at various locations on a table. You will be asked to look at and remember 
the object’s location for a few seconds. At the end of this part of the study you will 
be asked a couple of questions about the objects you have seen. 
 
The study should take approximately one hour. 
 
Are there any problems with taking part? There should be no problems that occur 
during the study, however you will be asked to sit at a table for the duration of the 
study.  
 
Will it help me if I take part? There will no direct benefit to you in taking part, you 
will however be contributing to the research here at the University and to our 
knowledge of how people remember objects and object locations. 
 
How will you store the information that I give you? All information which you 
provide during the study will be stored in accordance with the 1998 Data Protection 
Act and kept strictly confidential. The chief investigator will be the custodian of the 
anonymous research data. All data will be kept for 5 years, and will then be securely 
disposed of. All the data collected from the study will be stored anonymously on a 
password protected computer. Your consent form will be kept separately in a 
locked filing cabinet. Only the research team will have access to your data. 
 
School of Psychology 
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How will the data be used? Your anonymous data will be collated together with 
other data collected during the study. This collated date may be presented in 
scientific journal articles or presented to conferences. Neither you nor your 
individual data will be identifiable able amongst this group data.  
 
What happens if I agree to take part, but change my mind later? If you decide to 
withdraw during the study please let the investigator know. Any personal 
information or data that you have provided will be destroyed immediately. After 
you have completed the study you can still withdraw your personal information and 
data be contacting the investigator (Harmen Gudde: h.gudde@uea.ac.uk) within 
one month of the study. After this time the data will have been collated and may 
have been submitted for publication.   
 
How do I know that this research is safe for me to take part in? All research within 
the University is looked at by an independent group of people, called a Research 
Ethics Committee, to protect your safety, rights, wellbeing and dignity. This 
research was approved by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of East Anglia.   
 
You are under no obligation to agree to take part in this research. 
If you do agree you can withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
Contacts 
You are welcome to discuss your participation with the experimenter, Harmen 
Gudde: H.Gudde@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 591638 or the Principal Investigator, 
Head of School Professor Kenny Coventry: K.Coventry@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 
597145.  
If you have any worries or concerns about this research you want to share with 
someone not involved in the study you may contact: Chair of the Ethics Committee 
Dr. Piers Fleming, P.Fleming@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 59 3386 . 
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Consent Form  
Memory for Object Location  
Name of Researcher: Harmen Gudde 
 
1. I have read and understand the information sheet Memory 
for Object Location and have had the opportunity to 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.                                             
 
2. My participation is voluntary and I know that I am free to withdraw at any time,  
without giving any reason and without it affecting me at all  
 
3. I know that no personal information (such as my name) will be shared  
outside of the research team or published in the final report(s) from this 
research 
4. I agree to take part in the above study 
 
Participant’s signature……………………………………………Date……………………….. 
 
Researcher Contact details: 
Harmen Gudde, email: h.gudde@uea.ac.uk 
 
Do also contact us if you have any worries or concerns about this 
research. 
School of Psychology Ethics Committee: 
ethics.psychology@uea.ac.uk;  Phone 01603 597146 
Head of School Professor Kenny Coventry: 
k.coventry@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 597145  
  
School of Psychology 
 
 
Please initial all boxes 
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“Memory for Object Location” 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. Your help with our 
work is greatly appreciated. Research in Psychology is only possible with the time 
and effort that participants generously give up. Your assistance today has made a 
genuine contribution to the Psychology research in the School, and the field in 
general. 
 
In this research we are investigating the way language influences peoples 
memory for object location. At every presentation we altered the use of language 
to prime your memory. Using the real position of the object compared to the 
position you directed the researcher to we can see whether the language that was 
used actually changed your memory. This research can be useful for integrating 
natural language interfaces in computer systems. 
 
NB Please refrain from sharing any of the information and hypotheses you 
have received during or after the experiment with individuals who may also take 
part in this study. 
 
The data we have received through your participation will be analysed 
anonymously with the data we have gathered from other participants. Note that 
you may request your data to be removed from the sample at any time. 
  
All information which you provided during the study will be stored in 
accordance with the 1998 Data Protection Act and kept strictly confidential. The 
chief investigator will be the custodian of the anonymous research data. All data 
will be kept for 5 years, and will then be securely disposed of. All data will be 
secured by a password, but your contacts will be kept separate from your results. 
No data will be shared with anyone that is not involved in the study. 
 
 
Contacts 
This study has been cleared in accordance with the ethical review processes 
of the University of East Anglia and within the guidelines of the British Psychology 
Society.  
You are welcome to discuss your participation with the experimenter, 
Harmen Gudde: H.Gudde@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 591638 or the Principal 
Investigator, Head of School Professor Kenny Coventry: K.Coventry@uea.ac.uk; 
Phone 01603 597145.  
If you have any worries or concerns about this research you want to share 
with someone not involved in the study you may contact: Chair of the Ethics 
Committee Dr. Piers Fleming, P.Fleming@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 59 3386 . 
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Appendix E 
Information sheets for Experiment 9. 
 
Participant Information Sheet  
Thank you for your interest in this study. Before you decide whether to take part, 
please read the following information carefully (this sheet is for you to keep). You 
may ask any questions if you would like more information. 
 
What will I do in this research? 
In this experiment you will see some simple spatial relations that you have to describe while your 
eye-movements are measured with the eye-tracker. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide to join the study. We will describe the study and go through this information 
sheet. If you agree to take part, we will then ask you to sign a consent form. You are free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. This would not affect you in any way. 
 
What will happen if I agree to take part?  
If you agree you will be asked to describe some spatial situations that are presented on the screen. 
The experiment will take about 5 minutes. 
 
Will it help me if I take part? 
Taking part in this study will probably not help you personally, but by participating you will benefit 
the programme of research at the School of Psychology at UEA. It is therefore very much 
appreciated if you would take part. 
 
How will you store the information that I give you? 
All information you provided during the study will be stored in accordance with the 1998 Data 
Protection Act and kept strictly confidential. The chief investigator will be the custodian of the 
anonymous research data. All data will be secured by a password and your contacts will be kept 
separate from your results. No data will be shared with anyone that is not involved in the study. 
Anonymized data will be stored in line with open practice. 
 
How will the data be used? 
All data will be anonymised, processed and might be analysed. Data may be presented in journals 
and at conferences.  
 
What happens if I agree to take part, but change my mind later? 
You have the right to withdraw during the experiment and up until you leave the lab. After this time 
it will no longer be possible to identify your data for withdrawal since your experimental data is not 
paired with your name.  
 
How do I know that this research is safe for me to take part in? 
This study has been cleared in accordance with the ethical review processes of the University of East 
Anglia and within the guidelines of the British Psychology Society. For any questions please contact 
the Experimenter, Principal Investigator or Chair of the Ethics Committee, contacts are shown 
below. 
 
You are under no obligation to agree to take part in this research. 
If you do agree you can withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
Contacts 
You are welcome to discuss your participation with the experimenter, Harmen Gudde: H.Gudde@uea.ac.uk; 
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Phone 01603 591638 or the Principal Investigator, Head of School Professor Kenny Coventry: 
K.Coventry@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 597145.  
If you have any worries or concerns about this research you want to share with someone not involved in the 
study you may contact: Chair of the Ethics Committee Dr. Piers Flemming, P.Fleming@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 
59 3386 . 
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Consent Form  
Object location in static visual scenes  
Name of Researcher: Harmen Gudde 
 
5. I have read and understand the information sheet (Object 
location in static visual scenes) and have had the 
opportunity to questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily.                                             
 
6. My participation is voluntary and I know that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason and without it affecting me at all  
 
7. I know that no personal information (such as my name) will be shared outside 
of the research team or published in the final report(s) from this research 
 
8. I agree to take part in the above study 
 
Participant’s signature……………………………………………Date……………………….. 
 
Researcher Contact details: 
Harmen Gudde 
H.Gudde@uea.ac.uk 
Tel:  +44 (0)1603 59 1638 
 
 
Do also contact us if you have any worries or concerns about this 
research. 
 School of Psychology Ethics Committee: 
ethics.psychology@uea.ac.uk;  Phone 01603 597146 
Head of School Professor Kenny Coventry: 
K.Coventry@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 597145  
  
Please initial all boxes 
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“Object Location in Static Visual Scenes” 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
Thank you for participating in this study. Your help with our work is greatly 
appreciated. Research in Psychology is only possible with the time and effort that 
participants generously give up. Your assistance today has made a genuine 
contribution to the Psychology research in the School, and the field in general. 
 
In this research we are investigating the way people describe spatial 
situations. Using the eye-tracker we measured your eye movements to see which 
areas of interest you have checked when you analysed and described each of the 
situations we have presented. This research can be useful for integrating natural 
language interfaces in computer systems. 
 
NB Please refrain from sharing any of the information and hypotheses you 
have received during or after the experiment with individuals who may also take 
part in this study. 
 
The data we have received through your participation will be analysed 
anonymously with the data we have gathered from other participants. Note that 
you may request your data to be removed from the sample at any time. 
  
All information which you provided during the study will be stored in 
accordance with the 1998 Data Protection Act and kept strictly confidential. The 
chief investigator will be the custodian of the anonymous research data. All data 
will be kept for 5 years, and will then be securely disposed of. All data will be 
secured by a password, but your contacts will be kept separate from your results. 
No data will be shared with anyone that is not involved in the study. 
 
 
Contacts 
This study has been cleared in accordance with the ethical review processes 
of the University of East Anglia and within the guidelines of the British Psychology 
Society.  
You are welcome to discuss your participation with the experimenter, 
Harmen Gudde: H.Gudde@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 591638 or the Principal 
Investigator, Head of School Professor Kenny Coventry: K.Coventry@uea.ac.uk; 
Phone 01603 597145.  
If you have any worries or concerns about this research you want to share 
with someone not involved in the study you may contact: Chair of the Ethics 
Committee Dr. Piers Flemming, P.Fleming@uea.ac.uk; Phone 01603 59 3386 . 
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Appendix F 
 
Object-pairs used in the probe trials of study 4.1 
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